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General abstract 
There is something extraordinary about human culture. The striking 
complexity of our technologies, institutions, beliefs, and norms has allowed us 
to colonise the entire planet. One aspect in which human culture is unique 
relates to its cumulative nature – we accumulate and build on knowledge from 
the previous generations, leading to incremental improvement in skill, which 
allows us to produce technologies no one individual could have invented on 
their own. Understanding the drivers and dynamics of this type of cumulative 
culture is essential for understanding how human culture has interacted with 
human evolution. This thesis is concerned with precisely that, and uses a 
mixture of theoretical and experimental approaches linking individual-level 
decisions to population-level processes in cumulative culture contexts.  
Chapter 1 provides some essential background information. In Chapter 2 I 
used an agent-based simulation model to show that refinement, or 
incremental improvement in cultural traits, can lead to a drastic decrease of 
cultural diversity at the population level. This pattern was confirmed using 
experimental data from a collaborative programming competition in Chapter 
3, where I showed that in a cumulative setting, the differential riskiness of 
copying and innovation drives participants to converge on very similar 
solutions, leading to a loss of cultural diversity. In Chapter 4 I explored 
individual differences in social learning strategies, finding considerable 
variation in how individuals rely on copying, with more successful individuals 
being more exploratory. I found that successful individuals had more 
influence on subsequent entries, which is consistent with a prestige bias. 
Finally, Chapter 5 addressed the link between group structure, diversity, and 
cumulative improvement. I found that larger groups accumulate more 
improvement than smaller groups, but smaller groups can also inhibit the 
convergence patterns we witnessed in larger groups, suggesting an optimal 
level of connectivity responsible for cumulative improvement.  
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1. Introduction 
Humans have been incredibly successful at colonising practically the entire 
planet, and this success relies to a large extent on our cultural abilities. Useful 
innovations and technologies spread through social learning, were maintained 
and improved over time, becoming more and more crucial to our survival in 
unfamiliar environments. Today, we depend on technology so complex that no 
one individual could invent in their entire lifetime, to the point that we would 
be helpless without it (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Tomasello, 1999). There is 
little doubt that culture has contributed to our ability to adapt to different 
environments (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Mathew and Perreault, 2015; 
Henrich, 2016), which raises the question of why humans differ so much from 
every other animal species in our overwhelming reliance on cultural learning.  
This puzzle has only come more into focus in recent years as some scientists 
have increasingly argued that we are not the only species to show culture. 
Evidence has been steadily accumulating over the past 50 years pointing to 
the fact that many species  show behavioural patterns shared between two or 
more individuals, which persist over time and are acquired through learning 
from other individuals (Fragaszy and Perry, 2003). From instances of 
circumstantial evidence of milk-bottle opening in birds (Fisher and Hinde, 
1949; Hinde and Fisher, 1951) and sweet potato washing in Japanese 
macaques (Kawamura, 1959; Kawai, 1965), to examples from black rats 
(Terkel, 1995), dolphins and whales (Rendell and Whitehead, 2001), 
chimpanzees (Whiten et al., 1999), orangutans (van Schaik et al., 2003), and 
capuchins (Perry et al., 2003), the evidence ensures the issue of animal 
culture is currently a very active field (Allen et al., 2013; van de Waal, 
Borgeaud and Whiten, 2013; Aplin et al., 2014).  
Nonetheless, few argue that the kind of culture we see in humans is 
qualitatively equivalent to the culture we see in other non-human species. 
Other species, for instance, learn skills from each other, maintain those skills 
over generations, and show group differences in the way they use those skills 
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that cannot be attributed to ecological or genetic variation, but these skills do 
not seem to change much from one generation to the next. Humans, on the 
contrary, accumulate and build on previous generations’ knowledge, which 
leads to an improvement in skill and an increase in complexity. Is it this type 
of cumulative culture, producing a “ratcheting” in complexity of skill, which is 
specific to humans (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner, 
1993; Kurzban and Barrett, 2012). The question of why cumulative culture is 
so rare when there is ample evidence of cultural processes in more and more 
species is therefore key to understanding what makes humans unique. 
The field of cultural evolution, stemming from the idea that cultural change 
can be described using the Darwinian principles of evolution, is concerned 
with answering questions about why the ability for culture evolved, how 
cultural systems change over time, what explains the patterns of cultural 
diversity we witness, and, ultimately, how and why human culture is unique 
(Mesoudi, 2011b). Cultural evolution took off as a field once it was formalised 
mathematically in the 1980s by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, and Boyd and 
Richerson, using theoretical models adapted from biology to investigate the 
conditions under which culture is expected to evolve, based on the premise 
that culture is beneficial and shaped by natural selection (Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985).   
In the past 20 years the field has flourished, and while mathematical 
modelling still guides much of the work (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; McElreath 
et al., 2005; Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Rendell et al., 2010; Fogarty et al., 
2017), methodological approaches have extended to include laboratory 
experiments testing the predictions of those models (Caldwell and Millen, 
2008; Kirby, Cornish and Smith, 2008; Mesoudi, 2008; Derex, Godelle and 
Raymond, 2013; Morgan et al., 2015), as well as studies testing predictions 
using real data from the field (Henrich and Henrich, 2010; Hewlett et al., 
2011; Berl and Hewlett, 2015). Additionally, studies using phylogenetic 
comparative methods have been used to reconstruct evolutionary 
relationships between cultural traits such as languages (Atkinson et al., 2008; 
Pagel, 2009; Dunn et al., 2011), cultural artefacts (Tehrani and Collard, 2002; 
Tehrani, 2013; O’Brien et al., 2014), or social norms (Jordan et al., 2009; 
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Kushnick, Gray and Jordan, 2014). Finally, comparative studies have been 
used to investigate the cognitive differences between humans and other non-
human species (Horner et al., 2006; Pike and Laland, 2010; Dean et al., 
2012). This mix of theoretical and empirical methods, investigating questions 
ranging from how individual-level decisions interact in micro-evolutionary 
settings, and how in turn these translate into macro-evolutionary patterns 
over long periods of time, puts the field of cultural evolution in a unique 
position, spanning multiple disciplines concerned with the evolution of 
human behaviour, that allows multiple strands of evidence to connect in 
painting a still complicated picture of a complex phenomenon (Mesoudi, 
2011b). This thesis similarly combines theoretical and empirical approaches to 
understand individual-level and population-level patterns relating to 
cumulative culture, which for the purposes of this work is defined as the 
incremental accumulation of knowledge over generations that leads to 
technologies that no one individual could have invented in their own lifetime, 
and results in patterns of descent with modification. This definition reflects 
closely Boyd and Richerson’s position on culture (Boyd and Richerson, 1985), 
but a discussion of alternative interpretations will follow in subsequent 
sections.  
1.1. Why humans? 
Why is human cumulative culture so different from anything else we see in 
other animal species? Various explanations have been put forward, ranging 
from cognitive differences, social structure and demographic factors, and the 
dynamics of cultural evolution itself (see Dean et al., 2013 for a review). Some 
of the influential theories suggest that humans are unique in the way they 
preserve culture from one generation to the next, and this fidelity of 
transmission is essential for maintaining useful information in a population 
and building on it (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Tomasello, 1999). Tomasello 
(1999) goes even further, suggesting fidelity of transmission is crucially 
supported by understanding intentionality in other individuals, thus putting 
theory of mind at the core of cumulative culture.  
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Alternatively, increased sociality in humans would provide individuals with 
more opportunities for observation and learning (Pradhan, Tennie and van 
Schaik, 2012). Studies of modern hunter-gatherer societies seem to support 
this view, indicating that sociality could be a key factor leading to the 
evolution of cooperation (Apicella et al., 2012), or even cumulative culture 
(Hill et al., 2014). Another theory suggests demographic factors like 
population density, social organization, and intergroup competition, rather 
than complex cognitive mechanisms, might be key in explaining cumulative 
culture (Henrich, 2004; Powell, Shennan and Thomas, 2009; Kline and Boyd, 
2010). Finally, the emergence of human culture might not be due to a single 
factor like a sudden cognitive development or drastic change in population 
structure, but could rather be the result of an interplay of multiple factors, 
small adaptations magnified at the population level, interacting and co-
evolving through time over many generations to drive humans into the 
radically distinct cultural regime we witness today (Morgan et al., 2015). Most 
of the cultural evolution field indeed takes this view (Richerson and Boyd, 
2005; Henrich, 2016; Laland, 2017), studying how population-level processes 
magnify small individual biases, how learning biases and cultural traits 
reinforce each other and co-evolve, to the extent that cultural becomes an 
additional inheritance system, co-evolving with genetic inheritance.  
1.2. Comparative studies of cumulative culture  
Comparative studies of culture are generally concerned with identifying the 
cognitive similarities and differences between humans and other non-human 
animals that would contribute to our differences in culture. A first suggestion 
regarding these differences stems from the observation that humans tend to 
learn through imitation, for example accurately copying bodily movement 
while making a tool, while non-human primates seem to rely on emulation, or 
focusing on the results of another’s actions without faithful replication of the 
process required to achieve those results (Tomasello, 1996; Legare, 2017).  
This is further supported by humans’ apparent tendency to ‘over-imitate’, or 
imitate functionally irrelevant actions. Children readily imitate irrelevant 
actions both in an opaque puzzle task and in a transparent task, in which it is 
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obvious which actions are required for solving the puzzle. Chimpanzees, on 
the other hand, arguably rationally imitate all actions in the opaque condition, 
but stop imitating irrelevant actions in the transparent condition (Horner and 
Whiten, 2005). Children over-imitate even when specifically instructed to 
only copy relevant actions, when the social pressure is diminished, under 
competition, and under time constraints (Lyons, Young and Keil, 2007; Flynn, 
2008; Lyons et al., 2011), and over-imitation seems to occur even in adults 
(Flynn and Smith, 2012). However, this phenomenon breaks down when 
children are copying their peers (Flynn, 2008), or when the actions appear 
unintentional (Lyons et al., 2011). It is still unclear whether over-imitation is 
driven by a human predilection for imitation, so strong that it becomes the 
default way to learn even when in situations when it is not necessary, or 
whether over-imitation is the result of a higher social motivation in humans, 
which manifests even in experimental settings (Heyes, 2012b).  
Whiten et al. (2007) suggest that the explanation for the human-chimpanzee 
difference in culture might be attributed to behavioural conservatism. 
Chimpanzees can learn socially and sustain traditions within groups (Whiten 
et al., 2007), yet in a study using a honey-dipping task that could be solved 
using two techniques, the second more complex, but more rewarding, 
chimpanzees failed to switch to the second technique, persisting in using the 
first technique they had acquired (Marshall-Pescini and Whiten, 2008). This 
result is not isolated (Hrubesch, Preuschoft and van Schaik, 2009; Gruber et 
al., 2011), and a more recent comparative study sheds some light on the 
differences between humans and primates in terms of cumulative culture 
(Dean et al., 2012). The authors presented children, chimpanzees, and 
capuchin monkeys with an equivalent puzzle box that could be solved at three 
levels of difficulty, each more difficult, building on the previous one, but more 
rewarding. Results indicate that humans, but not the other two groups, 
manage to advance successfully to higher levels because of a package of socio-
cognitive mechanisms such as teaching, imitation, and pro-sociality.  
Several authors propose that signs of cumulative culture are present in other 
species apart from humans, giving examples of tools that seemingly increase 
in complexity used by chimpanzees and New Caledonian crows (Boesch, 
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2003; Hunt and Gray, 2003), or the use of the same tool in a more efficient 
way in chimpanzees (Yamamoto, Humle and Tanaka, 2013). While there is 
convincing evidence that the maintenance and use of these tools are culturally 
mediated, the history of the development of the tools is unknown, and 
therefore it is unclear whether they have been the product of a genuine 
cumulative cultural process in which the newer and more efficient versions of 
the tool are built through incremental improvement on older versions. Using 
controlled experimental approaches involving transmission chains, two 
studies have shown that repeated learning in other species can lead to an 
increase in efficiency (Sasaki and Biro, 2017) or learnability (Claidiere et al., 
2014), but not the combination of efficiency and complexity that typically 
characterises cumulative culture. Therefore whether cumulative cultural 
evolution is a uniquely human process remains an open question.  
1.3. Studies of social learning 
Social learning, or learning influenced by contact with other individuals 
(Heyes, 1994), is essential for spreading beneficial behaviours in a cultural 
species. Intuitively, social learning should be advantageous when it allows 
bypassing the cost of trial-and-error learning, and indeed the entire cultural 
evolution field is based on the assumption that social learning is beneficial 
and shaped by natural selection. At the core of this is the idea that social 
learning is adaptive and has been selected for in cultural species, and much of 
the early work in the field has focused on identifying the conditions under 
which social learning would evolve. Although intuitive, the benefits of social 
learning over individual learning are not immediately obvious (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985; Rogers, 1988; Giraldeau, Valone and Templeton, 2002; 
Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Rieucau and Giraldeau, 2011). 
An important starting point in the theoretical study of social learning was a 
simple though experiment designed by Rogers (Rogers, 1988), who simulated 
a population of social and individual learners in a changing environment. In 
this context, social learning does not increase the mean population fitness. 
When social learners are rare, most individuals learn through trial-and-error, 
accurately sampling the environment and collecting useful information, so 
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social learning provides cheap and beneficial information. As social learners 
increase in frequency, the number of individuals sampling the environment 
and collecting accurate information decreases. As the environment changes, 
social learners increasingly copy out-dated information (Feldman, Aoki and 
Kumm, 1996). The population thus reaches equilibrium when both social 
learners and asocial learners coexist with the same average fitness.  
Rogers’ paradox, then, is the surprising result that social learning does not 
seem to be adaptive compared to individual learning. The solution to this 
apparent conundrum lies in allowing individuals to adopt a flexible strategy 
that involves selective use of both social and asocial learning (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1995; Kameda and Nakanishi, 2003; Enquist and Eriksson, 2007; 
Rendell, Fogarty and Laland, 2010), which, it seems, is something that most 
humans also employ (Mesoudi, 2008). For instance, Enquist and Eriksson 
propose a learning approach called critical social learning, where individuals 
use social learning as a default, but switch to asocial learning if they fail to 
acquire the adaptive trait, thus outcompeting pure social learners and pure 
individual learners (Enquist and Eriksson, 2007). Indeed, evidence from 
experimental studies indicates that humans do selectively switch between 
strategies while completing social transmission tasks (Mesoudi, 2008, 2011a), 
though some studies find a polymorphism, with people exhibiting individual 
differences in their use of social learning (Kameda and Nakanishi, 2002; 
Efferson et al., 2008). 
Thus, in a changing environment, individuals should use specific rules, ‘social 
learning strategies’, which dictates the circumstances under which individuals 
should exploit information from others, and who they should learn from 
(Laland, 2004; see Rendell et al., 2011 for a review of both the theoretical and 
experimental literature). These rules specify when an individual should copy 
(for instance, ‘copy when uncertain’, ‘copy when dissatisfied’), what cultural 
traits they should copy, and which individuals they should focus on. A 
distinction was made between context biases, like frequency-dependent 
biases, in which case the identity of the trait copied depends on how frequent 
it is in the population, conformity being a prime example, and content biases, 
like payoff-bias, in which case the identity of the trait copied depends on how 
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beneficial it is inherently (Laland, 2004). It has been argued that payoff-bias 
would be cognitively costly, as it requires that individuals accurately assess 
how beneficial a trait is, while a conformist bias could be used as a heuristic 
easily applicable by a naïve individual – if most individuals do X, X could be a 
useful thing to do (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and McElreath, 2003).  
A great deal of the modelling work was concerned with understanding the 
circumstances under which these social learning biases would be adaptive and 
expected to evolve (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; Schlag, 1998; Eriksson, Enquist 
and Ghirlanda, 2007; Nakahashi, 2007; Kendal, Giraldeau and Laland, 2009), 
but virtually all these studies investigate social learning strategies 
independently, without attempting to pit them against each other and 
compare their relative influences. In contrast, Rendell et al. did just that 
(Rendell et al., 2010). The authors organized a computer tournament in which 
academics and members of the public submitted strategies that competed 
against each other in a complex, changing environment. These strategies 
specified how individuals in a population choose between social and 
individual learning. This tournament method, pioneered by Axelrod & 
Hamilton in a study on co-operation (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), injects a 
dose of realism compared to the simple mathematical models mentioned 
above, and allows the assessment of the relative advantages of a large number 
of different social learning strategies. Results showed that social learning is 
beneficial under a much greater range of conditions than previously thought – 
the winning strategy used copying almost exclusively when learning. In this 
context, learners do not have to rely on complex computation in order to 
identify the beneficial behaviours, because the burden of selectivity is carried 
out by their models. Agents are rational, performing their best behaviour from 
those they have learned in order to achieve optimal payoff, with the result that 
demonstrators are effectively filtering their behaviour, such that copiers are 
exposed to and learn adaptive traits without having to evaluate themselves the 
payoffs. This conclusion was surprising in light of ‘Rogers’ paradox’ discussed 
before, but these insights were only made possible by the design of the 
tournament, which models individuals and their interactions rather than 
merely looking at average population behaviour.  
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Empirical studies have confirmed that humans make use of both payoff bias 
and conformist bias in their learning (McElreath et al., 2008; Mesoudi, 2011a; 
Morgan et al., 2012), and results generally seem to indicate people have a 
stronger preference for payoff bias when given the choice. Although much 
rarer, field studies also bring evidence for social learning strategies in more 
naturalistic settings. For example, in fishing villages in Fiji, pregnancy food 
taboos are learned preferentially from prestigious unrelated older women 
(Henrich and Henrich, 2010). In the lab McElreath et al. used a simple task in 
which participants learn to choose between two crops to maximise their 
payoff, one of them giving higher yield. Participants could access the crop 
choices and the yields of their group members. By fitting several theoretical 
models to the population-level empirical data, the authors found support for a 
strategy that relies strongly on payoff bias. This approach of trying to infer 
learning mechanisms from population-level patterns of spread is debatable 
(Kandler and Steele, 2009), and a single study (Morgan et al., 2012) found 
evidence of conformity, as defined by Boyd and Richerson, in humans (i.e. 
disproportionate tendency to copy the majority; Boyd and Richerson, 1985). 
Fish (Pike and Laland, 2010) and birds (Aplin et al., 2014) also display 
apparently conformist behaviour, suggesting social learning strategies are not 
restricted to humans.  
Much of this work assumes individuals do not vary in their use of social 
learning strategies, but interestingly, Molleman et al. (2014) found consistent 
individual differences in how participants rely on social information, with 
some individuals having a stronger preference for payoff information, while 
others showing stronger preference for trait frequency information. Even 
more, the relative reliance on trait frequency information depends on the task. 
In a best choice context, participants have a stronger preference for payoff 
information, but they display a stronger preference for frequency information 
in a social dilemma or coordination game, where the individual payoff 
depends on the behaviour of the other participants. This work provides 
intriguing evidence that people use social learning strategies flexibly and 
strongly dependant on context, but also show consistent individual differences 
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in social learning, which persist over time and over contexts (Mesoudi et al., 
2016).   
The same authors find, in a separate study, that not only do humans show 
consistent individual differences in their use of social learning strategies, 
these different learning strategies affect the outcome of social interactions 
(van den Berg, Molleman and Weissing, 2015). Frequency-bias learners 
proved more co-operative in a social dilemma task than payoff-bias learners, 
which also led to frequency-biased learners accumulating higher payoff. 
Combined with the results before, these findings suggest that indeed the 
efficiency of individual differences in social learning approaches is modulated 
by context. Even more, individual preferences for social learning vary with 
subsistence style – populations of independent pastoralists show less reliance 
on social learning than horticulturalists, for which reliance on co-operation 
with a larger number of unrelated individuals is more important for survival 
(Glowacki and Molleman, 2017), and seem to be mediated by the cultural 
individualist – collectivist distinction (Mesoudi et al., 2015). This reiterates 
the point that moving away from theoretical models in which only single 
social learning strategies are investigated can show surprising interactions 
that question our assumptions.  
Social learning strategies are essential for the study of cultural evolution 
because they determine which cultural traits are selected and spread in the 
population, and have deciding effects on population dynamics of cultural 
evolution. Conformist bias has been suggesting as a key element supporting 
cultural group selection (Henrich and Boyd, 1998), as this relies on selection 
on variation between groups. Conformity is a mechanism that leads to 
behavioural homogeneity within groups and behavioural heterogeneity 
between groups, thus being able to stabilise behaviour within group while 
maintaining variation between groups. Intuitively, this type of blind copying 
of the majority should be advantageous for spreading beneficial behaviours, 
but would also hinder the spread of adaptive innovations and even cumulative 
culture (Eriksson, Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007), yet of course a conformist 
bias would not be used indiscriminately. If individuals are allowed to use 
social learning strategies flexibly, conformist learning would be useful after a 
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migration event, for example, or when the individual is behaviourally naïve 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985). 
The accumulation of beneficial information relies on two key elements: 
beneficial traits arise through innovation in the population, which 
subsequently selects these beneficial traits and improves on them. Payoff bias 
is therefore essential for accurately identifying the cultural traits worth 
learning and preserving in the population and therefore crucial to cumulative 
culture (Mesoudi, 2015).  When direct information about payoffs is 
unavailable, indirect cues for success, like prestige, can be used to guide social 
learning (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Much of the modelling work 
regarding cumulative culture has assumed individuals are capable of easily 
identifying the most beneficial traits, and has instead focused on this second 
element of selection and preservation, paying particular attention to the 
importance of fidelity of transmission, which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
1.4. Models for studying cumulative culture 
Much of the earlier modelling work that has set the foundation of the field of 
cultural evolution was concerned with which conditions can support the 
evolution of the ability for culture, particularly the type of cultural phenomena 
we witness in humans. Boyd and Richerson (1985, 1996) emphasise that the 
type of culture they talk about involves an accumulation of knowledge over 
many generations that leads to technologies that no one individual could have 
invented in their own lifetime. This has since become a trademark of 
cumulative culture, and scholars interested in identifying the roots of 
cumulative culture in other species often invoke this inability for individual 
invention as a criterion for establishing whether the phenomenon observed 
qualifies as cumulative culture. Tomasello, mainly interested in the cognitive 
mechanisms supporting this accumulation and particularly the preservation 
of culture, illustrates cumulative culture as a “ratchet”. For him, the essential 
feature is that cumulative culture allows the population to accumulate and 
maintain knowledge through an irreversible process in which cultural traits 
cannot be lost (Tomasello, 1999). Another view which has received great 
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attention portrays cumulative culture as a package of cultural traits that can 
be learned without needed to fully reproduce each step of its invention – in a 
way, one does not need to track the ontogeny of a trait to be able to learn it 
and use it, but this also means cultural traits can be easily lost along with the 
knowledgeable demonstrators (Henrich, 2016).  
A mixture of historical factors and differences in the focus of study has led to a 
confounding diversity of definitions for ‘cumulative culture’, which sometimes 
leads to unproductive debate. Nonetheless, early modelling studies were clear 
in the type of phenomena they were trying to address. In their earlier work, 
Boyd and Richerson plainly state: 
“Culture increases average fitness if it makes the learning processes that 
generate new knowledge less costly or more accurate. […] social learning 
allows learned improvements to accumulate from one generation to the next. 
When learning in small steps is less costly per unit improvement in fitness 
than learning in large steps, the cumulative learning over many generations 
can increase average fitness” (Boyd and Richerson, 1995) 
Therefore, they do not just specify the conditions under which they expect 
culture to emerge, but also how this culture is meant to operate. The authors 
do not question the fact that improvement takes place incrementally, in small 
steps, and leads to a pattern of descent with modification very similar to 
biological evolution – this is indeed something that has been witnessed again 
and again in the evolution of technology, in patterns of scientific discovery 
(Basalla, 1988), and in the archaeological record (Shennan, 2011).  
Boyd and Richerson (1996) found that natural selection favours culture when 
individual learning is costly or error prone, and the environment is 
moderately variable. If environments are stable, organisms can adapt 
genetically to environmental conditions. If environments change too fast, 
culture would not be beneficial since individuals would socially learn 
information that becomes out-dated very quickly. Is it at intermediate levels of 
environmental variation that culture excels, as it proves a faster way of 
adjusting than genetic adaptation. The authors find through a theoretical 
model that the rarity of cumulative culture can be explained through a 
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frequency dependent differential benefit of culture. When culture is rare, most 
of the behaviours that can be learned socially are behaviours that an 
individual could invent alone. Once cumulative culture takes off, the 
accumulation over generations leads to behaviours much more beneficial than 
anything one individual could invent on their own, thus dramatically 
increasing the benefit of social learning. This explains why cumulative culture 
is rare, but does not explain what it was that initially drove the emergence of 
culture.  
Macro-evolutionary models provide useful broad-stroke results essential for 
guiding further work, but more specific, more realistic modelling forces us to 
formally define and question our assumptions. Moving from population-level 
modelling to individual-level modelling allows us to investigate how 
individual interactions affect the broad patterns witnessed, but it also requires 
us to be more specific, in this case, about our assumption regarding what 
cumulative culture is and its mechanistic underpinnings. One of the first 
studies to take an individual-level approach to modelling cumulative culture 
operationalized this phenomenon as a two-step process. An individual socially 
learns the traits known by its randomly chosen cultural parent, and then 
innovates a random number of traits. Thus this model investigated the 
accumulation of traits in the population and its relationship to population size 
and learning efficiency, showing that the expected amount of culture increases 
with both those factors (Strimling et al., 2009).  
Most of the theoretical work concerned with cumulative culture focuses on the 
increase of the number of traits in the population, or on the monotonic 
accumulation of improvements in a single trait. In an attempt to go beyond 
such simple representations of culture, Enquist, Ghirlanda, and Eriksson 
(2011) used a modelling framework where the state of culture at any time 
point depends on the previous states, thus incorporating a measure of 
interaction between cultural traits that is so clearly characteristic of human 
culture. They emphasise the dependencies between cultural traits as a key 
characteristic of cumulative culture, and investigate how different dependency 
models affect the amount and diversity of culture. They present the first 
attempt in the modelling literature to capture dependencies that describe not 
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only refinement or progress, but also differentiation, combination, 
substitutability and loss of cultural elements. The authors showed that these 
different dependency frameworks resulted in very different patterns of 
evolution in terms of both the rate of growth of the number of elements in the 
population and the diversity of independently evolved cultures. For example, 
stepwise modification lead to linear growth in the amount of culture, while 
differentiation lead to faster, exponential, growth and combination lead to 
even faster growth. At the same time, modification lead to relatively similar 
cultures, while cultures based on differentiation and combination ultimately 
grew to be very different. This is a crucial point for the rest of this thesis – we 
expect that different processes involved in cumulative culture will lead to 
different population patterns.  
1.5. The role of fidelity of transmission in cumulative 
culture 
The accumulation of useful knowledge depends on the rate of innovation, and 
the spread of that innovation (Boyd and Richerson, 1996). If individuals 
innovate, but these innovations fail to be recognised and picked up by the 
population, cultural accumulation is impossible. Therefore, the population 
needs to be able to identify, spread, and maintain innovations through 
generations, and it has been argued that it is in the fidelity with which 
knowledge is transmitted through generations that human uniqueness lies. 
Much of the original modelling work concerned with cumulative culture 
consists of macro-evolutionary models that focus on the importance of the 
fidelity of transmission to the emergence and maintenance of cultural 
accumulation (Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Enquist et al., 2008, 2010; 
Lewis and Laland, 2012). For example, Enquist and Ghirlanda (2007) use a 
mathematical model of the accumulation of adaptive and maladaptive traits in 
a population to show that adaptive filtering is essential for the accumulation 
of adaptive traits, again suggesting that individuals need to be able to correctly 
identify and accurately copy the beneficial traits in order for cumulative 
culture to evolve. 
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The importance of transmission fidelity is also emphasised by a modelling 
study comparing the rates of innovation, modification, combination, and trait 
loss (i.e. a proxy for fidelity). The authors show that, by far, fidelity is the most 
important factor in maintaining cultural accumulation and diversity (Lewis 
and Laland, 2012). This raises questions about why fidelity of transmission is 
higher in humans, and what type of mechanisms we could be using to support 
this faithful preservation of information. In addition to the imitation-
emulation debate, one popular suggestion is teaching (Tomasello, 1999; 
Fogarty, Strimling and Laland, 2011; Castro and Toro, 2014; Laland, 2017) – 
by this argument, humans are the only species that purposefully and 
altruistically alter their behaviour to facilitate learning in conspecifics based 
on an understanding of knowledge differences rooted in theory of mind 
(sometimes termed ‘intentional teaching’, as a contrast to ‘functional 
teaching’, which we are not the only species to do; Thornton and Mcauliffe, 
2014). A more elaborate alternative suggests that, through niche construction, 
humans have crafted an environment that makes cultural learning easier 
(through artefacts, for example), and have evolved cognitive tools (like 
language) which facilitate social learning (Sterelny, 2011; Morgan et al., 2015).  
1.6. The importance of population size for cumulative 
culture 
The interplay between the fidelity of transmission and population size has 
been explored by several studies with similar results (Mesoudi, 2011c; Aoki, 
Wakano and Lehmann, 2012; Kempe, Lycett and Mesoudi, 2014; Nakahashi, 
2014; Acerbi, Tennie and Mesoudi, 2016), but it is one specific study that has 
been most persuasive in definitively establishing population size as a crucial 
factor for cumulative culture. Henrich developed a model that investigated the 
conditions under which skill in a population can accumulate and get lost, 
guided by the case of Tasmanian technology loss. When Tasmania became cut 
off from the Australian mainland around 10,000 years ago, the population lost 
a collection of useful complex skills and technologies, like winter clothing and 
boomerangs, and the author argues that this loss is due to a decrease in 
effective population size that resulted from the cut-off (Henrich, 2004).  
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In this model, individuals in a population could accurately identify and 
attempt to copy the best skilled individual. Learning is error-prone though, 
and a parameter of the model determines the variation in this individual copy 
error. In line with how difficult cumulative cultural skills are, most of the time, 
when attempting to copy, individuals will not manage to reach the best skill 
level in the population. Nonetheless, through lucky accidents or successful 
innovations, a small proportion of individuals will acquire a higher skill level, 
thus improving the overall population skill level. Thus, over time through 
repeated improvements on the best skill, the population cumulatively 
advances in skill. The key finding here is that the change in skill depends on 
the population size. The more individuals there are, the higher the chance that 
someone will improve the highest skill. The converse of this is that, as the 
population size decreases, so does the probability of beneficial learning errors, 
which means that after a certain threshold the population begins losing skill 
rather than accumulating it, which, Henrich argues, is what explains the 
Tasmanian scenario.  
Henrich’s model relies necessarily on the assumption that individuals can 
accurately identify and copy the best skilled individual in the population. This 
assumption, as the discussion of social learning strategies above has shown, is 
far from trivial. This study was not without its critics (Henrich, 2006; Read, 
2006, 2009), but it proved nonetheless influential, and has since been 
adopted and modified to investigate questions related to population structure, 
migration, overlapping generations, and different social learning strategies 
(Powell, Shennan and Thomas, 2009; Bentley and O’Brien, 2011; Lehmann, 
Aoki and Feldman, 2011; Mesoudi, 2011c; Vaesen, 2012; Kobayashi, Ohtsuki 
and Wakano, 2016). Similar models have been fitted to archaeological data, 
indicating that the appearance and disappearance of complex technologies in 
the Palaeolithic coincides with demographic changes (Shennan, 2001; Powell, 
Shennan and Thomas, 2009). 
The main criticism of Henrich’s model is that it does not incorporate 
population structure. Individuals have cheap unconstrained access to the best 
model, but once population density or connectedness patterns change, the 
spread of an innovation will cease to be as straightforward. A model 
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distinguishing between population size, network size, and connectedness (i.e. 
in this case, distinguishing between total population size, the number of 
individuals in a subpopulation that are available for copying, and the number 
of links between subpopulatons) finds that total population size has little 
effect on cultural accumulation, but network size and connectedness do 
(Baldini, 2015). This works emphasises the importance of population 
structure in the diffusion of information, which, in turn, affects the 
accumulation of skill. The effect of population connectedness on cultural 
accumulation is probably more salient than the effect of population size, and 
indeed this observation has been confirmed empirically (Derex and Boyd, 
2016).  
The importance of population connectivity for human culture has also been 
emphasised by Muthukrishna and Henrich (2016), who suggest that useful 
innovations do not arise as a result of the exceptional cognitive capabilities of 
isolated geniuses, but rather as an interaction between ordinary human 
psychology and population connectedness. According to the authors, 
connected populations produce collective brains, and the bigger and more 
connected the population, the higher the rate of innovations. This is 
confirmed in urban areas – urban density predicts the rate of innovation 
(Carlino, Chatterjee and Hunt, 2007), and so does the population of cities, 
when innovation is measured in patent numbers (Bettencourt et al., 2007). 
What is more, too much connectivity can lead to decrease variance, which 
would lead to a lower rate of useful recombination, thus suggesting there is an 
optimal amount of interconnectivity that leads to the highest innovation rate.  
Although not many studies have investigated this relationship using data from 
real populations, the ones that do show mixed results. Some studies support a 
positive relationship between complexity and population size (Kline and Boyd, 
2010; Collard, Ruttle, et al., 2013), while others find no evidence (Collard, 
Kemery and Banks, 2005; Collard, Buchanan, et al., 2013). For example, 
island population size predicts the size of the fishing toolkit in the Pacific 
(Kline and Boyd, 2010), but there is no link between population size and 
technological richness in hunter-gatherers from Western North America 
(Collard, Buchanan, et al., 2013). Empirical evidence from the experimental 
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laboratory also points to the fact that larger group size promotes higher 
improvement in skill or better preservation of skill at the micro-evolutionary 
level (Caldwell and Millen, 2010; Derex et al., 2013; Muthukrishna et al., 
2013; Kempe and Mesoudi, 2014), but it is unclear whether the same 
processes that support better task performance in the laboratory also explain 
macro-evolutionary processes in real world populations.  
There is mixed evidence that links population size to measures of language 
complexity (Nettle, 2012). Population size is also related to the word rate of 
change – languages with larger speaker populations gain words faster and lose 
words slower in the basic vocabulary (Borenstein, Feldman and Aoki, 2008). 
Nonetheless, while the evidence points to a positive relationship between 
speaker population size and phoneme inventory size, the relationship is 
negative with morphological complexity. Language complexity is an intricate 
issue though, as languages vary on several dimensions in the way they encode 
information, with trade-offs between these dimensions, which might 
confound any relationship with population size.  
Similarly, in a study investigating the relationship between population size 
and the complexity in a non-technological domain, folktales, the authors 
found mixed results (Acerbi, Kendal and Tehrani, 2017). There was a 
significant positive relationship between population size and complexity 
measured as the overall number of folktale types, but a negative relationship 
with complexity measured as the number of tale motifs. This mixed result 
could be attributed to the fact that different levels of cultural complexity 
depend to varying degrees on population size because they are subject to 
different pressures, just like language is shaped by both expressivity and 
learnability. Alternatively, the authors suggest that the relationship between 
population size and complexity could be domain dependent. For a functional 
domain like technology we expect a strong relationship, yet a domain like 
folktales, which is not subject to functional pressures, but in which instead 
cultural traits can be easily individually reproduced without a need for strong 
replicative transmission, should show a weaker dependence on population 
size.  
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1.7. Empirical studies of cumulative culture 
The study of cumulative culture draws on historical work on the study of the 
evolution of technology (Basalla, 1988), but was kick-started by theoretical 
modellers, and a large body of literature has accumulated over the past 30 
years, centred on population-level factors supporting the emergence, 
maintenance, and spread of culture. While individual-level modelling can test 
how our assumptions about individual cognition and how individual decisions 
translate into population-level patterns through the dynamics of cultural 
transmission, these assumptions need to be corroborated by experimental 
studies investigating real humans. Much of the recent work still relies on 
theoretical approaches, yet the past 10 years have witnessed a boom in the 
number of empirical studies on cumulative culture, aimed to test theoretical 
results in the laboratory, as well as take cumulative culture research into more 
realistic settings.   
In a highly influential empirical study of cumulative culture, Caldwell and 
Millen (2008) used a micro-society paradigm, which simulates generational 
transmission by repeated replacement of individuals, in order to establish 
what information is needed to be transmitted in order to deliver skill 
improvement over generations. The authors used simple tasks like building a 
paper airplane or building a tower out of spaghetti and clay, with a clear 
measureable goal like how far does the airplane fly or how tall the tower is. 
Participants were paired, with one building, and the other one observing. 
After a fixed period of time the observer became the builder, and the builder 
was replaced by a naïve observer. Results show that the artefacts improve over 
time throughout the chains, and chains show patterns of descent with 
modification – designs are more similar within chains than between chains. 
Both these features are characteristic of cumulative culture. 
This transmission-chain paradigm has been used by the same authors to test 
questions about whether this kind of improvement necessarily requires 
imitation or whether the same accumulation can be achieved merely using 
product information (i.e. participants only need to be exposed to the artefact 
and do not need to witness the making process). The authors conclude that 
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imitation is not necessary for improvement in skill (Caldwell and Millen, 
2009). This study has however been criticised for using tasks that are too 
simple and transparent – cumulative culture involves copying complex, 
opaque artefacts that reap payoffs that are hard to judge (Muthukrishna et al., 
2013), and using a transparent task that participants can solve alone arguably 
says little about the mechanisms underlying cumulative culture. Indeed, 
research using more complex tasks actually shows that only product with no 
process information is not sufficient to lead to cumulative improvement in 
other laboratory settings (Derex, Godelle and Raymond, 2013; Wasielewski, 
2014).  
From a comparative perspective, this same transmission chain method has 
been used to show that pairs of pigeons find increasingly more efficient flight 
routes between two points (Sasaki and Biro, 2017). Over several generations, 
the authors replaced each experienced pigeon in a pair with a naïve pigeon 
and show that, compared to pigeons navigating alone and pigeons navigating 
in fixed pairs, the naïve pigeons in the experimental condition actually 
stabilised on more efficient routes. Although showing a decrease in 
performance at the beginning of each generation, pairs consisting of one 
experienced and one naïve pigeon managed to overtake the other two groups. 
The authors argue that a type of collective intelligence operating by pruning 
less efficient routes out of a larger collection of ‘innovations’ contributed by 
the larger pool of participants can lead to this incremental improvement in 
skill, and provocatively claim this is an example of non-human cumulative 
culture. Arguably however, this study illustrates an increase in efficiency, but 
not complexity, the latter also being one of the purported characteristics of 
cumulative cultural evolution, and the debate about whether these results 
really do represent cumulative culture looks set to continue along similar lines 
to the debate about animal culture in general. 
The same transmission chain framework has been adapted to more complex 
tasks like using an online interface to build virtual fishing nets that vary on a 
series of dimensions, which interact in opaque ways to give a payoff that 
cannot be easily deduced from the building process (Derex, Godelle and 
Raymond, 2013), or tasks like using complex graphics software to replicate an 
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image, or even real-world knot tying (Muthukrishna et al., 2013). These 
methods, as mentioned above, were used to explore questions regarding the 
cognitive mechanisms necessary for cumulative improvement, finding that for 
such more complex tasks mere product information is not sufficient for 
cultural accumulation. The same methods were used to test the link between 
group size and improvement, confirming theoretical results.  
1.8. Open questions 
The emphasis on increasing efficiency and complexity as defining criteria for 
cumulative culture stems from the long-lasting focus on the field on the 
evolution of technology (Basalla, 1988). The study of evolution in cultural 
domains that differ in functionality sheds doubt on the definite position of 
efficiency and complexity at the heart of cumulative cultural evolution. For 
instance, transmission chain studies of language evolution show that artificial 
languages change over time to be more learnable (Kirby, Cornish and Smith, 
2008), which in some cases can mean less complex. Participants were asked 
to learn an artificial language that randomly associated visual stimuli varying 
on three dimensions (shape, colour, movement) with novel labels. Results 
show that through repeated communicative interactions, the languages 
became more efficient, as indicated by the participant success in 
communication, but also more learnable, as the languages became more 
structured – for example, different parts of a word referred to each of the 
three dimensions the objects differ on.  
This interplay between learnability and communication efficiency is not a 
uniquely human phenomenon and has been shown, through similar methods, 
to arise in baboons (Claidiere et al., 2014) and zebra finches (Fehér et al., 
2017). This increase in structure through iterated learning emphasises how 
individual learning biases become magnified in the population through 
repeated interaction between individuals, but also bears testament to the fact 
that once culture serves more than a straightforward functional purpose (as it 
was the case for technology), it becomes more difficult to predict how 
incremental accumulation over time will shape cultural traits. In the case of 
language, communicative efficiency could be considered an equivalent of tool 
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efficiency, but the additional constraint of learnability means that languages 
will evolve to be simple enough so they can be easily learned, but complex 
enough to be able to express meanings effectively, and structure is a solution 
to this compromise. What this means, though, is that language complexity can 
be measured on different dimensions. Certainly learnability plays an 
important part in the evolution of functional culture and technology needs to 
be successfully passed on from one individual to another and will therefore be 
structured by this pressure. Yet the difference between language and 
technology is that technology relies to a large extent on material culture that 
can be copied directly and thus supports the transmission of more complex 
culture, which means that the pressure for learnability is lower. Similarly, 
symbolic culture is shaped by different pressures than functional culture, and 
we expect different processes to affect how culture is transmitted and changes 
over time (Morin, 2015). 
In addition to giving empirical validity to theoretical predictions, 
experimental studies of cumulative culture allow us to observe what other 
factors not yet formally investigated might contribute to cultural 
accumulation. Modelling work typically pits social learning against individual 
learning, assuming copying is a purely replicative process, but Muthukrishna 
et al. (2013) for example observe that when presented with several models, 
people actually combine information from different sources instead of 
faithfully replicating a single one. Similarly, Derex et al. (2015) found that 
participants combined and transformed information from multiple sources in 
order to produce new solutions. A study of innovation in US patents also finds 
that combination is a key process involved in innovation (Youn et al., 2015). 
These observations emphasise the idea that multiple processes may be at work 
to support cumulative cultural evolution. The lines between innovation, 
modification, refinement, combination, and replication can become blurred 
and, importantly, different processes might produce different diffusion 
patterns, and might interact with population structure differently. For 
example, an emphasis on combining traits means group connectivity can 
crucially affect the spread of information and decisively affect the 
accumulation of skill in a population (Derex and Boyd, 2016).  
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Much of this work also illustrates that results regarding cumulative culture are 
task-dependent. Different problems emphasise different factors that 
contribute to cumulative improvement and, naturally, experiments are an 
effective means of isolating these different factors and testing their effects. 
Nevertheless, we are only beginning to develop intuitions about the different 
aspects relevant to cumulative culture and how they interact, and more 
complex, more naturalistic experimental scenarios that allow participants to 
engage freely in a cumulative task are sorely needed.  
1.9. Thesis outline 
In summary, the uniquely cumulative character of human culture has been 
studied using theoretical and empirical approaches, both in human and non-
human animal populations. Key findings emphasise the importance of faithful 
transmission, as well as the crucial significance of population size, for the 
accumulation and maintenance of culture. This body of literature bears 
testament to the importance of the combined effort of theoretical and 
empirical methods for elucidating big questions about the evolution of human 
behaviour. More recently, evidence has been accumulating suggesting that 
relaxing our assumptions regarding the homogeneity of populations can have 
important effects on the dynamics of cultural evolution and, potentially, on 
how culture accumulates. This is a key point that this work will be addressing, 
by exploring the patterns of cultural evolution though both theory and a 
realistic microcosm of cumulative culture, and asking questions regarding the 
importance of different processes involved in cumulative culture, like 
refinement and recombination. I will also be investigating the effects of 
individual social learning strategies approaches on cumulative culture, as well 
as the importance of group structure and population size for the dynamics of 
cumulative culture.  
In Chapter 2 I investigate a key process involved in cumulative cultural 
evolution, the incremental refinement of behaviours, through a complex 
realistic agent-based model that extended the Social Learning Strategies 
Tournament (Rendell et al., 2010). This will answer questions regarding how 
refinement is used effectively in a complex exploration-exploitation problem, 
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how the use of refinement changes under different learning and 
environmental conditions, and how it affects population patterns of cultural 
diversity in the population.  
The remaining three chapters of this thesis focus on a complex task, a 
collaborative programming competition, which simulates cumulative cultural 
evolution in a more realistic context than ever attempted in the empirical 
literature so far. In Chapter 3 I examine the drivers and dynamics of 
cumulative cultural evolution in this context, answering questions about the 
patterns of similarities and improvements of cultural artefacts over time, their 
effect on cultural diversity, and the importance of copying and recombination 
in cumulative culture.  
Chapter 4 is concerned with individual differences in the cumulative setting 
of the programming competition. Here, I explore whether different learning 
approaches with regards to social learning are related to improved 
performance both at the individual level and at the population level. This will 
contribute to the recently emerging literature on how individual differences in 
social learning strategies affect cultural population patterns and reiterate the 
importance of recognising the value of investigating heterogeneous 
populations for the evolution of culture. In Chapter 5 I extend the 
programming contest paradigm experimentally to investigate how group 
structure and group size affect cumulative improvement and cultural 
diversity, adding to the population size – cumulative culture debate and 
exploring potential mechanisms underlying the effect of population size on 
cumulative culture. Finally, in Chapter 6 I discuss the results from a broader 
perspective, considering the wider implications for our understanding of 
cumulative cultural evolution.  
  
    
Chapter 2 
Cumulative Culture and Cultural 
Diversity in the Second Social Learning 
Strategies Tournament 
 
 
 
Abst ract  
Human culture, which allows us to build and improve on knowledge from 
previous generations, has contributed to the extensive adaptability of our 
species, but we have yet to find definite answers regarding the trade-offs 
between innovation and copying in a cumulative cultural setting. I introduce a 
computer tournament in which participants submitted strategies that 
specified how to learn socially and asocially in a complex, changing 
environment, and focus on the cumulative extension, in which individuals can 
invest in improving behaviours they already know. I find that this type of 
cumulative culture creates a scenario in which the population benefits from a 
level of refinement much higher than what is individually beneficial, which 
creates clear tensions between individual and population interests. Thus, 
individual refinement is costly, while copying is cheap, which leads to a strong 
convergence in the population on a very limited number of extremely long-
lived refined behaviours. Additionally, I see evidence that strong convergence 
is associated with success in the tournament. This raises the question of what 
other processes besides refinement are responsible for the remarkable 
diversity that cumulative cultural evolution displays.  
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
28 
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
29 
2.1. Introduction 
Culture is responsible for the extraordinarily diverse behavioural repertoire 
that has led to our species’ impressive adaptability (Mathew and Perreault, 
2015). Social learning, learning influenced by contact with conspecifics 
(Heyes, 1994), is at the heart of spreading beneficial knowledge, and is used 
by an extensive variety of species. Nevertheless, it is still unclear why social 
learning is profitable and how best to copy. 
Intuitively, social learning should be beneficial when it allows individuals to 
bypass the cost of trial-and-error learning. For example, learning which type 
of mushroom is edible by trying out different varieties is very risky, while 
simply choosing the mushrooms you have seen other individuals eat is easy 
and effective. The story is obviously not this straightforward, and indeed 
theoretical studies have questioned the benefits of social learning (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985; Rogers, 1988; Giraldeau, Valone and Templeton, 2002; 
Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Rieucau and Giraldeau, 2011). For instance, 
some theoretical studies suggest that social learning in a changing 
environment is only beneficial when it is rare in the population (Rogers, 
1988). In a mixed population of individual and social learners, when most of 
the population is learning through trial-and-error, sampling the environment 
and collecting accurate information, social learning provides good 
information quickly and cheaply. Evolution, however, would then lead to an 
increase in the proportion of social learners. As fewer and fewer individuals 
learn by trail-and-error, there will be fewer who sample the environment in an 
effective manner. Copying in this context will most likely provide unreliable, 
out-dated information (Feldman, Aoki and Kumm, 1996; Rendell, Fogarty and 
Laland, 2010). The population, therefore, will reach equilibrium on a mixture 
of social and asocial learners, both with equal fitness.  
This implies that copying others indiscriminately is not adaptive and, indeed, 
further work suggests that individuals should use social learning selectively 
(Kameda and Nakanishi, 2003; Enquist and Eriksson, 2007; Rendell, Fogarty 
and Laland, 2010). Both humans and non-human animals employ social 
learning strategies, which specify how, what, and under what circumstances 
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individuals should copy (Laland, 2004; see Rendell et al., 2011 for a review of 
both the theoretical and experimental literature).  This body of work has 
mainly focused on general analytical models that explore a very small subset 
of strategies. In order to explore a large range of alternative social learning 
strategies in a complex, changing environment, Rendell et al. (2010) 
organised a computer tournament, a method previously used to investigate 
the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). This involved 
participants submitting various strategies that specified when to use 
individual and social learning, which then competed against each other in an 
agent-based simulated environment. The main result of the tournament was 
that social learning proved beneficial under a much broader range of 
conditions than previously shown, even when copying was highly imprecise. 
The competitive dynamic of the tournament lead individuals in the population 
to always exploit their best behaviours, effectively filtering the information. 
Therefore, social learners did not need to be as selective when copying, 
because the other individuals were selective in what they made available to 
copy.  
If we are interested, though, in what makes human culture unique, one key 
point is the fact that our culture relies on accumulating knowledge and 
behaviours from previous generations, allowing for gradual incremental 
improvement in skill (Boyd and Richerson, 1996; Tomasello, 1999). This type 
of cumulative culture relies crucially on an interaction between innovation 
and copying. Each generation needs to acquire and maintain the skills and 
knowledge gained so far in order to pass them on (Enquist et al., 2010), yet at 
the same time enough novelty needs to be generated in order to allow for the 
improvement in the skills inherited from previous generations. As a result, 
this type of cultural evolution allows for a remarkable accumulation of traits 
in the population, such that individual cultural repertoires are smaller because 
no one individual can learn and know all of the traits. It leads to such 
advanced technologies that no one individual could have invented on their 
own. It involves adding, modifying, refining, and combining cultural traits, 
which influence each other and interact in complex ways. 
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Cumulative cultural evolution is a large-scale, long-term, elaborate process, 
which makes it difficult to study. Nevertheless, to date, an extensive literature 
consisting of both theoretical and experimental approaches has shown that 
population size, population structure, and transmission fidelity all favourably 
affect the accumulation of culture, but most of this work has focused on a 
limited set of conditions. The modelling literature has typically investigated 
population level dynamics and has been defining cumulative culture as either 
an increase in the number of traits (Enquist et al., 2008; Strimling et al., 
2009), improvement in a single trait (Henrich, 2004; Mesoudi, 2011c; 
Nakahashi, 2014) or, even more generally, the persistence of one trait in the 
population (Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Enquist et al., 2010). More 
recently, modellers have started to investigate how this type of cultural 
accumulation takes place when traits provide the user with a fitness benefit, 
which increases with increased refinement (Mesoudi, 2011c; Ehn and Laland, 
2012; Lewis and Laland, 2012), finding similar results regarding the 
interaction between population structure and the fidelity of transmission.  
In laboratory studies, transmission chain methods have been used to simulate 
intergenerational transmission, aiming to investigate how one skill such as 
building spaghetti towers (Caldwell and Millen, 2008), fishing nets (Derex, 
Godelle and Raymond, 2013), or arrowheads (Derex et al., 2015) improves 
over time. This body of work was mainly concerned with questions regarding 
the type of information required for successful improvement in such tasks 
over generations, and the importance of group size to this end. Results 
indicate that more complex tasks require more extensive information 
regarding the artefacts and the processes required to build these artefacts, as 
well as requiring larger groups to sustain higher accumulation or lower 
cultural loss. More recently, the focus has been extended to more specific 
processes involved in cumulative culture, like recombination of increasingly 
beneficial skills (Derex and Boyd, 2015, 2016), but more work in this direction 
is sorely needed.  
One study points out the importance of different ways of conceptualising 
cumulative culture in modelling approaches (Enquist, Ghirlanda and 
Eriksson, 2011). The authors used a complex framework that allows for 
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interaction between cultural traits in order to investigate how different modes 
of cultural dependency, such as sequential improvement, differentiation, and 
recombination, affect cultural accumulation. Results showed that these 
different processes produced very different patterns of cultural evolution in 
terms of the rate of growth of the number of cultural traits in a population, 
and the diversity between populations. Therefore, different innovative 
processes involved in cumulative culture can lead to different population 
patterns. However, the modelling literature has largely exclusively focused on 
sequential improvement, using simple theoretical populations.   
Clearly, modelling something as complex as cumulative culture requires 
drastic simplification, but by focusing on specific aspects we can gain a better 
understanding of how each contributes to the emergence and evolution of the 
phenomenon. Previous studies have mainly been concerned with investigating 
cumulative culture one process at a time, focusing primarily on cumulative 
culture as successive sequential improvement in one trait, which leaves more 
nuanced sources of cumulative improvement largely unexplored. What is 
more, the methodological approaches could be updated to more complex, 
more realistic systems.  
One such more realistic approach is the Social Learning Strategies 
Tournament (Rendell et al., 2010) mentioned above, a complex agent-based 
simulation in which individual agents use elaborate learning strategies and 
interact directly in a changing environment. The Tournament investigated the 
basic trade-off between social and individual learning, but this paradigm 
provides an excellent opportunity for investigating cumulative culture. I 
introduce here the Second Social Learning Strategies Tournament, which 
extended the first in three directions (1) by allowing individuals to choose who 
to copy from,  (2) by allowing individuals to invest in improving a behaviour 
they already know, and (3) by allowing for migration between subpopulations. 
In the model bias extension, individuals are allowed to choose whom they 
want to learn from, using information like age, number of offspring, and mean 
lifetime performance. The spatial extension introduces migration between 
three populations, thus allowing for a spatially structured meta-population. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
33 
Finally, in the cumulative extension, individuals are given the option to invest 
in improving already known behaviours in order to increase their payoffs.  
This chapter will be concerned with analysing data from the cumulative 
extension, in which cumulative culture is modelled in terms of refinement. 
Refinement here is defined as an incremental improvement of several 
independent cultural traits. This definition does not distinguish between 
whether the repeated improvement is the result of the effort of a single 
individual or whether it is a collective endeavour, but in practice the 
simulations ran for much longer than an individual lifespan, which resulted in 
incremental improvement from numerous generations. There is currently no 
consensus in the literature about whether cumulative culture is purely a 
collective process or whether the same results could be achieved by a 
theoretically immortal single individual, so our model of refinement here 
captures a combination of both individual and collective improvements. The 
richness of the tournament model allows us to ask new questions about 
cumulative culture. For example, much of the work mentioned above focused 
on identifying the conditions under which social learning is beneficial relative 
to individual learning, but to our knowledge little work has directly compared 
the benefits of refinement against individual learning and, importantly, 
copying. The data from the tournament easily allows us to do that and answer 
questions like what strategies do we expect to be selected for choosing when to 
copy, when to innovate something completely new, and when to work on 
improving what you already know? For cumulative culture to evolve, some 
individuals need to invest time in improving already known solutions – but 
who does that, and when? Finally, this framework allows to link small-scale 
individual decisions to population-level patterns of behaviour. This work adds 
more realism to models like the one by Enquist et al. (2011), and answers 
questions about whether refinement can lead to specific population-level 
patterns of culture that we would not expect in populations where cumulative 
improvement is not possible. 
Therefore this chapter will focus on the dynamics of refinement at the 
individual and population level in the tournament. More specifically, in the 
sections that follow I will begin with a general overview of the tournament 
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setup. The large scale of the tournament framework allows us to investigate 
how the use of refinement changes in different environmental conditions. The 
first results section is concerned with how the use of refinement changed 
across the parameter space, investigating how refinement was affected by 
environmental change, the number of models, the probability of failure, and 
the maximum level of refinement level. I expect that more refinement will be 
associated with a higher number of models, as the information and implicitly 
refined information would spread faster, which is in line with previous work 
linking population size and cumulative culture. Similarly I expect that more 
refinement should be associated with higher environmental change, as 
cumulative culture should provide a quick way of adapting to fast-changing 
environments, and it should be associated with a higher accuracy of 
transmission as the fidelity of transmission has been posited as crucially 
important to cumulative culture.  
The second section answers questions regarding how much refinement took 
place and the benefits of refinement at the strategy level for performance in 
the tournament. I expect differential fitness to be associated with refinement 
at the individual and population level, as refinement is beneficial for the 
population but not for the individuals, which should create tensions between 
individual and population level interests. Finally, the last section shifts the 
focus to population level dynamics, and is concerned with how refinement 
affected cultural diversity. As individuals invest in beneficial refinements, the 
population should converge on these refined behaviours, which should 
decrease cultural diversity. Because these three sections deal with relatively 
unrelated topics, I included a separate description of the methodology at the 
beginning of each section, along with short discussions when relevant. A 
general discussion concludes this chapter.  
It is worth noting that this dataset was the result of a large collaborative 
project. I was not involved in the design, not in the data gathering, but all the 
analyses are my own.  
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2.2. Tournament specifications 
Participants submitted strategies to enter the tournament. Each strategy was 
a set of rules specifying how agents should behave in an agent based 
simulation on the acquisition and use of knowledge. The strategy details when 
agents should in each iteration or round of a simulation choose to either make 
use of a behaviour they already know (through a move called EXPLOIT) or 
learn asocially (using INNOVATE), socially (OBSERVE), or invest in 
improving a behaviour they already know (REFINE).  
The tournament was based on a restless multi-armed bandit problem (Schlag, 
1998; Gross et al., 2008). The ‘one armed bandit’, or the slot machine, 
involves pulling one arm in order to receive a payoff drawn from a given 
distribution. In our case, the bandit had 100 arms. This means there was a 
choice between 100 behaviours, each associated with a payoff drawn, here, 
from an exponential distribution, so that most payoffs were small, but some 
were very high. In addition, the bandit was restless: the payoffs changed over 
time. Each round, with a certain probability, the payoff of each behaviour 
changed independently, being replaced with a new payoff drawn from the 
same exponential distribution. The aim of each agent was to learn which 
behaviours are best to use (i.e. which of the bandit’s arms to ‘pull’) and when 
in order to maximise its lifetime payoff. 
This was an exploration – exploitation problem: agents first needed to learn 
how to pull an arm either though social or asocial learning, and could then 
exploit that arm to receive payoff. This established a trade-off between 
learning and exploiting - the cost of a learn move was that it could have been 
an exploit move that reaps payoff: an opportunity cost. Since evolutionary 
‘fitness’ in the simulation depended on the accumulation of payoff, agents 
should exploit as much as possible, but in order to make sure they were 
exploiting the best behaviours, they needed to balance exploit with smart 
learning.  
The simulated environment contained a population of 100 agents, each 
controlled by one of the strategies submitted by our participants. The agents 
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engaged in a turn-based interaction over 10,000 time steps. At each time step, 
each agent performed a move. The first move they could select, EXPLOIT, 
involved choosing a behaviour in their repertoire and reaping its payoff – this 
was the only move that allowed for the accumulation of payoff. On the other 
hand, INNOVATE allowed agents to learn a behaviour selected at random 
from the set of 100 possible behaviours not in their repertoire yet. By ‘learning 
a behaviour’ in this case I mean adding that behaviour to the agent’s 
repertoire, along with exact information about the behaviour’s payoff. The 
third move available was OBSERVE, which allowed agents to learn randomly 
chosen behaviours from the set of behaviours the other agents were exploiting 
at this time step. A simulation parameter, nobserve, controlled how many other 
individuals the agent could observe – if nobserve was higher than 1, the agent 
learned all the nobserve behaviours observed, along with information about 
their payoffs. OBSERVE moves were associated with errors both in terms of 
acts and payoffs. Each of the nobserve acts could fail being copied with 
probability pcopyFail, which was a parameter of the simulation – if the copying 
failed, no information regarding the behaviour or the payoff was added to the 
agent’s repertoire. Additionally, when copying was successful, the payoff 
information was not exact – an error term drawn from a Poisson distribution 
was added to the payoff estimate, which ensured that the higher the payoff 
observed, the larger the error around the estimate.  
It is worth noting that the payoff information acquired along with a behaviour 
related to the state of the environment at that particular time. If the 
environment changed, the agents would possess out-dated information. This 
payoff information could, however, be updated in two ways. When an agent 
chose to play EXPLOIT, the payoff it received was used to update the payoff 
recorded in its repertoire; similarly, if an agent OBSERVED a behaviour it 
already knew, the payoff information of that behaviour was updated with the 
current value observed.  
Evolution was implemented through a death-birth process. At each time step, 
agents died with probability of 1/50 (giving each agent an expected lifespan of 
50 rounds), and were replaced with the offspring of survivors. The probability 
of reproduction was proportional to the mean lifetime payoff, which was 
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defined as the total payoff acquired (through EXPLOIT moves), divided by the 
number of time steps they had been alive for. Agents were born behaviourally 
naïve, but they inherited their parent’s learning strategy. At birth mutation 
occured also with probability 1/50, which meant that instead of inheriting the 
parent strategy, offspring could inherit a strategy selected at random from the 
set of strategies competing in the simulation. These mutations were how 
strategies appeared in populations initially containing a single strategy, and 
did not occur in the last quarter of each melee contest (see below).  
To summarise, each simulation round consisted of the following steps: (1) 
each agent was chosen sequentially to play a move, until all agents had played, 
(2) some individuals died, and individuals reproduced with a probability 
proportional to their mean lifetime payoff, (3) the environment changed with 
a probability pc, which was a parameter of the simulation, and (4) in the 
spatial extension, some individuals migrated between populations.  
In the cumulative extension, agents could use an additional move, REFINE. 
Each behaviour was associated with a refinement level, which was initially 
zero when the behaviour was learned through INNOVATE. A REFINE move 
allowed agents to choose a behaviour in their repertoire and increase its 
refinement level. The payoff of a behaviour, in the cumulative extension, was 
the sum of the basic payoff defined by the environment, plus a refinement 
increment. Therefore, increasing the refinement level of a behaviour increased 
the payoff associated with that behaviour by a certain increment, which was 
proportional to the refinement level. When a refined behaviour was copied 
through OBSERVE, the refinement level was also copied. Individuals did not 
know the refinement level of acts they have in their repertoire – only that the 
refinement level increased by 1 – and learned a new total payoff available for 
that act, without error. Importantly, this increment was independent of the 
environmental variation – even if the basic payoff of the behaviour changed, 
the increment remained constant.  
Parameter summary: 
pc – probability of environmental change  
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nobserve – number of individuals copied by an agent playing OBSERVE 
pcopyFail – probability that copying failed for every act OBSERVED 
rmax – in the cumulative extension, this was the maximum allowed 
refinement level.  
The refinement increment that was added to a behaviour’s payoff was a 
function of r (the current refinement level, ranging from 0 to the maximum 
possible level, rmax) and rmax itself, plotted below, and given by: 
𝑖 = 0.051− 0.95!!"# 0.95!!!!!!! 𝑝!"#                                                                         (Equation  2.1) 
where pmax was the maximum possible increment, defined as the mean of the 
basic payoff distribution, multiplied by 50. The payoff increment i is plotted as 
a function of the refinement level r in Fig. 2.1 below.
 
Refining a given behaviour enough times means the refinement increment 
would surpass even the highest possible basic payoff. Bearing in mind that 
this increment did not change when the environment did, this translated into 
refining the population ‘out’ of environmental variation. Therefore once the 
population crossed this threshold into a world in which refined behaviours are 
Figure 2.1 – relationship between refinement level and refinement increment. The 
payoff increment, in black, is compared to the mean and maximum basic payoff 
values. The shape of basic payoff distribution is plotted on a different scale using 
the gray bars for illustrative purposes  
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the only behaviours worth knowing, individuals only needed to do enough 
learning to acquire a well enough refined behaviour, ideally through copying. 
A smart refiner did not even need to refine at all – as long as they found 
themselves in a refined environment, they just needed to learn the refined 
behaviour from someone else.  
The tournament was run in three stages: 
Stage 1: Single extension pairwise 
For each extension, all 51 strategies entered in the tournament competed 
against each other in a round-robin pairwise fashion with only that respective 
extension active and possible (i.e. a cumulative round, a model-bias round, 
and a spatial round). Each contest between strategies A and B involved seeing 
if strategy A could invade a population using strategy B, and vice-versa. In 
each simulation, a population of the dominant ‘defender’ strategy was 
introduced, and ran for 100 rounds in order to establish behavioural 
repertoires. Then, the second ‘invader’ strategy was allowed to mutate in. 
Each such contest was replicated with 6 sets of parameters, twice with strategy 
A invading B, and twice with B invading A, for repeatability. The score of a 
strategy in each simulation was the frequency of that strategy in the 
population in the last quarter of the simulation (i.e. the proportion of agents 
in the population using strategy A or B). The score of a strategy in each 
extension was the average score of that strategy across all the simulations it 
was involved in. The parameter values chosen for these runs were pc = {0.001, 
0.01, 0.1}, nobserve = {1,5}, rmax = 100, pcopyFail = 0.05. 
Stage 2: Single extension melee  
For each single extension pairwise contest set, the strategies that scored 
within the top ten in that extension proceeded to stage 2, where they all 
competed against each other simultaneously, with only that respective 
extension active. The strategies were allowed to invade through mutation a 
standard defending strategy, innovateOnce, which learned once asocially and 
then exploited that one behaviour for the rest of its life. Again, the score of a 
strategy in each simulation was the frequency of that strategy in the 
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population in the last quarter of the simulation. The winning strategy for each 
extension was the strategy with the highest average score within that 
extension contest set.  
The second stage was run as two sets of simulations: one using parameter 
values drawn systematically from fixed sets of values, with 10 replicates each, 
and one drawing parameter values from plausible distributions, to 
preferentially explore the more biologically realistic regions of the parameter 
space. 
The systematic parameter values used were:  
pc = {0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4} 
pcopyFail = {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.25, 0.5} 
nobserve = {1, 2, 5, 10} 
rmax = {10, 25, 50, 100, 500, 1000} 
Stage 3: All extensions melee 
Finally, the top 5 strategies from each single pairwise melee extension were 
chosen to compete against each other in a melee fashion, with all three 
extensions active simultaneously. Score was calculated as above, and the 
strategy with the highest score was designated the final winner of the 
tournament. Like Stage II, this involved running simulations using a set of 
fixed parameters that was identical to the ones used in Stage II, each repeated 
5 times, as well as simulations using parameters drawn from random 
distributions.  
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2.3. How does refinement change across the 
parameter space? 
2.3.1. Methods 
In order to quantify how refinement changed across the parameter space, I 
illustrate how refinement varied with each of the four parameters in the 
tournament. For this section, and much of the following two, I used two 
straightforward measures of refinement. The first is the proportion of 
REFINE moves averaged over each simulation (i.e. over both strategies for 
Stage I, or over all top ten strategies for Stages II and III), which quantified 
how much effort a strategy invested in refinement, as opposed to 
EXPLOITING or other learning moves. The second was the maximum final 
refinement level (i.e. the maximum refinement level of any act at the end of 
the simulation), as a measure of the population-level result of this investment 
in refinement. The two measures were evidently linked, as a higher proportion 
of REFINE moves would lead to higher final refinement level. Nonetheless, 
given that the final refinement level is a simulation-level measure, and each 
simulation contains at least two strategies, which potentially use REFINE 
moves at different rates, the two measures capture slightly different dynamics. 
Here I present results from the first two stages of the tournament. Stage III 
included the same strategies and the same parameter values as Stage II, but 
showed much less variability, so it was excluded from this analysis.  
In the first stage, the only parameters varied were nobserve ={1, 5} and pc = 
{0.001, 0.01, 0.1}. In the second stage, as mentioned above, we ran two sets of 
simulations, one where we systematically varied parameters, and one with 
parameters drawn from more biologically realistic distributions. The 
systematic parameters using in the second stage were pc = {0.001, 0.005, 
0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4}, pcopyFail = {0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.25, 0.5}, nobserve 
= {1, 2, 5, 10}, and rmax = {10, 25, 50, 100, 500, 1000}. The distributions of the 
random parameters were skewed toward intuitively biologically relevant levels 
(Fig. 2.2). For example, an environmental change rate of 0.5 means that every 
other round the environment changes, which is not necessarily a situation we 
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would expect culture to have evolved in, therefore we skewed the distribution 
towards smaller values.  
 
2.3.2. Results  
2.3.2.1. Stage I 
In the first stage, the average refinement level increased over time throughout 
all simulations, as expected as the population accumulates improvements, but 
it remained constantly higher for higher values of both nobserve and pc (Fig. 
2.3a). Higher nobserve meant each individual could learn from more 
individuals, so information spread faster in the population. This allowed 
agents to both learn refined moves quicker, and refine them themselves, thus 
leading to a generally higher level of refinement overall, compared to the case 
where nobserve is 1. 
A higher environmental change rate, here illustrated by higher pc, required 
more learning to make sure agents have up-to-date information. This would 
imply more INNOVATE and OBSERVE moves, but results also show an 
increase in the refinement level. The advantage of refinement is that it allows 
the population to overcome environmental variability by investing in refining 
a small number of behaviours to the point where their payoffs exceed any 
Figure 2.2 – distribution of random parameters used for Stage II 
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decrease in payoff due to environmental change, but the benefit of refinement 
only becomes evident once the population has reached this optimally refined 
stage. The fact that here a higher probability of environmental change was 
associated with a higher refinement level suggests that strategies did indeed 
use refinement in order to refine themselves out of the environmental 
variations.  As the environment changes more quickly, it pays to invest in 
refining out of it more than finding a good, stable payoff. 
 
The proportion of refine moves paints a picture in line with these conclusions 
(Fig. 2.3b). The proportion of REFINE moves was lower when nobserve was 5, 
presumably because as the information spread faster in the population, agents 
did not need to invest as much time in refinement. On the other hand, in this 
case the proportion of REFINE moves did not change significantly across pc 
value, although we saw clear differences in the refinement level (Fig. 2.3a). 
This is a puzzling result and most likely due to the large variation in strategies 
Figure 2.3 – (a) timeline of refinement level for all simulations in Stage I, by different 
values of nobserve and pc. Maximum refinement level values calculated for each 
simulation every 500 iterations, and averaged over all simulations in each parameter 
value. (b) proportion of refine moves averaged over all simulations, for the same 
parameters. Values were plotted on the same scale for ease of comparison. Standard 
error bars are included for all measurements 
a. 
b. 
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competing in the first stage, which might be using refinement sub-optimally 
such that on average there is no difference in the proportion of REFINE 
moves, but the better strategies successfully increase refinement level overall. 
This question is fully explored in the next section presenting results from the 
second stage, which included only the best performing strategies and varied pc 
values more widely.	  
2.3.2.2. Stage II 
The second stage included only the best scoring 10 strategies, but a wider 
range of parameter values. It is worth pointing out, before I present the 
refinement results, that the broader parameter space did not change the 
ranking significantly. With two exceptions in strategies in the lower end of the 
ranking, the rankings of the top ten strategies remained unchanged across all 
four parameters we varied. We did see a larger distance between the scores of 
the top 3 or 4 strategies and the rest at higher values of pc, pcopyFail, and nobserve, 
indicating that the best strategies were perhaps better at handling ‘tougher’ 
conditions. Rmax showed no effect whatsoever on the rankings or the 
differences in score between strategies. Overall, the better strategies were 
consistently better across the whole parameter range.  
The proportion of REFINE moves used varied systematically with all of the 
parameters (Fig. 2.4b). As in the first stage, a higher nobserve was associated 
with fewer REFINE moves, since the information spread more quickly though 
the population. Similarly, higher pc values meant more REFINE moves, 
because rapid changes prompted increased investment in refinement as 
agents needed to find (or, in this case, craft) more rewarding acts when the 
environment changed more quickly.  In addition, the proportion of REFINE 
moves increased with higher pcopyFail. A higher probability that an OBSERVE 
moves fails means agents need to find alternative means of acquiring 
beneficial acts, refinement being one of them.  
Finally, higher rmax was also associated with a higher proportion of 
refinement, as rmax was essentially a cap on how high a refinement level the 
population can achieve, and how valuable refinement is overall. This effect 
was a great deal smaller than it was the case with the other three parameters 
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(Fig. 2.4b for comparison), and the differences decrease for higher values of 
rmax. 
 
The timelines of the refinement level are in line with both the results from 
Stage I, and what we would expect having seen how the proportion of REFINE 
changed across parameters (Fig. 2.4a). Once again, higher pc and pcopyFail  were 
both associated with higher refinement levels, due to the higher proportion of 
REFINE moves they promote. A higher number of models was associated with 
higher refinement levels, despite requiring a smaller proportion of REFINE 
moves, as the information spread more quickly when a higher number of 
models was available.  
Rmax affected the value of refinement, as we saw in the previous section, but a 
smart refiner should not be influenced by rmax as much when the 
improvements from additional refinements begin to drop off (i.e. rmax over 
100-200).  Indeed, as the timeline graphs indicate, lower values of rmax limit 
both the highest refinement level that can be achieved, and how long it takes 
to achieve that maximum level. Once rmax exceeded 100, though, there seemed 
Figure 2.4 – (a) timeline of maximum refinement level for all the simulations in Stage II for 
different values of the four parameters explored – nobserve, rmax, pcopyFail, and pc; (b) overall 
proportion of REFINE moves averaged over all simulations in Stage II as a function of the 
four parameters. Standard error bars are included for all measurements. Results from the 
systematic parameter simulations 
a. 
b. 
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to be little difference in the trajectory of the curve, and the increase in 
refinement did not differ quantitatively or qualitatively. Very similar patterns 
were seen in the random parameter space exploration, but slightly 
complicated by the noisier results in the less biologically plausible areas that 
were less explored because of the skewed distributions.  
2.3.2.3. Over-refining and rmax in Stage II 
There was an interesting relationship between the rmax values explored and 
the maximum refinement level at the end of the simulation, caused by how the 
diminishing returns curve characterising the refinement increment affected 
how strategies use refinement. Investing in increasing the refinement level 
becomes less beneficial once the refinement level reaches a value around 100, 
as the increment becomes to plateau (Fig. 2.5a). Strategies conspicuously 
recognised this as the final refinement level patterns looked very different for 
different values of rmax (Fig. 2.5b). 
For rmax  values under 100, the final refinement level was highly left skewed, 
suggesting that strategies over-refined. This over-refinement is most plausibly 
due to the fact that strategies were attempting to achieve the optimal 
refinement level where the increment plateaus and refinement stops paying 
off. When rmax  was allowed to exceed 100 (i.e. rmax  = 500 and 1000), 
refinement levels were distributed efficiently with a mode at the optimal 
refinement level. Although there is variation in where the different 
simulations set the threshold of when refinement stops being useful, none of 
them mindlessly continue over-refining. This over-refining phenomenon also 
explains why there was no difference in the dynamics of refinement level over 
time for high values of rmax  in the previous section (Fig. 2.4a) – once rmax  was 
allowed to go over 100, strategies used refinement rationally.  
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Figure 2.5 – (a) relationship between rmax and refinement increment as defined by 
the increment function in Equation 1 and (b) final maxmimum refinement level 
distribution for all simulations in Stage II, grouped by rmax  
a. b. 
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2.4. How much refinement occurred?  
2.4.1. Methods 
This analysis focuses on how strategies used refinement and uses data from 
Stage I of the tournament because it displayed the most variation in terms of 
strategies. In this stage all 51 competing strategies were present and competed 
pairwise, while the following stages only focused on the subset of strategies 
that have performed the best in Stage I. Therefore, Stages II and III only 
consisted of well-performing strategies, and will be the focus of following 
sections. However, since I was interested in characterising general behaviour 
in terms of refinement in the tournament, the analysis incorporated the full 
set of strategies, which varied both in performance and their use of 
refinement.  
I initially investigated whether refinement was beneficial to a strategy’s score 
by examining the relationship between score and the proportion of each move 
available. For each strategy I averaged the score (i.e. frequency of the strategy 
at the end of the simulation) that the strategy achieved across all the 
simulations it was involved in as part of Stage I. Similarly, I averaged the 
proportion of each of the four available moves used over all the simulations 
that strategy was part of. This results in an average measure of performance 
for each strategy, as well as an average measure of how much each strategy 
made use of each of the four available moves.  
To further establish whether refinement was beneficial at the strategy level, I 
investigated whether there was a difference in performance between strategies 
that used REFINE moves and strategies that never did. Because REFINE 
moves have a profound effect on the environment by increasing the overall 
refinement level and thus affecting the inherent value of refinement, I also 
investigated whether this difference in performance between strategies that 
did or did not make use of REFINE moves depended on the interaction 
between strategy type and the type of refinement environment (i.e. how 
refined the environment is).  
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For this purpose I used average strategy-level measures. I categorised 
strategies as either using REFINE if the strategy ever made use of a REFINE 
move in any simulation, or non-refine if it never did. Similarly, I categorised 
the environment as either fully-refined if the final refinement level at the end 
of the simulation was the maximum possible value, 100, or non-refined if that 
was not the case. For each strategy I calculated two average scores – one was 
the average score of the strategy in all the simulations that were classified as a 
refined environment, and one was the average score of the strategy in all the 
simulations that were not a refined environment. Thus our sample includes 
102 scores – each of the 51 strategies in each of the 2 possible refinement 
environment types.  
I used non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to establish whether the 
differences in score between the two types of strategies were significant. I used 
the same test to establish whether scores in different refinement 
environments were significantly different. In order to investigate the 
interaction between the type of refinement environment and whether a 
strategy used REFINE moves or not, I fitted a linear model using strategy 
score in either type of environment as a dependent variable, and environment 
type, strategy type, and their interaction, as explanatory variables (Equation 
2.2). The model included average score per strategy (the average score of a 
strategy in all simulations, irrespective of environment) as an offset, to control 
for the fact that some strategies may be inherently better in the tournament, 
regardless of their approach to refinement. 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒! =   𝛽 + 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑒𝑡 +   𝛽!𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! +   𝛽!𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦! +   𝜀!    𝜀!   ~  𝑁(0,𝜎)  
   (Equation 2.2) 
2.4.2. Learning and refinement  
Firstly, the strategic nature of the task impacts how much time individuals 
should spend learning or exploiting. Given that the only way to accumulate 
payoff was to exploit, but individuals needed to make sure they were 
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exploiting the behaviours that were most in line with the current environment 
to reap the highest payoff, there was a trade-off between learning and 
exploiting. A smart agent should learn as little as possible in order to make the 
most of exploit moves, while still using an efficient learning algorithm that 
allows them to acquire the best behaviours. This trade-off was reflected in the 
proportion of moves in use in the tournament (Fig. 2.6). EXPLOIT was 
overwhelmingly more common, followed by OBSERVE, with INNOVATE and 
REFINE moves being quite rare.  
 
The relationship between the proportion of each move and score indicates 
that strategies that were better at managing this learning/exploiting trade-off 
were more successful in the tournament (Fig. 2.7). There was a significant 
positive relationship between score and the proportion of EXPLOIT moves 
(Spearman’s rank correlation 𝜌 = 0.82, p < 0.001), while all the learning 
moves were negatively correlated to score. The relationship between the score 
and the proportion of OBSERVE moves was significantly negative (Spearman 𝜌 = -0.45, p  < 0.001), and so was the relationship between score and the 
proportion of INNOVATE (𝜌 = -0.68, p < 0.001, excluding strategies that 
never innovate) and REFINE moves (𝜌 = -0.397, p = 0.019, excluding 
strategies that never refine). This again reiterates the point that learning too 
much is costly.  
Figure 2.6 – overall proportion of moves for all 51 strategies in the tournament 
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With regards to learning, results confirmed the general conclusion from the 
first tournament – copying paid off. There was a positive relationship between 
the proportion of learning moves that are OBSERVE and score, suggesting 
that social learning is beneficial (Fig. 2.8).  
On the other hand, the proportion of REFINE moves did not seem to have 
that large of an effect on performance (Fig. 2.9a). REFINE moves are learning 
moves that are relatively equivalent, at least in terms of frequency, to 
INNOVATE moves. Therefore we would expect that if indeed there was a 
relationship between the amount of refinement and score, this relationship 
Figure 2.7 – Relationship between score and the proportions of EXPLOIT, 
OBSERVE, INNOVATE and REFINE moves, averaged over each strategy 
Figure 2.8 – (a) relationship between score and proportion of learning moves and (b) 
proportion of learning that is OBSERVE, averaged over each strategy 
a. b. 
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would be more evident when we excluded EXPLOIT moves that were 
overwhelmingly frequent, and compared REFINE with more equivalent types 
of moves. Nonetheless, there was no significant relationship between the 
proportion of REFINE moves relative to all learning moves and score 
(Spearman’s ρ = -0.21, p = 0.21), or between the proportion of REFINE moves 
relative to INNOVATE moves (Spearman’s ρ = 0.28, p = 0.1; Fig 2.9). This 
suggests that the relationship between the amount of refinement and score 
was not very strong, and overwhelmed by the very strong effect of how much a 
strategy played EXPLOIT had on its score.  
 
2.4.3. Overall refinement  
A straightforward way to quantify how much refinement was taking place in 
each simulation is to measure the maximum refinement level achieved by the 
population at the end of the simulation. In the first stage, there was a strongly 
bimodal distribution in the tournament results – most of the simulations 
exhibited either very low or very high levels of refinement (Fig. 2.10). This 
pattern is partly due to the fact that 15 out of the 51 entrant strategies never 
make use of the refine move. Excluding the strategies that do not use refine 
does not however change the picture qualitatively: there was still a 
considerable number of simulations in which the refinement level stayed very 
low (Fig. 2.10). This is because there was considerable variation in how 
strategies employ refinement moves (Fig. 2.11). Overall, 60% of the 
simulations achieved a final refinement level of 100, the maximum value.  
Figure 2.9 – (a) relationship between score and amount of REFINE as a proportion 
of all learning moves and (b) as a proportion of just REFINE and INNOVATE learning 
moves 
a. b. 
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Figure 2.10 – (a) distribution of final maximum refinement level in the tournament in all 
simulations and (b) in simulations that include only strategies that use refine 
a. b. 
Figure 2.11 - distribution of mean proportion refine moves per simulation for each 
strategy, ordered from the top left by score in descending order 
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A refined environment should be beneficial irrespective of whether a strategy 
plays REFINE or not, because it merely ensures that some acts are 
disproportionately more advantageous. With respect to how beneficial it is for 
a strategy to use REFINE, we had no expectations. One the one hand, it could 
be that strategies that use REFINE, compared to strategies that do not, 
manage to use refinement as a niche-construction-like process to transform 
the environment so it becomes more advantageous for them to play in. On the 
other hand, refinement is costly, so it could be the case that strategies that use 
REFINE actually lose out by investing moves in refinement, while strategies 
that do not benefit from the extra EXPLOIT moves.  
However, there was no significant difference in score between strategies that 
did and did not use REFINE moves (W(102) = 1382, p = 0.059) and, if 
anything, there was  a trend towards non-refine strategies performing better 
(Fig. 2.12 – although the difference in performance between the two types of 
strategies was not significant when comparing average scores, it was actually 
significant when comparing the full distribution of scores in all simulations – 
W(61200) =  451 x 106, p < 0.001). It seems that a strategy can do well in an 
environment that allows for refinement even if it does not use refinement 
itself. 
 
 
Figure 2.12 – average scores for strategies that never use REFINE moves (left), and 
strategies that do (right), respectively 
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2.4.4. Refinement environments  
The divergent distribution in the amount of refinement that takes place across 
simulations was unexpected. As mentioned above, a refined environment 
should be beneficial for all strategies, irrespective of whether they use 
REFINE or not, but given that there was a difference in performance between 
strategy types, perhaps strategies behave differently in a fully refined 
environment as opposed to a non-refined environment. There was a 
significant difference in average scores between strategies that found 
themselves in a fully refined environment and the strategies that found 
themselves in a non-refined environment (Wilcoxon W(102) = 947, p = 
0.018), with scores in a fully refined environment being significantly higher 
than scores in a non-refined environment (Fig. 2.13).  
 
Interestingly, average scores showed a different distribution depending on the 
refinement environment to which they belonged (Fig. 2.14). While scores in a 
fully refined environment were skewed towards higher values, scores in the 
non-refined environment exhibited again an abrupt split, with most values 
clustering at extreme values.  
 
Figure 2.13 – average scores for all strategies in different refinement 
environments: fully refined (left) and unrefined (right) 
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Breaking this down further, there was a difference between the performance 
of strategies that used REFINE moves and strategies that did not in different 
refinement environments  (Fig. 2.15). It seems that strategies that did not use 
refine were unaffected by the type of refinement environment they found 
themselves in, while strategies that made use of refine were highly sensitive to 
the environment, performing worse in a non- refined environment but also 
modifying their environment through refining into one in which they do 
better.  
 
Figure 2.14 – (a) average score distributions and density plots in a fully refined 
environment and (b) a non-refined environment 
a. b. 
Figure 2.15 – average score distributions for by environment type, for both 
strategies that do and do not use refine 
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Results from the linear model described in the Methods used in order to 
investigate the interaction between the type of refinement environment and 
the type of refine strategy are shown below in Table 1, and assume a non-
refine strategy in a non-refined environment as the baseline. Since the model 
included the average score for each strategy as an offset, the results represent 
an average increase or decrease in score relative to this average score 
depending on the strategy type and the refinement environment type.  The 
model confirmed the interaction, and was notably powerful in explaining 
score variation - the model explained 80% of the variation (adjusted R-
squared = 0.809, F(3,98) = 144.3, p < 0.001).  
The results indicate that the type of environment in terms of refinement was 
not a significant predictor of score, but whether the strategy usesd REFINE 
was, and so was the interaction between environment type and strategy type. 
This interaction was driven by the strategies that used REFINE, which showed 
a large difference in score depending on the environment type they found 
themselves in (Fig. 2.16). Strategies that refine performed significantly better 
in a refined environment, but the type of environment did not seem to matter 
for strategies that did not use refine. Indeed, this model confirms that a 
mismatch in environment and strategy types is not beneficial for either 
strategy type, but refine strategies are particularly affected. For a refine 
strategy, it is plainly beneficial to be in a refined environment. 
Variable β 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
t-value p-value 
Intercept -0.0008 0.0315  -0.026   0.97 
environment type:refined 0.0306  0.044    0.686   0.49 
strategy type:refine -0.108 0.038  -2.856   0.005 ** 
Environment:refined * 
strategy:refine 
0.131   0.053   2.441   0.016 * 
Table 2.1 – results from the linear model score ~ environment*strategy + average_score 
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2.4.5. Discussion 
Naturally, the refinement environment a strategy finds itself in is not imposed 
top-down, but is the result of an interaction between the refinement moves 
performed by the two strategies competing in each pairwise Stage I 
simulation. Therefore, this result that refine strategies do well in a refined 
environment could mean that in fact, successful refine strategies are good at 
transforming the environment into a refined environment, while good non-
refine strategies are good at ensuring the environment is not refined, 
potentially by invading the other strategy before it has time to achieve high 
refinement levels. Therefore, a refine strategy that finds itself at the end of the 
simulation in an unrefined environment was probably not very successful at 
invading and ensuring full refinement – similarly, a non-refine strategy that 
finds itself in a fully refined environment was probably taken over by a refine 
strategy. A fully refined environment should be beneficial to any strategy, as 
Figure 2.16 – Predictions from the linear model score ~ environment*strategy + 
average_score presented in Table 1. The points plot the average increase or 
decrease relative to the average score, and the bars indicate standard errors 
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long as they implement a learning algorithm that is successful enough to take 
advantage of this benefit. The conundrum posed by refine strategies not 
performing well in a refined environment could have an easy explanation – 
not all refine strategies make use of an efficient learning algorithm, and 
therefore do not manage to take advantage of the refined environment nor 
prosper during that period before high levels of refinement are achieved.  
The relationship between score and final refinement level suggests this was 
indeed the case (Fig. 2.17). There was a significant negative correlation in the 
case of non-refiners (Spearman ρ = -0.78, p<0.001), suggesting that good 
non-refiners were good at invading quickly, before the other strategy has time 
to refine. When non-refiners lose out to refining strategies, then the latter also 
ensure a refined environment, creating this negative relationship. On the 
other hand, there was no relationship in the case of refiners – there were 
plenty of refiner strategies that performed well at all average levels of 
refinement. This was caused by a complicated relationship between refining, 
over-refining, and learning.  
 
When it comes to refiners playing against non-refiners, refining strategies pay 
the cost of lost exploit moves, but improve the cultural environment for those 
free-loading non-refiners. To estimate whether a behaviour is refined enough, 
an individual needs to refine further in order to receive payoff information, 
Non-refiners Refiners 
Figure 2.17 - Correlation between score and average refinement level at the end of 
the simulation, averaged over every strategy, for strategies that do not use refine 
and strategies that do use refine  
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thus adding to the excess refinement. Therefore, refining above optimal levels 
is not a completely irrational behaviour (since some ‘test’ REFINE moves are 
needed to be sure that there are not further unrealised benefits available from 
additional refinement). It could be then that what contributes most to a 
refiner’s success is not how much refinement they do, but rather how good the 
strategy is at learning in general, and how good it is at exploiting a refined 
environment.  
Several strategies refined more than necessary. The refinement context 
creates a dilemma – individuals are born in a world where refinement is 
beneficial, as it increases payoff, but investing moves in refining is not. 
Ideally, someone else would have refined already, and individuals would just 
have to copy those refined moves. Improving on hundreds of previous refine 
moves would be impossible in one agent lifespan, while copying them is 
cheap. Therefore the population as a whole benefits from a level of refinement 
much higher than what an individual benefits from. This happens because 
individuals benefit from being born in an already refined world where they 
can copy a highly refined behaviour, but do not benefit from actually investing 
in that refinement.  
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2.5. How does refinement affect cultural diversity? 
2.5.1. Methods 
Following Rendell et al. (2011), this section addresses the effect of refinement 
on cultural diversity.  In this context, cultural diversity is quantified in terms 
of the number of acts present in the combined repertoires or expressed 
behaviours of all the agents the population at a specific time point (expressed 
as a proportion of the 100 total possible to obtain). For example, if different 
agents use a variety of different acts, the culture of that population can be 
described as relatively diverse, while a situation of low cultural diversity would 
be defined by a large number of agents using the same acts.  This analysis 
entails a shift of emphasis from the individual or strategy level to population 
level outcomes. To measure diversity, I made a distinction between the acts 
the population knows and the acts the population uses. Therefore I defined 
‘Knowledge’ as the combined repertoire of all the agents alive in the 
population at a certain time point, while ‘Behaviour’ was the set of acts being 
exploited in the population at that point in time.  
For both, cultural diversity was quantified using metrics I terms ‘amount’, 
‘evenness’ and ‘persistence’ (after Rendell et al. 2011). Amount was calculated 
as the mean or median proportion of possible acts used or known by at least 
one agent in each round in the last quarter of the simulations, averaged over 
demes in spatial extension.  Evenness, the flatness of the frequency 
distribution of behaviour patterns across the population, was measured using 
Pielou’s evenness index,  
𝐽 = ! !! !"!!!!!!!" !   
 (Equation 2.3) 
 Here pi traditionally represents the proportion of species i and S is the 
number of species (Smith and Wilson, 1996). In the tournament context, each 
species i represented an act, so pi was calculated as the proportion of agents 
using act i. Here maximum evenness was achieved when all possible acts are 
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performed with equal frequency, whilst minimum evenness would represent 
the situation in which all agents perform the same single act. Persistence 
refers to the mean, median, or maximum number of rounds that an act was 
exploited or that knowledge of it persisted within the population, without a 
break, within a population. In the cumulative extension, refinement level was 
not differentiated – an act was treated as the same after it had been refined. 
We averaged each diversity measure over all simulations in a given extension, 
at every 1000 time steps, to see how the measure changes over time. 
In the section that follows I first present basic results from the first stage, 
which hold for the rest of the tournament as well, and then proceed by 
introducing evidence from the later stages. I conclude by exploring the 
relationship between diversity and performance, with evidence focusing on 
the top ten strategies, to understand the role that refinement specifically 
played in the observed patterns.  
2.5.2. Stage I 
2.5.2.1. Cumulative extension results 
I have shown above that refinement takes place, but this section will provide 
evidence that the presence of refinement also considerably affected the 
diversity of culture. The first piece of evidence for this is the observation that, 
as the refinement level increased, the cultural diversity decreased. Refinement 
level increased over time as the population gradually improved on behaviours 
it already knows and this lead to a decrease in cultural diversity as effective 
learners gradually found the highly refined behaviours and used them 
consistently, making them even more likely to be copied, and so forth, until all 
the population has focused exclusively on the single most refined behaviour 
(Fig. 2.18). 
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Importantly, the population knew a great deal more than it was using (Fig. 
2.19). The amount of both behaviour and knowledge decreased over time, 
which is not unexpected as the population is filtering and ultimately 
discarding ineffective acts, yet behaviour remained consistently much lower 
than knowledge. Crucially, the population converged very quickly on a very 
small number of acts. The amount values suggest that the population was 
using only 3-4 acts at any time, although it had around 40 in its combined 
knowledge repertoire. 
 
Figure 2.18 - behaviour amount and evenness as a function of refinement level over 
time. Each point here is an average of all simulations, taken every 500 iterations, 
with time indicated by symbol shading 
 
Figure 2.19 – (a) behaviour and knowledge amount and (b) behaviour and knowledge 
evenness as a function of time, averaged across all simulations, every 500 iterations. 
 
a. b. 
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A low evenness means most individuals know or use the same behaviour. 
When the population converges on the same acts, either in knowledge or 
behaviour, then evenness decreases.  Therefore, here, although the population 
knew a more diverse repertoire, it used a very small number of acts, those that 
had been refined the most (Fig. 2.19b). 
The data on persistence paint a similar picture. Knowledge persisted in the 
population longer than behaviour. Bear in mind that persistence was 
calculated as the number of rounds that acts were used or known by at least 
one member of the population. Most acts did not last in the population’s 
behaviour or knowledge repertoires for long, but the ones that did last, lasted 
for a very, very long time – hence the large difference between the mean and 
maximum persistences we observed (Fig. 2.20) – the latter are close to the 
maximum number of possible rounds. These long lasting acts are the refined 
acts. 
 
  
Figure 2.20 – (a) average mean and (b) maximum persistence for knowledge and 
behaviour 
 
a. b. 
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2.5.2.2. Across extensions 
We can also compare cultural diversity across tournament extensions. 
Although I have not described results from the other two extensions in any 
detail, they provide control groups for understanding the effect of cumulative 
refinement. If the decrease in diversity described above is due to a 
convergence in the population on the refined behaviours, then we expect less 
convergence (i.e. higher diversity and evenness) in the other two extensions. 
Of course, convergence can occur without cumulative culture. Populations 
mostly containing strategies that deploy effective learning, or identify good 
models, would still be expected to converge on the best behaviours. 
Nonetheless, neither extension creates a similar situation to refinement, 
where the payoffs from the best behaviour are so large that environmental 
variation becomes proportionally negligible. In the other two extensions, even 
strategies that are excellent learners would still need to maintain a more 
varied repertoire in order to buffer environmental variation and make sure 
they have fall-back options in case the best act known stops being useful. 
Therefore, although we expect cultural diversity to decrease across all 
extensions, this decrease should be more dramatic in the cumulative case.  
Indeed, it seems that in the absence of refinement, populations maintained 
higher amounts of behaviour and knowledge. This was true for both the 
spatial and model bias extension (Fig. 2.21), and it happened precisely 
because of the convergence due to refinement – individuals simply did not 
need to know as much as long as they had an act in their repertoire that was 
refined enough. Similarly, in the cumulative extension, evenness was lower, 
and decreased more sharply than in the other two extensions as populations 
homed in on the most refined behaviour and individuals ceased to learn after 
they have acquired it. Finally, in the cumulative extension acts persisted for 
longer, while the other two extensions showed considerable turnover (Fig. 
2.22).  
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Thus, in the cumulative extension behavioural diversity was lowest relative to 
the other extensions, decreased the most, and persisted the longest both on 
average and for the longest lasting act. This suggests that the population 
converged on a very small number of acts very quickly, and carried on using 
those acts for the whole time. Knowledge, on the other hand, showed a slightly 
more complicated pattern. The amount and evenness were, again, lowest in 
the cumulative case, but the persistence was lowest on average, and maximum 
persistence was highest. This would suggest that in the cumulative extension, 
the population-wide repertoire was smaller, the longest persisting acts 
(presumably the refined acts) persisted for a very long time, but there was 
higher turnover on average in the population as indicated by the average 
knowledge persistence, because only highly refined acts tended to get passed 
on by copying. The refined acts were the ones the whole population knows and 
uses, and therefore there was little pressure to maintain other acts in the 
repertoire because they would not be as useful as the refined acts, nor 
necessary as fall-back options. This translated into a higher turnover of acts 
known on average, so at any time the population repertoire consisted of very 
few refined acts which persisted and multiple disposable acts that the 
population kept replacing. 
Figure 2.21 – amount and evenness for behaviour and knowledge over time, for 
each extension, in Stage I 
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2.5.3. Stages II and III  
In this section I present cultural diversity results from the entire set of 
simulations in Stage II and III, using the full set of parameters and strategies 
included in each respective stage. These two stages only included the top ten 
performing strategies, so they provide insight into how cultural diversity 
changes in the context of successful strategies.  
Again, the cumulative extension exhibited the most convergence, as indicated 
by all three cultural measures. In Stage III, with all three extensions active 
simultaneously, we expect refinement to have the same strong convergence 
effect, and consequently to drive cultural diversity in this stage to be more 
similar to the diversity in the cumulative extension in previous stages, and 
that is indeed what we found (Fig. 2.23) Population outcomes in Stage III 
were much closer to those of Stage II in the cumulative extension than any 
other extension. Even more, the Stage III results are characterised by still 
lower amounts and evenness of knowledge and behaviour. Likewise, 
maximum persistence was very high. It seems then that, in the final stage of 
Figure 2.22 – average and maximum behaviour (top) and knowledge persistence 
(bottom) across the three extensions, in Stage I 
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the tournament, the cultural dynamics are most strongly influenced by the 
forces we see in the cumulative-only Stage II. The population is very good at 
converging almost immediately on a very small set of acts they continue to use 
for the rest of the simulation, while rapidly discarding any newly learned acts 
that do not prove as beneficial.  
 
2.5.4. Diversity over the parameter space in Stage II 
The second stage of the tournament provides the most variation in terms of 
the parameter space explored, and therefore represents the focus of this 
section. We expected cultural diversity to vary across the parameter space, as 
the amount of learning and the diffusion of information changes with different 
parameters. When the probability of environmental change, pc, increased, so 
did the amount, evenness, and maximum persistence, while average 
persistence lowered slightly (Fig. 2.24). These are all effects we would expect if 
the rate of learning increases, leading the population to maintain a larger 
repertoire with a higher turnover. The rate of failure of social learning pcopyFail 
seems to have a similar but weaker effect on cultural diversity.  
Figure 2.23 – cultural diversity measures across extension for Stage II (cumulative, 
model bias, and spatial extensions), and Stage III (all three extensions active, here in 
black). The timelines illustrate knowledge and behaviour amount and evenness over 
time, and the bar charts illustrate average and maximum persistence for knowledge 
and behaviour 
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When rmax increased, the amount and evenness of knowledge and behaviour 
decreased drastically (Fig. 2.25). Both average and maximum persistence 
remained relatively unchanged. Thus lower values of rmax were associated with 
lower levels of convergence. If only a little refinement is possible, then refined 
behaviours are not as valuable (i.e. they do not add as much increment to the 
basic payoff, and payoffs are still proportionally much more affected by 
environmental change), and individuals can themselves fully refine 
behaviours in their own lifetime, thus they do not need to copy many 
generations’ worth of refinement. Therefore, there is less pressure to copy and 
share the refined behaviours in the population, which results in lower 
convergence and higher cultural diversity. Crucially, only when refinement 
can reach levels individuals cannot attain in their own lifespans do we see the 
most drastic loss of diversity.  
Figure 2.24 – cultural diversity measures as a function of pc and pcopyFail in 
Stage II. Timelines of amount and evenness are presented as line charts, 
while the boxplots illustrate mean values for mean and maximum persistence 
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In the case of nobserve, interesting patterns emerged from the effect the number 
of available models has on the diffusion of information. Both the amount of 
knowledge and behaviour were highest when only one model was available, 
but similarly lower once individuals were exposed to more than one model. 
Maximum and mean persistence both increased monotonically with 
increasing nobserve. Evenness, however, showed a different pattern. When 
nobserve was 1, evenness started high and decreased abruptly. When nobserve was 
high, evenness started low but did not change much. When nobserve  = 2, 
though, the evennes started high but decreased quickly and abruptly – after a 
quarter of the simulation time, the evenness value was the lowest here out of 
all nobserve values, and remained the lowest. Therefore this suggests we see the 
most drastic convergence when individuals can observe two models.  
 
The relationship between cultural diversity and nobserve is explained by how the 
number of models affects the speed of diffusion, which in turn affects the rate 
Figure 2.25 – cultural diversity measures as a function of rmax and nObserve, in 
Stage II 
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of refinement. Assuming that in all cases agents are equally good at 
identifying and copying the most successful acts, they will copy the refined 
acts that provide the best payoff. We expect that when information spreads 
very fast, as is it is the case for high nobserve values, the successfully refined acts 
are quickly copied and additionally refined. This would mean that at the 
beginning of each simulation, as information spreads quickly, there is a brief 
flowering of diversity, followed by quick convergence on refined acts, which 
persist over time. The evenness remains relatively high though, suggesting 
that although there is a small number of acts in the population (as the data on 
amount of culture illustrate), and although these few acts persist, the 
population converges on a more diverse set of acts which is captured by higher 
evnness values.  
When only one model is available, information spreads relatively slowly. 
Individuals have a harder time identifying the best acts, which means they 
maintain a higher number of alternative acts in their repertoire – this is 
confirmed by the high amount values and low persistence. With time, though, 
they manage to find refined acts and converge on them, as indicated by the 
steady decrease in evenness. The interesting case happens when the nobserve 
value is 2. Here the information spread is not too slow to inhibit quick 
refinement, as when nobserve = 1, but neither fast enough to allow for too much 
parallel refinement. It takes longer for an act to become established and 
refined by the population, so refining several acts at the same time is more 
costly. This drives the population to converge quickly on a small number of 
acts that persist, as confirmed by the small amount values, high persistence 
values, and quick and strong decrease in evenness.  
2.5.5. Diversity and performance	  
This final section addresses the relationship between cultural diversity and 
strategy performance. I hypothesised that more successful strategies will be 
better at refining efficiently, which would translate into more drastic 
convergence. I isolated Stage I simulations that only included strategies that 
scored in the top ten, and compared them with the diversity results of 
simulations containing the rest of the strategies. Better learners should be able 
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to use refinement to their advantage, and converge more effectively on the 
most beneficial behaviours. Therefore, I expected that the diversity measures 
for simulations with the top ten strategies would show higher convergence 
than simulations containing less effective strategies.  
Indeed, the amount and evenness were lower in the best ten strategies, and 
acts persisted generally for a longer time (Fig. 2.26). In the case of behaviour, 
good strategies started with a smaller, but less even set of acts they use, as 
illustrated by lower amount but higher evenness values compared to the 
strategies not scoring in the top ten. The top ten population quickly converged 
on one or two behaviours, which lasted for a long time. The amount of 
knowledge was also very low compared to less effective strategies, with a 
rapidly decreasing evenness.  
The longest persisting act lasted for a long time (more than 70% of the total 
number of rounds) in the population of top ten strategies, but the average 
persistence was much lower than for the rest of the strategies (Fig. 2.27). This 
again can be explained by convergence on refined acts. Similarly to the 
comparison between the cumulative extension and the other two extensions, 
here there is little pressure to maintain other acts in the repertoire as a 
backup, as long as the refined acts are known. In this case, too, we expect the 
top ten population repertoire would contain only a small number of refined 
acts that persist, along with several expendable acts that exhibit high 
turnover, which is what was observed. In sum, strategies that performed well 
in this tournament extension were highly effective at converging on highly 
refined behaviours.  
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Figure 2.26 – amount and evenness, for both behaviour and amount, in 
simulations that only include topten strategies (pink) and simulations with the rest 
of the 41 strategies (yellow), in Stage I 
Figure 2.27 –and mean and maximum persistence, for both behaviour and 
amount, in simulations that only include topten strategies (pink) and simulations 
with the rest of the 41 strategies (yellow), in Stage I 
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2.6. General discussion 
This chapter has shown that in the multi-armed bandit context of the 
tournament, playing REFINE too much is a disadvantage, like INNOVATE 
was in the first tournament. The trade-off between learning and exploiting 
means that individuals should learn as little as possible, and when learning, 
they should copy rather than try to individually learn or improve what they 
know. Therefore a rational agent should invest as little as possible in 
refinement, which is what the results showed. 
 Similarly, I found that in relation to the parameter space, refinement is 
employed more, like any learning move, in faster changing environments, 
when learning is less accurate, and when the number of models is smaller. A 
smaller number of available models means the information spreads slower in 
the population as the agents copy fewer individuals, so achieving optimal 
refinement levels requires a higher rate of REFINE moves. The result that a 
higher number of models was associated with more refinement is in line with 
the literature. As discussed in Chapter 1, studies using both theoretical and 
experimental approaches have shown that large groups promote an increase 
in cultural accumulation of more efficient or more complex skills (Henrich, 
2004; Derex et al., 2013; Muthukrishna et al., 2013). This work has been 
mostly concerned with confirming the link between population size and 
cumulative culture, and less with investigating the mechanisms that might be 
supporting it (though see Chapter 5 for a first attempt). The number of models 
available for copying should surely be a relevant mechanism that, even 
through merely pooling a larger body of information together in a ‘collective 
brain’ type of effect, leads to cultural accumulation, as shown here.  
When learning is less accurate, copying refined behaviours is also less reliable, 
which promotes an increase in refinement rates, potentially as an alternative 
to copying for acquiring beneficial behaviours. The fact that an increase in the 
fidelity of transmission can be associated with less refinement is 
counterintuitive in light of the literature that posits fidelity of transmission as 
a key factor to cumulative culture (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Lewis and 
Laland, 2012; Henrich, 2016). Much work has focused on the fact that for a 
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population to be able to improve on knowledge from previous generations, it 
first needs to maintain that knowledge faithfully enough from one generation 
to another. Therefore cultural accumulation is conceptualised as a two-step 
process: social learning that ensures faithful transmission, followed by 
individual refinement that ensures increase in efficiency. This would mean 
that higher fidelity of transmission should promote increased cultural 
accumulation, but most of this work was concerned with situations in which 
individual improvement in skill is not a viable alternative to copying. In this 
tournament that was not necessarily the case. Here refinement is beneficial, 
but individuals can easily invest in independently refining, so it would make 
sense that when copying is highly error prone, individuals would rely on 
refinement as a way of acquiring the best behaviours, which is what we saw.  
Finally, higher environmental change was associated with more refinement, 
which confirms previous results indicating that cumulative culture should 
provide a quick and flexible way of adapting to fast-changing environments 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985). In the tournament, refinement was modelled as a 
way of overcoming environmental variation by allowing a population to refine 
behaviours to such an extent that environmental variation has negligible 
effects on their payoffs. Therefore, if the environment changes very quickly, it 
is more advantageous to invest in refining rather than invest in trying to keep 
track of the best behaviours through either copying or individual learning. 
Results show that this was precisely what strategies chose to do, which 
resulted in higher refinement levels for higher rates of environmental change.  
There is a clear strategic aspect to playing REFINE. Being in a refined 
population is individually beneficial, as it means one just needs to copy a well 
enough refined behaviour rather than invest tens of moves in trying to refine 
on their own. But for a population to become refined, some agents need to 
sacrifice moves in order to refine. This leads to a conflict of interest, since the 
population as a whole benefits from a rate of refinement much higher than 
what is individually optimal. Nonetheless, populations managed to use 
refinement optimally, as the observed level of refinement was consistent with 
values at which refinement ceases to provide increasing advantage due to the 
diminishing returns function associated with the refinement increment. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
76 
While non-refine strategies showed little difference in performance depending 
on the type of environment they found themselves in, the environment 
mattered a great deal to strategies that made use of refinement. By using 
refinement and thus overcoming environmental variation, strategies can 
construct a more advantageous environment through a process evocative of 
niche-construction (Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman, 2000). This was 
clearly illustrated by the fact that strategies that used refine did not perform 
very well in an unrefined environment, but considerably increased in 
performance in a refined environment. Even more, all strategies scored better 
in a refined environment, indicating that indeed a refined environment was 
beneficial irrespective of the strategy’s approach to refinement. However, 
there is a tension between strategies that do and do not use refine: strategies 
that refine pay the cost of lost exploit moves, but refine the environment for 
everyone. This results in non-refine strategies having a generally higher score, 
even if they never refine.  
Cultural diversity in the simulations showed a pattern of strong convergence: 
the amount and evenness decreased as the population focused on a very small 
number of refined acts, which persisted for most of the simulation. There was 
sharper convergence in the cumulative extension, as expected if refinement 
promotes higher convergence, and in the top ten strategies, suggesting that 
better performing strategies used refinement more efficiently. The fact that 
simulations including better performing strategies are characterised by 
stronger convergence suggests more successful strategies are better at refining 
and consequently converging on the refined acts. Therefore we expect natural 
selection to favour strategies that perform in ways that strengthen the 
convergence effect, which should lead to more and more strategies that 
converge more strongly, which would further increase the convergence effect. 
It seems then that, for individuals, investing in refining is costly, while 
copying someone else’s refinement is cheap. This leads to the entire 
population converging on a very small set of refined behaviours that stay 
unchanged. Of course, we would expect some degree of convergence in the 
other extensions too, as agents gradually learn the most beneficial behaviours. 
This effect would be stronger in the model-bias case than in the spatial 
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extension, where having the option to choose whom to copy from facilitates 
effective learning and convergence on the best behaviours, and this is indeed 
what we saw.  
Nonetheless, there seems to be a qualitative difference in convergence in the 
cumulative extension. More refinement of each behaviour results in higher 
payoff, but refinement is costly, especially the type of refinement that can take 
the population into a world unaffected by environmental variation. 
Strategically, the population should not refine randomly, but concentrate on 
one or two behaviours and improve them as long as refinement pays off. Once 
the population has settled on a couple of trajectories of refinement in which it 
has invested many moves, the only rational strategy for an individual is to 
copy the refined behaviours and potentially refine further, rather than try to 
start over with a new behaviour that will never pay as much. Obviously, the 
individuals themselves are born naïve, not knowing how refined acts are in the 
population – nevertheless, attempting to copy the best refined acts is the 
optimal individual strategy. Thus, the cumulative setting creates an extra 
pressure for convergence, as copying is much more crucial for performance 
than in the other extensions if highly refined behaviours are available to copy. 
This extreme convergence leads the population to use the same one or two 
behaviours at a time. This results in a pattern in the population that resembles 
conformity, even in the absence of an explicit conformist bias. This is not an 
isolated result (Franz and Matthews, 2010; L Rendell et al., 2011). Using 
methods very similar to the ones used here, Rendell et al. (2011) showed that 
in the first Social Learning Strategies Tournament, the population converged 
on a smaller set of acts as a result of learning the beneficial behaviours. The 
authors found that this convergence becomes less strong when the 
environment changes faster, as the beneficial acts become obsolete faster, and 
updating and learning new information is necessary. Here we have shown that 
this convergence is even stronger in a cumulative culture setting – we confirm 
these results through empirical approaches in the next chapter. 
Therefore, the evidence points towards the fact that in a well-defined problem 
space, strategic individuals can naturally come to acquire the same behaviours 
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simply because they successfully learned what the best behaviours are. This 
learning is often mediated by copying, and a cumulative setting provides 
increased incentive to copy, because in a cumulative setting discovering or 
creating, through refinement, successful solutions alone is especially difficult, 
but copying is easy. As a result, the population converges on similar behaviour 
and, depending on the strength of copying, this similarity of behaviour can be 
so high that the pattern that emerges in the population can be easily confused 
with what we would expect conformist bias to lead to. This would therefore 
indicate a more complex interaction between cumulative culture and 
conformity (or at least population level patterns consistent with conformity) 
than currently suggested by the literature (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Chudek 
and Henrich, 2011). 
The pressure to copy created in the cumulative extension discussed here 
incentivises credulity. Copying is so much more beneficial for individuals that, 
in a refined world where everyone is using the refined behaviour, individuals 
should blindly copy rather than try to refine on their own. This situation 
relates to the trade-off between social learning and credulity that Boyd and 
Richerson (2009) discuss. According to these authors, social learning allows 
populations to accumulate adaptive knowledge through cumulative culture, 
and this requires them to often copy opaque technologies and norms without 
necessarily understanding how they work. This credulity, though, would also 
lead to the accumulation of maladaptive beliefs and practices. The trade-off is, 
then, between copying too little and potentially missing out on adaptive 
knowledge, and copying too much and potentially acquiring unsuitable 
behaviour. Boyd and Richerson claim that the optimum in the case of humans 
has led to substantial cultural transmission.  
There is some evidence in humans that blind copying of social norms is indeed 
taking place (Henrich and Henrich, 2010), and Joe Henrich fully supports 
credulity as key to the evolution of human society and our success as a species 
(Henrich, 2016). According to him, our success in colonising virtually the 
entire planet is not due to individual human intelligence, but due to small 
incremental improvements in knowledge supported by cultural transmission 
and population dynamics. In this view, improvement over generations relies 
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on blindly copying opaque technology and knowledge – if individuals did not 
show this level of credulity, faithful transmission would be impossible, which 
would hinder cumulative culture. However, it still debated whether humans 
are blind or selective copiers (Enquist and Eriksson, 2007; Enquist and 
Ghirlanda, 2007), or whether pure copying even is the main mode of learning 
(Morin, 2015, 2016). We expect that, depending on context, domain, and 
circumstances, humans would rely more or less selectively on replicative 
social learning.  
Although much more realistic than most analytical models in the literature, 
the tournament still greatly simplifies real-world phenomena. For the 
cumulative extension, we focused on a type of refinement that, like human 
culture, would allow a population to overcome environmental variation. In 
this case, the rational response is for the whole population to converge on one 
or two behaviours. However, this drastic convergence is not entirely 
characteristic of human culture. Human populations show remarkable 
variation in their cultural repertoires, which are a great deal smaller than the 
whole of human cultural knowledge. This contrast forms something of a 
paradox in the tension between convergence in the tournament and diversity 
in the real world. We could, then, imagine a scenario in which extreme 
environmental change events, or mass migration, could render the current 
cultural repertoire useless. In this case, the population would need to 
maintain more cultural diversity in order to have useful behaviours to fall 
back on, like in the other two extensions.  
We focused on refinement here, but clearly there are other processes involved 
in cumulative culture that display different dynamics. Recombination, for 
example, is one aspect that has been claimed to rest at the heart of cumulative 
cultural evolution (Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, 2011b), yet little effort has 
been spent exploring it. This is due mostly to the fact that recombination 
cannot be modelled as straightforwardly as refinement, and most 
experimental tasks used so far do not allow for recombination (though see 
Derex & Boyd, 2016 for a first attempt in this direction, and the following 
chapter). We can easily imagine that, were we to focus on recombination, we 
would find increased variation, as opposed to the strong convergence we 
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found here. This interplay between different processes involved in cumulative 
culture could explain the fact that, despite the convergence we witness in the 
cumulative extension, real world human culture is actually characterised by an 
astonishing amount of diversity. Thus, a complete account would look beyond 
the approaches current literature has been focusing on, and endeavour to take 
into account the full range of processes that contribute to cumulative cultural 
evolution.
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Chapter 3 
Behavioural Homogeneity without 
Conformity in Cumulative Culture 
 
Abst ract  
Cumulative culture, the ability to build progressively on the achievements of 
previous generations, is a central aspect of human uniqueness, but 
experimental investigations of this phenomenon do not currently extend 
beyond simple tasks and small populations. I studied the dynamics of 
cumulative culture in a realistic setting with a large-scale dataset of computer 
code obtained from a series of collaborative programming competitions 
involving hundreds of participants run over a 14-year period. Participants 
submitted solutions to a non-trivial computational problem, and the 
submitted solutions were then made available to all for use in subsequent 
submissions. I quantified the extent to which copying took place, and its 
consequences on the diversity of culture. As improvement in the complex 
tasks became progressively more difficult with the accumulation of more 
valuable information, populations largely focused on copying and improving 
the current best entry. As a result I observed patterns of convergence, 
punctuated by jumps from one idea to another. This convergence lead to a 
decrease in cultural diversity over time, as the population focused on solutions 
that have already benefitted from improvements made by many participants. 
We conclude that when complex solutions are built over time through 
cumulative culture, conformity as a population outcome need not depend on 
cognitive processes that drive individuals to copy the majority. Instead, it 
could simply be an emergent pattern in a population of individuals 
independently copying in a cumulative culture context. The question of 
whether this emergent conformity is in any sense an optimally adaptive 
approach to complex problems remains open.	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3.1. Introduction	  
The cultural transmission of knowledge and skills, and concomitant advances 
in technology, have led to incredible demographic and ecological 
accomplishments in our species (Mathew and Perreault, 2015), but the key 
aspects that set human culture apart from anything seen in non-humans are 
still to be definitively identified. Proposed as a crucial element for this 
distinction, cumulative culture is the accumulation of knowledge over time, 
often associated with an increase in efficiency or complexity, and leads to a 
“ratchet” effect that allows populations to construct incrementally improved 
technologies that could not have been invented by a single individual, yet 
which are maintained over generations (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1996; 
Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner, 1993). 
A set of cognitive processes that include teaching, language, imitation and 
prosociality seem to allow this uniquely human accumulation of knowledge 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Galef, 1992; Tomasello, 1999; Laland, 2004; 
Tennie, Call and Tomasello, 2009). Notably, human reliance on imitation has 
received support as a key element of cumulative culture (Caldwell and Millen, 
2009; Tennie, Call and Tomasello, 2009; Lewis and Laland, 2012; Derex, 
Godelle and Raymond, 2013); but see also (Marshall-Pescini and Whiten, 
2008), yet a recent comparative study on cumulative improvement seems to 
indicate that this factor is not uniquely important. Rather, humans seem to 
rely on a package of social cognitive capabilities, encompassing teaching 
(largely through verbal instruction) as well as imitation and altruism (Dean et 
al., 2012).  
Additionally, spurred by the observation that bigger populations sustain larger 
and more complex sets of cultural adaptations (Shennan, 2001; Powell, 
Shennan and Thomas, 2009; Kline and Boyd, 2010), a large amount of 
research effort has gone into investigating the relationship between 
population size and cultural complexity. As discussed in the introduction, 
population size, sociality, and demography have all been proven to be a 
facilitators of cumulative culture through theoretical modelling (Henrich, 
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2004; Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Enquist et al., 2010; Lehmann, Aoki and 
Feldman, 2011; Kobayashi and Aoki, 2012; Pradhan, Tennie and van Schaik, 
2012; Vaesen, 2012), experimental approaches (Caldwell and Millen, 2010; 
Derex et al., 2013; Muthukrishna et al., 2013; Kempe and Mesoudi, 2014), as 
well as field studies with real populations (Kline and Boyd, 2010; Collard, 
Ruttle, et al., 2013) . 
Despite these insights, methodological limitations still restrict our knowledge 
of the drivers and dynamics of cumulative cultural evolution in contexts that 
approach modern complexity levels. On the one hand, the modelling work in 
this field typically operationalizes cumulative culture as either an increase in 
the number of cultural traits in the population (Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; 
Strimling et al., 2009), or an increase in skill level in a single trait (Henrich, 
2004), but struggles to capture the complexity of interaction between traits 
that characterize cumulative culture (although see (Enquist, Ghirlanda and 
Eriksson, 2011) for a first suggestion in this direction). On the other hand, 
experimental approaches have been forced to focus on highly simple cases.  
For instance, Caldwell and Millen (Caldwell and Millen, 2008) adapted a 
long-standing micro-society paradigm to simulate inter-generational 
transmission in the study of cumulative culture (Mesoudi and Whiten, 2008; 
Hoppitt and Laland, 2013). Groups of participants tried to solve simple tasks 
such as building paper airplanes or spaghetti towers – some building, some 
observing. After a fixed period of time the observers became builders, and the 
builders were replaced by naïve observers. The experiments showed that, even 
in such simple conditions, chains improve over generations, and even show 
descent with modification, as designs became more similar within chains than 
across them. These studies have been criticized however as using too simple a 
task, which might affect the results and the conclusions that can be drawn 
regarding cumulative cultural evolution (Derex et al., 2013; Muthukrishna et 
al., 2013). 
Subsequent studies have adapted this microsociety design to more complex 
tasks like building an intricate fishing net or arrowhead, or reproducing a 
complicated graphical symbol or knot (Derex, Godelle and Raymond, 2013; 
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Muthukrishna et al., 2013; Derex et al., 2015; Derex and Boyd, 2016). These 
results are in line with theoretical predictions, suggesting that cumulative 
cultural evolution relies crucially on larger population sizes and process 
information, yet there is still a large gap between these experimental settings 
and real-world cumulative culture, especially with regards to exploring the 
interactions between a large number of participants in a complex task that 
allows for open-ended improvement.  
The challenge in finding an appropriate task is that one of the defining 
characteristics of cumulative culture is its overwhelming complexity – it 
typically involves material artefacts that are constructed using opaque 
techniques and processes, which consist of a complex interaction of traits that 
cannot be easily reproduced (Oswalt, 1976). These artefacts are typically used 
to find the best solution in multimodal adaptive landscapes (Mesoudi, 2008), 
where the best solution is unclear and very difficult to find, such that the 
relationship between traits and payoffs is obscured. It is difficult to anticipate 
how well the results of laboratory experiments to date hold when complexity 
scales up to levels comparable to human culture today. As population size 
increases, for example, so does the cost of filtering information and 
discriminating between payoffs. In this context, the deployment of social 
learning strategies which dictate how individuals learn from each other could 
critically affect the distribution of traits in the population and the rate of 
change of these traits (Laland, 2004; Rendell et al., 2010).   
The recombination of already established cultural traits is also thought to play 
a central role in cumulative cultural evolution (Basalla, 1988), along with 
other innovative mechanisms such as modification and invention, as key 
processes contributing to improving culturally transmitted information and 
leading to cultural ratcheting (Tomasello, 1999). While the fidelity of 
transmission has been studied extensively in the cultural evolution literature, 
as discussed in Chapter 1, very little is understood about how creativity shapes 
cumulative culture. Lewis and Laland (2012) introduce one of the few 
theoretical studies investigating the role of cultural recombination in 
cumulative culture. They used a model to show that invention, combination, 
and modification rates are much less important to cultural accumulation than 
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the fidelity of transmission. Enquist et al. (2011) used a more complex 
theoretical paradigm to investigate how different models of interaction 
between cultural traits lead to different population-level dynamics of cultural 
evolution in terms of the increase in cultural complexity and cultural diversity 
between populations. The authors showed that recombination leads to a much 
faster increase in cultural traits than successive modification or 
differentiation. Combining already existing cultural traits decreases similarity 
between different populations, and largely increases cultural complexity 
through an increased rate of innovation that can mitigate cultural loss. 
An empirical study by Derex & Boyd (2016) incorporated recombination as 
the key process involved in cumulative culture. The authors designed a task 
that relied on pre-determined triadic combinations starting from a set of six 
ingredients in order to invent increasingly more rewarding ‘remedies’, which 
could in turn be used in recombination. The number of possible combinations 
increased quickly, and early innovations directed participants on divergent 
trajectories, such that partially connected groups were more successful at 
discovering all innovations than fully connected groups. However, this result 
relied on pre-defined cultural trajectories. Similarly, the types of micro-society 
experiments reported above used tasks that are generally not suited to allow 
for recombination to take place freely, although one study found evidence that 
when presented with five model artefacts, participants tend to copy the best 
performing one, while also including elements from the less effective ones, 
suggesting recombination (Muthukrishna et al., 2013).  Recombination 
becomes a real possibility in a larger population when devising novel solutions 
to problems – and indeed is something that people readily seem to do – but 
current experimental approaches restrict its investigation. 
Separately, the role of conformity in cultural evolution is currently subject to 
considerable debate regarding the degree to which it is adaptive, and the 
extent to which humans and non-human animals actually do conform (see 
Morgan & Laland, 2012; van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014 for reviews). Conformity 
has been approached by both the psychology and the cultural evolution 
literature with slightly different focus – while psychology is mostly interested 
in the conditions under which humans change their behaviour in order to 
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match the majority, cultural evolution is concerned with naïve individuals and 
the circumstances under which they come to acquire the majority behaviour 
(van Leeuwen and Haun, 2014).  
The literature makes a distinction, in terms of the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying conformity, between normative conformity (i.e. individuals 
acquire the majority behaviour in order to affiliate with a group) and 
informational conformity (i.e. individuals acquire the majority behaviour as a 
shortcut to acquiring useful information; van Leeuwen & Haun, 2014). The 
cultural evolution literature is mostly interested in the latter - conformist 
traditions can have substantial fitness benefits to the extent that they facilitate 
the spread of locally adaptive behaviour (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich 
and Boyd, 1998). Conformity provides a possible explanation for cultural 
diversity, as it both increases homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity 
between groups, and it could thereby promote cultural group selection 
(Richerson and Boyd, 2005).  What has been much less considered is how 
conformity interacts with cumulative culture, and whether there are situations 
in which the dynamics of cultural evolution can lead to behavioural 
homogeneity at the population level (i.e. low diversity in behaviour) without 
actually requiring an explicit conformist learning bias. Here I show how a 
history of investment in complex solutions in a cumulative cultural evolution 
context can lead to such outcomes. This distinction is relevant in relation to 
the cultural group hypothesis theory, which suggests that large-scale co-
operation can evolve as a result of inter-group competition (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985).  
In this chapter I introduce a new tractable method of observing cumulative 
cultural evolution on a fine scale in a real-world context that reflects the 
complexity of human behaviour. I analysed cumulative cultural evolution in a 
large-scale dataset of computer code originating from collaborative 
programming competitions organized over the course of 14 years. The dataset 
reaches a level of complexity that has not been achieved by previous 
experimental investigations of cumulative culture. I was particularly 
interested in the dynamics of cumulative cultural evolution, how copying 
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biases and behavioural variation interact in a cumulative setting, and how 
these factors impact population outcomes such as the diversity of culture.  	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3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Dataset 
The dataset resulted from a series of 19 online competitions, organized by 
MathWorks, the software company that produces the MATLAB technical 
computing package. In every contest the organisers set a computational 
challenge and, over the course of one week, participants developed and 
provided solutions in the form of MATLAB code (see Appendix for a full list of 
the contests and additional information on the challenges). Upon submission, 
entries were evaluated and, if they ran successfully, assigned a score that was 
a composite of the effectiveness of the solution, the complexity of its code, and 
its computation time. Once an entry had been evaluated, its score, code and 
the username of the participant who submitted it became public and available 
to all the other participants. Participants could submit as many solutions as 
they wanted though an online interface, within which they were identified by a 
self-chosen nickname. Although submission was completely anonymised, 
participants generally submitted solutions from a single ID, because the main 
motivation to win the contest was reputational – actual prizes were nominal, 
for example a branded T-shirt. We did not directly collect demographic data 
on the participants, but they were generally Western males who use MATLAB 
professionally either in academia or in the industry. There was however scope 
for a wide range of experience levels and not all participants were MATLAB 
experts. 
The challenges were all NP-complete computer science problems (Karp, 
2010), meaning an algorithm cannot find exact solutions on feasible 
timescales for problems of decent size. For example, one contest was based 
around a ‘Crossword’ problem where participants were given a list of 
acceptable words, each associated with a score and a grid size, and were asked 
to provide a grid that maximises the number of high value words. Another 
contest proposed a generalised Sudoku problem, in which participants were 
provided with a partially filled grid and a list of numbers, and had to fill in the 
grid so that each row, column, and region add up as close as possible to the 
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same target sum. Using this type of optimisation problems results in reliance 
on heuristic and approximate solutions, thus allowing for open-ended 
improvement in the task. Our sample included 19 contests, with an average of 
2396 entries per contest (ranging from 1138 to 6367 entries) and an average 
120 participants per contest (between 63 and 202). This amounted to a total 
of 47,967 entries containing a total of 483,173 lines of code (between 1 and 
2757 lines per entry). Each contest resulted in a database containing every line 
of every code entry submitted, along with the entry’s author, time of 
submission, and score on the particular problem set in that contest (see 
Appendix for an example). 
There were a number of variations on this basic model. In 2004, the 
organisers introduced two more stages to the competition. While the first 6 
contests allowed participants to view other entries from the beginning, the 
subsequent 13 contests used a framework consisting of three stages. On the 
first day, ‘darkness’, participants did not have any information on the scores of 
their own entries or other players’. During the second day, labelled ‘twilight’, 
participants only had information on the rank of their own entries compared 
to everyone else’s. From the third day onwards, in ‘daylight’, they had full 
access to information concerning their own entries and the entries of other 
players, including their score, rank, and computer code. When analysing the 
data from these later contests, I only included data from the daylight 
condition – the only condition directly comparable with earlier contests – 
while statistically controlling for this difference using mixed effects models. 
Entries in the contests were scored as a function of their result on the task, the 
speed of execution, and code complexity, measured using McCabe’s 
cyclomatic complexity (McCabe, 1976) which takes into account the code 
structure by measuring the number of independent paths through a program's 
source code. The score was given by 
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =   𝑘! ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 +   𝑘! ∗   𝑒!!∗!"#$%&' + 𝑘! ∗𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 10, 0  
(Equation 3.1) 
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The values used for the k variables were k1 = 1; k2 in the range 0.1 – 0.2, k3 = 
0.05, and k4 several orders of magnitude smaller. The first two factors 
weighed more heavily towards the final score, while limiting complexity 
ensured that entries remain concise so as not to lock up the computer 
evaluating the entries. Thus, improving task result score, or the speed of 
execution, or both, could all result in better contest scores. Entries were 
disqualified if they exceeded execution time or length limits. 
3.2.2. Measuring similarity between entries 
In the contest microcosms, the use of code from previous entries represents 
cultural transmission. As part of the submission procedure, participants had 
the option to declare a “parent” entry, i.e. entry they were inspired by or they 
decided to copy. This is a self-declared measure of copying, and so vulnerable 
to innacurate reporting, but here I also tracked transmission directly by 
tracking lines of code across entries.  
The code similarity between two entries was used as an index of copying – the 
higher the similarity between two entries, the higher the chance the later 
submitted entry copied the earlier one. The similarity between entries over 
time was measured in terms of lines of shared code. In computer code, some 
structural keywords (such as ‘for’ and ‘end’ in MATLAB code) are identical, 
and when lines contain only such keywords, then similarity between those 
individual lines can have little to do with copying.   In our dataset such single-
keyword lines comprised 13% of the total number of lines submitted. 
However, most lines of code also refer to variables – arbitrary symbolic names 
chosen by the coder and linked to values that can change – and the probability 
of using identical variable names by chance is extremely low. For this reason, 
most lines of code that are identical are very likely to have been copied. Of 
course, while copying implies similarity, the inverse is not necessarily true. 
While two participants are unlikely have developed very similar solutions by 
chance, more plausibly it could be the case that two entries share a high 
similarity because both have copied an unrelated third entry. This similarity 
would however still be relevant for this work, as the interest is not in the 
specific copier and model, but rather in the relative probabilities of an entry 
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introducing predominantly novel information or reusing code already existing 
in the population.  
I used a variation of the Sørensen–Dice coefficient in order to measure the 
similarity between two entries (Dice, 1945; Sørensen, 1948). Originally a 
statistic designed for comparing two ecological samples in terms of 
presence/absence of species, it has an extension, the Czekanowski similarity 
(Bray and Curtis, 1957), which does not take into account merely 
presence/absence, but incorporates the actual frequency of each sample, thus 
including more information about the overlap in samples between species. 
The similarity, which we use here, is given by: 
𝐶𝑍!" = 2   !"#  (!!",!!")!!!! (!!"!!!")!!!!   (Equation 3.2) 
where CZik is the similarity between samples i and k, xij is the number of 
instances of species j in sample i, and xkj is the number of instances of species j 
in sample k.  For our analysis, each sample corresponded to an entry, and 
each species is a line of code. Every entry is a set of lines of code, so the 
similarity between two entries was a function of the total number of lines they 
had in common, including reoccurring lines, relative to the sum of their 
lengths.  
The Czekanowski similarity does not take context into account – it relies on 
the number of lines, disregarding order and potential sequences of lines that 
might reappear together – yet it performs very well for our purposes (during 
exploratory analysis I tested several similarity measures, including more 
comprehensive character-based measures like Levenshtein distance, and 
found very comparable results). If two entries have a high Czekanowski 
similarity, they are almost certainly similar in terms of the order of lines of 
code, as it is extremely unlikely that the same lines could be combined 
differently in a piece of code that remains functional. Moreover, the nature of 
computer code ensures that the lines in an entry will be highly idiosyncratic 
because variable names are arbitrarily selected from a vast sample space 
(MATLAB variable names can be up to 63 characters long, and can contain 
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letters, digits, and underscores, resulting in 1097 possible variable names, 
approximately), so the chance of finding the same lines in two entries that are 
not actually functionally identical is very low. Thus the Czekanowski similarity 
between two unrelated entries will be low, while two functionally related 
entries would exhibit high Czekanowski similarity.  
3.2.3. Assessing the relationship between similarity and 
performance 
I expect that copying will be associated with better performance, so in order to 
investigate whether code similarity is indeed linked to improvement in score, I 
used code similarity to the current leader as a relative measure of copying, and 
the difference in score between each target entry and the current leader as a 
relative measure of improvement in task. I split entries in leaders, i.e. entries 
that manage to achieve the best score at the time of their submission and 
therefore improve the overall score, and the rest, in order to establish whether 
successful entries use novelty differently. Because the data was highly skewed 
and non-normally distributed, I tested the relationship between improvement 
and similarity in both leaders and the rest using non-parametric Spearman 
correlations between the two variables of interest, rescaled as values between 
0 and 1 in order to enable cross-contest comparison. 
Additionally, I fit a quadratic linear model with score difference as the 
dependent variable (this was rescaled a value in the range of [-1,1], such that 
leaders were associated with positive score increments, and the rest of the 
entries were associated with negative score differences), and the similarity to 
the current leader as a main and quadratic effect, both including an 
interaction with a factor indicating whether the entry was a leader. In order to 
control for the non-independence of entries submitted in the same contests, 
or by the same participants, I included contest as a random effect, and author 
as a random effect nested within contest. The expected value of the increment 
for entry k submitted by author j in contest i is specified in the model 
definition is given by: 
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𝐸 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"#=   𝛼 + 𝛽! + 𝛾!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟! +   𝛽!  𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!!  𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟! 
𝛽!   ~  𝑁 0,𝜎!! ;   𝛾!"   ~  𝑁(0,𝜎!!) 
3.2.3. Analysing cultural diversity 
I expect that similarity will increase over time as a result of copying, which 
will lead to a decrease of cultural diversity over time. To measure diversity I 
grouped entries to create snapshots of the ‘culture’ (the collection of solutions 
submitted) of the population at given points in the contest. I sorted entries by 
order of submission and grouped them in bins each containing 1% of the 
entries in the contest, then computed a diversity measure for each bin. This 
measure over the contest reflects the diversity of the first 1% of the entries, the 
following 1%, and so on. Within each bin, diversity was measured as the 
number of unique lines of code entered divided by the total number of lines 
submitted in the contest, thus resulting in values ranging from 0 to 0.046, 
with a mean of 0.004258 and median of 0.00755. 
The bins were numbered from 1 to 100. Since the entries were ordered 
chronologically, and since the analysis was not concerned with the exact time 
of submission, but with how diversity changes during the contests, I used bin 
number as our time measurement. I also performed a separate analysis with 
time of submission as the explanatory variable, not presented here. This 
analysis suggested that there was less activity at the beginning of each contest 
and considerably more submissions towards the end. Therefore the time 
measure using bin number is conservative, as it compresses the initial time 
period of high diversity, and expands the final lower diversity (and potential 
noise), thus potentially reducing the effect of time on diversity.  
I fitted a Bayesian mixed-effect regression model using Monte Carlo Markov 
Chain (MCMC) methods to estimate the parameters with JAGS (Plummer, 
2003) in R (Team, 2016). As diversity is measured as a proportion between 0 
and 1, I used beta distributed errors, with a logit link. I used diversity as the 
dependent variable, and chronological bin number as a fixed effect. Each 
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contest proposed a different problem and had a different set of participants, 
which meant that entries from within the same contest could not be 
considered independent. To account for this I included normally-distributed 
random effects, allowing both the intercept and the slopes in the diversity-
time relationship to vary with contest. The model definition, parameterised as 
per Ferrari & Cribari-Neto (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto, 2004) is given below: 
𝑌!"   ~  𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 𝜇!" ,𝜙 ;   𝐸 𝑌!" =   𝜇!"; 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑌!" =    !!"  ×  (!!!!")(!!!)  
logit 𝜇!" =   𝛼! + 𝛽!Bin!"; 𝛼!   ~𝑁(𝜇!"# ,𝜎!"#! ); 𝛽!   ~𝑁(𝜇!"#$% ,𝜎!"#$%! ) 
I present results from an MCMC run of 50,000 iterations after burn-in, with 3 
chains, and a thinning value of 10, resulting in 5000 posterior samples, with 
adequate mixing. I used uninformative Gaussian priors for the µ estimates, 
and flat uniform priors for ϕ and σ: µ ~ N(0, 0.001), ϕ ~ U(0,1000), σ 
~U(0,1000). 	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3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Copying and scores 
Participants copied each other considerably: all entries contained at least one 
line of code from a previous submission, and on average only 3.8% of the 
entries consisted of at least 50% novel lines (Fig.1). Each contest produced a 
collection of code artefacts that evolved over time through gradual 
modifications by multiple individuals – each contest was therefore a 
microcosm of cumulative culture, in which progressive improvements by 
many individuals result in a cultural product – a computer code function – 
that improves over time in a quantifiable way.  
 
As expected under a cumulative cultural setting, the scores did in fact 
consistently improve throughout all contests (on average the best solution 
scored 40 times better than the first), thus the population as a whole became 
more effective at solving the task (Fig. 3.2). Improvement alone is not 
surprising, but along with the large amount of copying taking place it provides 
compelling evidence that these contests indeed simulate cumulative cultural 
evolution.  
Figure 3.1 – total number of entries introducing none, one, or more new lines of 
code into the contest. Most entries clearly introduce new information 
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Figure 3.2 – Normalized log-transformed scores over time in all contests. Note that in all 
contests low score values are better. Each point on the graph is an entry. The red line 
follows the progress of the leading entries in the contest, i.e. the entries that achieved the 
best score at the time of their submission 
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Although the contest setup produced improvements that seem externally 
collaborative, it was still a competitive process. This is illustrated by the fact 
that some participants strategically held back their most promising solutions 
until the very end of the contest in order to avoid being copied and losing the 
potential best score. This artefact does not affect our conclusions – in fact, 
they still held even if I incorporated this final artificial spike in activity and 
diversity as noise in the analysis. 
 
Crucially, only a very small proportion of entries improved upon the current 
leading score when they were entered (overall just 6%, Fig. 3.3). Thus each 
contest posed a genuinely challenging task. Some contests showed rapid score 
improvements in the initial stages, but not all did, and nearly all continued to 
show score improvements over the whole duration of the contest. 
Interestingly, there was large variation in the rate of improvement over time, 
with distinct periods of stasis characterised by minimal improvement in score, 
separated by large jumps in score associated with key innovations. Each 
contest had a unique history of improvement, which is precisely what we 
would expect under cumulative cultural evolution.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – distribution of negative/positive incremental change in score relative to 
the current leader in all the contests (a), and adjusted on data below the third 
quantile (b). Increments were calculated as the difference in score between the 
current best entry so far (i.e. the current leader) and each entry – as a lower score is 
better, positive increments represent entries that improve the overall score 
b. a. 
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3.3.2. Code similarity 
I used a matrix of Czekanowski similarities between entries (Fig. 3.4-3.5, see 
Figure A1 for all contests) to illustrate the patterns of copying occurring 
throughout the contests. Copying grouped the submitted entries into clusters 
of highly similar solutions, illustrated by blocks of lighter colour in the plotted 
matrices. These matrices show how populations converge on particular forms 
of solution for periods of time, and occasionally switch to new ones. We can 
describe this dynamic in terms of tweaks and leaps: the population adopts a 
solution for a while, modifying and tweaking it, and at times leaps to a new 
solution that has low similarity to those preceding it. These patterns of tweaks 
and leaps vary between contests, yet all contests exhibit consistent periods of 
tweaking, where multiple players enter very similar solutions modified only in 
small ways, punctuated by leaps in ideas, when a new form of solution is 
introduced that takes the lead and captures the attention of other players.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 – Similarity matrix between all pairs of entries in one contest (for ease of 
interpretation this example includes only passed entries that declared a parent, but 
the trend is identical in the entire collection of entries). Entries are ordered 
chronologically from top to bottom and left to right. Each point represents the 
similarity between two entries, and each line the similarity between an entry and 
every other entry. Lighter colours indicate higher similarity (data from the contest 
‘Peg Solitaire’, May 2007). 
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c. d.
Figure 3.5 – Code similarity matrices between all pairs of entries in four contests. Entries 
are ordered chronologically from top to bottom and left to right. Each point represents the 
similarity between two entries, and each line the similarity between an entry and every 
other entry. The bright squares show series of entries that are relatively similar to each 
other compared to previous and subsequent periods, representing minor variations on a 
solution ‘theme’, while the bottom-right corners of the bright squares show where the 
population switched to a new form of solution that was relatively dissimilar to those that 
came before, and the top-left corners show where a new solution ‘theme’ began. Data for 
four contests: (a) ‘Gerrymandering’ – April 2004, (b) ‘Peg Solitaire’ – May 2007, (c) ‘Color 
Bridge’ – November 2009 and (d) ‘Mars Surveyor’ – June 1999. The variation in patterns of 
tweaks and leaps illustrates how sometimes ideas are based on older ones – the final large 
group of similar solutions shows intermediate similarity to the previous smaller group (a), 
while other times the population switches to a completely new idea – the three main 
groups of similar solutions are clearly distinct (b). In some cases the population reverts to a 
previous idea – illustrated by very high similarity between the final group and a previous 
one (c). Some ideas last in the population for a long time as characterised by large 
succeeding groups of similar ideas (a), yet sometimes contests are characterised by rapid 
shifts in ideas (d). 
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Copying was not indiscriminate. Participants preferentially copied the current 
leader compared to random copying: the baseline distribution of similarities 
between all entries shows a clear skew towards zero (Fig. 3.6a), but the 
similarities to the current leader peaked around the maximum value (Fig. 
3.6b), indicating that most entries copied the current leader. While 50% of the 
entries had a similarity > 0.9 to the current leader, only 26% had a similarity 
of this level to more recent entries submitted since the current leader. 
Therefore entries were much more likely to be similar to the current leader 
than any other entry. This pattern becomes even stronger in entries that took 
the lead when they were submitted (Fig. 3.6c): 91% of these leading entries 
had a similarity of at least 50% to the previous leader, suggesting that 
remarkably few new leaders introduced substantial amounts of novel code. 
Copying the leader was then a recipe for success. The distribution of 
similarities to the current leader (Fig. 3.6b) was not only dominated by high 
similarities, but clearly skewed toward extremes – most similarities were 
either very high or very low with very few intermediate similarity entries. 
 
The success of an entry – whether it took the lead (i.e. scored better than 
anything previously submitted to the contest), and if so by how much – had a 
complex relationship with the extent to which it was based on copying or 
innovation. Overall and fairly unsurprisingly, the more similar an entry was to 
the current leader, the more similar the scores (Fig. 3.7). Entries that took the 
lead (i.e. the entries that beat the current best when submitted) show a 
Figure 3.6 – (a) proportion of similarities between all entries; (b) to the current leader 
when the entry was submitted; and (c) of those entries that took the lead when 
entered compared to the previous leader, across all contests  
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significant negative correlation between similarity to the previous leader and 
their associated improvement in score (Spearman ρ = - 0.15, p < 0.001). In 
other words, in the context of these successful entries, a high similarity to the 
current best entry was associated with a small improvement, while leaps in 
ideas, indicated by low similarity to the current leader, were associated with 
large improvements.  
While this was true for entries that took the lead the picture changes 
drastically when considering just the entries that did not take the lead. In this 
context, the correlation between the similarity to the current leader and the 
difference in score between the current entry and the current leader was even 
stronger (Spearman ρ = -0.53, p < 0.001). As this refers to entries that did not 
manage to improve on the overall score, large score differences represent 
particularly unsuccessful entries that scored considerably lower than the 
current leader, and are associated with more innovative entries.  Thus, the 
more similar an entry was to the current leader, the more likely it was to be 
associated with a smaller change in score, whether negative or positive, while 
more innovative entries were associated with both large improvements in 
score, but also the most spectacular failures. 
 
This result was confirmed by the mixed linear model. Although the interaction 
between leader similarity and whether the entry was a leader or not was not 
Figure 3.7 – normalised score difference between each entry and their current 
leader, as a function of code similarity to the current leader. The more similar an 
entry in terms of code, the smaller the difference in score.  
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significant, it seems that in the case of leaders, there is a trade-off in terms of 
how similarity to the leader relates to the score improvement. A solution 
needs to be similar enough to the previous leader, but not too similar, in order 
to achieve a high improvement. For non-leading entries, though, the highest 
increment (i.e. lowest score difference relative to the leader) is achieved with 
the highest code similarity, while low similarity is associated with drastic 
reduction in score. However, the data used for this model was bounded and 
heavily skewed, which means the model fit was modest and results from the 
model should be cautiously treated. Nonetheless, both methodological 
approaches point to the same results. 
 
In the context of these programming challenges, then, copying is a ‘safe’ 
strategy, associated with relatively small improvements or decreases in score. 
On the other hand, innovation is risky – more often than not it leads to much 
worse scores than copiers are achieving – but when it is beneficial it is 
associated with larger improvements in performance. The ‘risk’ to innovators 
here is in terms of time wasted developing a new solution in contests that were 
heavily time constrained that proves worse than the current leaders, but is 
easily equated to real-world risks in real-world cumulative cultural evolution 
in competitive contexts. So, if we consider the current best entry to be the 
optimal choice at any given point in time, the safe choice in the contests is to 
Figure 3.8 – (a) score increment (i.e. signed normalized score difference between 
each entry and the current leader) as a function of leader similarity in all daylight 
entries in all contests; (b) results from the quadratic linear mixed model for 
leaders (in red) and the rest of the entries (in black)  
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copy the current leader – and it is clear that this is what most participants do. 
There are consistently large numbers of tweaks and relatively few leaps (Fig 
3.4-3.5), and most entries exhibit high similarity to the current leader (Fig. 
3.6). 
3.3.3. Cultural diversity 
I also investigated how cultural diversity changed over time. The results above 
show that many entries copied the current leader. As a result, the population 
converged on similar solutions for periods of time, causing a decrease in the 
diversity of culture, as measured by the normalised number of distinct lines of 
code present in the population during any given time interval (Fig. 3.9, 3.10; 
Bayesian mixed models with beta distributed errors indicated an average 
decline of 0.15; 95% credible interval [-0.19 to -0.12] in the logit of diversity 
for every additional 10% of contest entries, equivalent to a drop in diversity 
from 0.01 to 0.086. This is a drastic change considering the average 
normalised diversity value is 0.0042). While individual exploration is 
expected to be associated with a large variety of solutions, over time copying 
reduces the number of solutions the population as a whole is entertaining at a 
given time. Indeed, the distribution of all entry similarities to the current 
leader indicates that the majority of the population seems to be performing 
very similar behaviours (Fig. 3.6b).  
CHAPTER 3 
 
105 
 
a. b. 
Figure 3.9 – (a) distribution of cultural diversity values across all contests for each 
1% contest progress bin, and (b) adjusted to exclude outliers in  
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Figure 3.10 – (a) generalised linear mixed-model predictions of cultural diversity 
over time. Each black line plots the predictions for each contest, and the red line 
plots the overall estimate. The shaded area indicates the 95% credible interval of 
the posterior estimates per contest. (b) posterior distributions of parameter 
estimates for intercept and standardised bin 
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3.3.4. Recombination 
Copying also affects how individuals combine ideas from previous entries. 
Because copying took place on such a large scale that no entry is practically 
entirely new, I have chosen to regard the introduction of all new code as 
innovation, and I define recombination strictly as an association of cultural 
traits that have already been present in the population. These results thus 
assume combination of new and old ideas as a distinct process from 
recombination. This dataset does not allow to distinguish between genuine 
and copied recombination, so instead I chose to focus purely on how old ideas 
are aggregated in new entries and how they persist in the population. This 
analysis used a line-based approach – for each entry, I tracked each line back 
to the first ‘parent’ entry that introduced it into the contest. Thus each entry 
could be characterised in terms of its number of such parents. This essentially 
allows us to quantify how many original sources each entry draws inspiration 
from, and how long these persist over time.  
Using this approach, entries drew on a large number of sources overall (Fig. 
3.11a). The amount of recombination increased with time (Spearman ρ  = 
0.53, p < 0.001) and the length of the entry (Spearman ρ  = 0.64, p < 0.001), 
but it was also positively correlated with the similarity to the current leader 
(Spearman ρ = 0.44, p < 0.001) and negatively correlated with the difference 
in score to the current leader (Spearman ρ = -0.25, p < 0.001). In order to test 
these relationships, because the absolute values for all measures (time, length 
of entry, similarity to current leader, and difference in score relative to current 
leader) depend on the contest, they were normalised within contest and 
rescaled to the interval [0,1] according to Equation 3.3 to allow for 
comparison between contests.  
𝑋! =    !!  !!"#!!"#!!!"#  (Equation 3.3) 
The number of original sources was similarly rescaled within contest. As 
before, I did not use absolute time measurements, but instead I used the 
chronological order of the entries in the contest as a measure of time (such 
that time is an integer between 1 and the total number of entries submitted in 
CHAPTER 3 
 
107 
each contest). Therefore, copying notably leads to an accumulation of 
recombination in the population – with time, entries borrow from more 
sources, and the use of more ultimate sources was correlated with better 
performance (Fig. 3.12).  
Alternatively, individual recombination can be measured at the line level by 
tracking each line to the most recent previous entry that used it. It could be 
the case that an individual did not copy the last instance of a line being used in 
the contest, but they copied a previous entry. Therefore this is a conservative 
measure that assumes copying is the dominant strategy, and that entries tend 
to copy the latest entries. 90% of all entries drew on 5 sources or fewer, while 
25% modified only one previous entry, so did not actually use recombination 
by the definition used here. For comparison, only 5% of all entries drew on 5 
original sources or less, indicating recombination involved a much larger 
number of sources at the population level. So although the population 
accumulated recombinations over time, individual solutions were based on a 
small number of proximate sources.  
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Figure 3.11 – (a) number of initial sources and (b) number of recent sources for all 
the entries in all contests 
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Figure 3.12 – Normalised number of original sources for all entries as a function 
of (A, B) time, (C, D) similarity to the current leader, (E, F) entry length and (G, H) 
score difference to the current leader. For ease of visualization, each of the four 
variables has been split into bins, and for each bin we have calculated the 
average number of original sources (A, C, E, G – over 50 bins), and we are 
plotting the distribution of the number of original sources in that bin below (B, 
D, F, H – over 20 bins). 
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3.4. Discussion 
I have shown that cumulative cultural evolution in the microcosms of the 
MATLAB programming contests is driven by high levels of cultural 
transmission with a strong payoff bias. Even though copying is associated with 
smaller performance increments, it is also associated with a much lower risk 
of significant performance decreases. The result of this dynamic is population-
level homogeneity in behaviour, with simultaneous production of ratcheted 
improvements in performance.  
When trying to advance in such a difficult task where improvements become 
very challenging very quickly, copying pays off or, perhaps more accurately, 
not copying can incur significant costs on performance. The optimal choice is 
to resort to copying the current leader, and this is what most participants do, 
as illustrated by the similarity and diversity dynamics throughout the 
contests. As a result, the population moves from a large diversity of solutions 
to all converging on virtually the same behaviour, which gives rise to 
population-level patterns comparable to expectations under conformist bias at 
the individual level. 
The MATLAB programming competition provides a very realistic model of 
real-world technological evolution in a confined population, which allows the 
experimental study of cumulative culture on a scale that has never been 
attempted before. Like real human culture, it involves a complex optimisation 
task that allows for the open-ended evolution of solutions, which vary on 
several dimensions. Unlike previous experimental studies of cumulative 
culture that require participants to copy a model, here solutions can vary 
without limit, within the constraints of the programming language. A solution 
can be copied because it is more effective, more interesting, faster, clearer to 
understand, or has been submitted by a prestigious individual. Admittedly, 
there is no direct social interaction, but individuals interact through their 
solutions, and can freely copy according to no pre-specified rules. This 
freedom in both artefact design and social learning choice means this is a very 
general model for studying cumulative culture.  
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Ironically, this freedom also serves as the biggest drawback to this framework. 
Because individuals have full access to all information regarding the entries, 
they can also see each entry’s exact score. Arguably, in many ecologically valid 
situations, cumulative culture involves no direct information regarding the 
payoff of a behaviour or artefact. In this sense, the MATLAB contest models a 
subset of cumulative cultural evolution that involves relative transparency – 
while the artefacts themselves are complex and require expert knowledge in 
order to understand, the outcomes can be straightforwardly judged. 
Payoff bias, or copying the best performing individual, is crucial for explaining 
these results. Direct access to scores allows participants to judge the worth of 
strategies at minimal cost. Convergence here relies on accurate knowledge 
about payoffs, and with less precise knowledge this pattern might break down 
(although the same convergence could be supported by a different 
mechanism, like model bias for example, which allows individuals to choose 
who they copy from based on the characteristics of the model). This reliance 
on payoff bias restricts the search space and makes it more manageable within 
the vast solution spaces of the computer coding tasks, which would be 
impossible to fully explore given the time constraints of the contest. 
It is important to note that this convergence dynamic does not necessarily 
mean that the population is converging on the globally best solution. As an 
individual, it makes sense to capitalise on the investment that other 
individuals in a population have already made in developing the current best 
solution, but this could result in populations ignoring and therefore failing to 
realise the potential of new innovations if they are not immediately the best 
solution. Instead, individuals pursue the current consensus largely because of 
the effort that has already been put into it – creating the potential for a 
cultural version of the ‘Concorde fallacy’ (Dawkins and Carlisle, 1976). Once a 
population has scaled a particular peak in the solution landscape, ideas that 
are introduced later do not get the same opportunity to climb to that altitude 
if they do not immediately better the current leader. 
It has been argued that recombination of different ideas is a major driving 
factor in cumulative culture (Boyd, Richerson and Henrich, 2011a), but the 
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concept remains vague and the evidence scarce. Here I conceptualise it as a 
spectrum spanning the combination of different sources, either original 
innovators or recent exploiters, and show that although most solutions are 
based on a very small number of sources as a results of copying, the 
population as a whole draws on an increasing number of initial sources, which 
persist over time. This sheds little light on the individual mechanisms 
involving recombination, but I expect that focusing on the best solution 
restricts the search space, and might also limit how many combinatorial 
elements are identified, which would limit recombination.  
The recombinatorial aspect of cumulative culture relies on correctly 
identifying effective elements in different solutions and successfully 
incorporating them in a new solution. This is a time consuming task, and, 
crucially, the effectiveness of these separate elements is not necessarily 
correlated with the effectiveness of the overall solution. I have shown that 
participants consistently focus their efforts on the best solutions, and this not 
only restricts their search space, but might also limit how many elements with 
potential use in recombination are inspected, which could explain the patterns 
we observe. It is possible that relaxing time constraints in the contests could 
result in more recombination activity. 
The spectrum between pure innovation and pure copying in this context is 
very wide and difficult to carve up into useful concepts and, naturally, the 
interpretation of these results in light of the issue of recombination will 
depend on our definitions. Here I chose to call innovation the introduction of 
any new code to the contest, and restrict recombination to those cases in 
which individuals combine information already existing in the contest. An 
alternative conceptualisation of these phenomena would shift these thresholds 
such that recombination would cover any combination of new and old 
information, while innovation would purely refer to entirely new code. 
However, this view would provide little use in the context of the programming 
competition, as virtually no entry is entirely new according to our line-based 
measure, and would mean that all entries fall into the recombination category, 
with a large variation in the number of sources entries draw on. Intuitively, 
though, the introduction of novel information hints at innovation – 
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modification is, after all, a type of innovation – which is why this work focuses 
on a narrow view of recombination of information already established in the 
population.  
Similarly, there was a continuous spectrum in terms of social learning 
between pure innovation and pure copying in the context of the programming 
competition. I have shown that the distribution of similarity to the current 
leader shows both that copying took place at a high rate in all contests, and 
that there were also ‘maverick’ entries, very different to the current best 
solution, indicating attempts at complete or radical innovation. This result is 
in line with work by Efferson et al. (2008) who, in an experimental study of 
conformity that allowed participants to choose to copy each other in a two-
armed bandit task, found that participants showed individual differences in 
their preference for social learning. While most participants did indeed 
conform, and self-reported as social learners, a small minority refused to 
make use of social information. I found the same pattern in the code similarity 
to the current leader, but as there is no obvious point on the 
innovation/copying spectrum that cleanly splits the entries into copiers and 
mavericks, I analysed copying on a continuous dimension. I return to this 
question with a full exploration of individual differences in Chapter 4. 
These results are related to the issue of conformity, which has attracted 
significant attention in the cultural evolution field because it underpins Boyd 
and Richerson’s (1985) cultural group selection theory for the evolution of 
cooperation. These authors have used theoretical models to suggest that 
conformist bias should be favoured whenever social learning is favoured, but 
the extent to which humans or non-human animals show conformist bias in 
their social learning is subject to debate (Eriksson and Coultas, 2009; Morgan 
and Laland, 2012; van Leeuwen and Haun, 2014). Importantly, much of this 
body of research assumes homogeneity of behaviour at the population level is 
a result of individual-level tendencies to copy the majority, but we question 
whether this assumption is always necessary for the cultural group selection 
theory to hold.  
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Chudek and Henrich (2011) emphasise the interaction between cumulative 
culture and conformity in a gene-culture coevolution explanation of large-
scale human cooperation. According to these authors, cumulative culture 
sparked a series of cognitive adaptations for improved social learning and 
coordination (which include conformist transmission) that they term norm-
psychology. These norm-psychology processes support cooperation, which 
spreads through group selection, which in turn increases selection for 
prosocial norm-adherence. They assume that cumulative culture gives rise to a 
cognitive tendency to copy the majority, which becomes an integral part of 
norm-psychology. My analysis implies that once early human culture became 
cumulative, it might have resulted in patterns of convergence in behaviour 
without the need for an individual conformist bias by the same mechanism we 
observe in the programming contests. Behavioural homogeneity could result 
from independent individual decisions based on payoff bias in a cumulative 
cultural context, through mechanisms we have illustrated here. Similarly, 
behavioural homogeneity could also be a result of local adaptation of other 
types of learning biases like payoff bias, which would lead the population to 
converge on a uniform set of cultural traits, thus supporting the fact that 
conformist transmission is not necessary for behavioural homogeneity. 
In a cumulative setting where high-fidelity learning is common (potentially 
through material artefacts – here, cultural transmission was materially 
supported as individuals could copy and paste code directly), and tasks reach 
sufficient complexity that the differential risks of copying versus innovation 
we have observed here are established, convergence in behaviour at the 
population level is expected. Although this convergence is not initially driven 
by conformist bias, it could then feed back to select for conformist bias and 
norm-conformity because, as our results show, cumulative culture makes 
copying a low-risk option. This would support Chudek and Henrich’s 
suggestion that the evolution of cumulative culture and conformity are 
intimately linked.  
This chapter raises interesting questions regarding the optimal way of 
achieving collective improvements. Previous work has shown that novelty in 
science is risky, but can be associated with considerably higher long-term 
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impact (Wang, Veugelers and Stephan, 2016). Our data show multiple 
examples of populations persisting with a style of solution that ultimately 
proves to be sub-optimal relative to those submitted later. If the emphasis on 
copying we see is driving the population to persist in suboptimal behaviours, 
essentially for fear of losing the advantages from the investment already 
present in the current best solution, is this actually the optimal way to ratchet 
cumulative cultural solutions? The answer to this question could have 
important implications for organizing efforts to collectively overcome 
challenges: should we concentrate resources on the current leaders, implying 
progress will be incremental and possibly overlooking revolutionary 
innovations, or should we actively seek diversity to encourage innovation, 
accepting the risk that only few ideas will be successful? I suggest that the 
nature of the relationship between innovation and cumulative cultural 
evolution therefore merits further investigation. 
 
 	  
    
Chapter 4 
Individual Variation and Cumulative 
Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
Abst ract  
Recent experimental work has identified stable individual differences in the 
use of social learning, which are consistent cross-context, but no investigation 
of individual differences in a cumulative cultural context has been attempted 
yet. Here I used the data from the MATLAB competition to explore individual 
differences in performance and the use of social information, as well as 
answer questions about how individuals are copied, and how the variation in 
participant make-up affects cumulative improvement cross-contest. I found 
considerable variation both between and within individuals. The cumulative 
setting and its associated tweaking behaviour allowed individuals to improve 
solutions without considerable effort, but overall better performance was 
associated with more investment in solutions. While there was no clear split 
between copiers and innovators, better players showed more variation and 
more exploratory behaviour in terms of novelty of solutions. Additionally, I 
found that the individuals formed ‘reputations’ within and across contests, 
which affected how entries were copied, consistent with prestige-type effects. 
Finally, I found no effect of population size, or participant composition, on 
improvement at the contest level. 
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4.1. Introduction 
The previous two chapters have discussed cumulative culture in the context of 
two different methodological approaches leading to encouragingly similar 
results centred on a loss of cultural diversity associated with cumulative 
cultural improvements. This chapter will explore the issue of diversity at the 
individual level, answering questions about whether individual behaviour is 
variable with respect to social learning in a cumulative setting, and whether 
this variability affects improvement.  
Individual differences in a population are intrinsically essential for natural 
selection to operate on, but the growing field of animal ‘personality’ has 
brought into focus the existence of not only variation, but consistent, stable 
individual differences between individuals across contexts (Sih, Bell and 
Johnson, 2004; Thornton and Lukas, 2012; Roche, Careau and Binning, 
2016). In the context of social learning, ‘personality’ traits such as exploratory 
behaviour seem to lead to stable individual differences in social information 
use, but these differences have also been shown to be the result of 
developmental cues, physiological condition, or past experience (Mesoudi et 
al., 2016). For example, pregnant ninespine sticklebacks show more social 
learning than non-pregnant females, potentially because social learning is 
safer in terms of predation risk, which pregnant females are more vulnerable 
to (Webster and Laland, 2011). Finally, humans seem to show evidence of 
cultural variation in social learning, suggesting that social learning biases can 
themselves be learned socially (Heyes, 2012a). This suggests that individual 
differences in social information use might be subject to high phenotypic 
plasticity, thus providing a mechanism for fast environmental adaptation 
(Mesoudi et al., 2016).  
Nonetheless, while there is experimental evidence for cultural differences in 
social learning between societies that differ in their individualist – collectivist 
tendencies for instance (Mesoudi et al., 2015), little systematic work has tried 
to go beyond identifying and describing these differences to try to understand 
what causes them. Indeed, much of the modelling work, for example, has been 
concerned with identifying the adaptive value of social learning and culture by 
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investigating the conditions under which social learning is more beneficial 
than individual learning simply by framing individual differences in terms of 
pure individual learners and pure social learners. For instance, earlier work 
usually assumes individuals have fixed strategies – either exclusively 
individual learners or exclusively social learners. In such a context, under a 
changing environment, neither phenotype wins (Rogers, 1988).  
Subsequent work on Rogers’ paradox has shown that culture becomes 
adaptive once individuals are allowed to employ strategies selectively (Enquist 
and Eriksson, 2007) and this work has been confirmed experimentally 
(Kameda and Nakanishi, 2003). Since then, a large body of theoretical and 
experimental work has shown that individuals use either social or asocial 
learning flexibly depending on the context. For example, both humans and 
non-human animals rely on social learning more when they are unsure of the 
payoffs (Kendal et al., 2005; Galef, Dudley and Whiskin, 2008; Morgan et al., 
2012; Toelch et al., 2013). 
Additional to this evidence for individual flexibility across contexts, more 
recent findings on human culture have shown consistent differences in the 
individual predilection to use either social or asocial information in decision-
making. A study looking at conformity using both theoretical and 
experimental approaches found that, in a two-choice experiment in which 
they were given an option to socially learn, participants split into 
‘conformists’, as expected from a rational player, and ‘mavericks’, who refuse 
to access social information even though it would have been to their 
advantage (Efferson et al., 2008). These personal preferences have been 
confirmed by further studies that found individual differences in social 
learning strategies (Mesoudi, 2011a; Molleman, van den Berg and Weissing, 
2014), and consistent individual differences in participants’ propensity to use 
social learning across contexts (Toelch et al., 2013).  
This finding regarding the prevalence of individual differences in social 
information use, arising somewhat unexpectedly in the process of 
investigating social learning strategies, has profound implications for the way 
we conceptualise and model social learning, making it clear that accounts of 
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cultural evolution assuming homogenous populations are neither realistic nor 
complete. To my knowledge, though, no work has purposefully explored 
individual differences in a cumulative cultural evolution setting, which is what 
I set out to do in this chapter. Thus, the first focus of this chapter will be 
investigating whether there are consistent and distinct individual strategies in 
social learning use in a cumulative setting, and whether these strategies are 
linked to performance. 
Finding individual differences in social learning and performance in a 
cumulative setting would raise questions regarding whether these differences 
affect how individuals behave as cultural learning models. For example, in 
populations with a complex cultural repertoire, where the link between a 
cultural trait and its payoff is opaque, individuals need to find effective 
heuristics to guide their social learning. Prestige, defined as high status or 
influence typically related to good performance and age, arising from complex 
social exchanges, can be such a heuristic (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001), and 
there is real-world evidence that people indeed use it. For example, Fijian 
villagers show evidence of a predilection to learn from more successful or 
more knowledgeable individuals (Henrich and Broesch, 2011). Importantly, 
this preference extends across domains – for example, being perceived as a 
successful yam grower would still increase the probability that an individual’s 
fishing techniques would be copied – and it is precisely this cross-domain 
influence that is indicative of prestige bias in social transmission.  Prestigious 
individuals are not just successful at fishing, for example, but gain this 
prestige from multiple interactions across different contexts and domains.  
The complex interactions characterising cumulative culture provide an ideal 
context for prestige bias to emerge. Although I have shown that payoff bias is 
an easy, accessible rule even in a cumulative cultural setting (Chapter 3), and 
indeed seems to be a preferred strategy when available (Mesoudi, 2011a), it is 
of interest to see if this copying rule is exclusively used or whether individual 
differences in a cumulative setting generate reputations that are used as a 
guide for social learning. Thus, the question of whether prestige-like processes 
emerge from the individual variation witnessed in a cumulative setting 
represents the second focus of this chapter.  
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Finally, there is compelling evidence that the individual make-up of a 
population will affect the accumulation of improvement in that population. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, a large body of work has addressed the relationship 
between group size and cumulative culture, both through theoretical 
(Henrich, 2004; Powell, Shennan and Thomas, 2009) and experimental 
approaches (Caldwell and Millen, 2010; Derex et al., 2013; Muthukrishna et 
al., 2013). The experimental approaches in particular suffer from the 
methodological limitations surrounding sample sizes and task complexity 
discussed in Chapter 3. For example, modelling and field studies interested in 
the relationship between population size and cumulative culture involve group 
sizes in the thousands (Kline and Boyd, 2010), while experimental studies 
usually involve groups of 3 or 5 individuals – the largest group size 
investigated experimentally did not exceed, to our knowledge, 16 participants 
(Derex et al., 2013).   
A recent study purposefully framed the group size issue regarding cumulative 
culture in terms of mitigating loss of skill rather than promoting skill 
accumulation (Muthukrishna et al., 2013). This study contrasted social 
learning in a cumulative setting in two conditions involving either one or 5 
models, finding that individuals allowed to observe 5 models show better skill 
preservation over time. It is, however, unclear whether results obtained under 
this type of methodology extend to cultural accumulation in populations 
comprising thousands of individuals or whether they tackle learning from 
multiple sources of information, rather than incremental improvement. 
Indeed, recent theory suggesting that the effect of population size on cultural 
accumulation becomes less important the more populations grow points in 
this direction (Andersson and Törnberg, 2016).  
Additionally, work on individual differences in human social learning has 
shown that individual variation in learning strategies can promote the spread 
of beneficial behaviours, and populations characterised by individual variation 
may be more successful . The authors showed that an effective solution 
spreads faster in a population where individuals employ either payoff bias or 
frequency-based learning, than in a homogenous population in which all 
individuals equally use both types of learning (Molleman, van den Berg and 
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Weissing, 2014). The final question addressed in this chapter is therefore the 
nature of the relationship between group size, individual variation, and 
cumulative improvement, in a larger sample size of typically 100 participants, 
using a complex cumulative task.  
In this chapter I used data from the MATLAB competition introduced in the 
previous chapter to answer a number of questions about how variation affects 
performance at the individual level, whether this variation promotes prestige-
like effects in a cumulative setting, and whether group size and variation affect 
improvement across contests. Specifically, is there considerable within-
individual variation in copying or can individuals be classified as ‘copiers’ and 
‘mavericks’ (Efferson et al., 2008)? How are improvements in the contest 
related to individual social learning use, both at the individual and the group 
level? Do individual characteristics lead to the formation of so-called 
‘reputations’ within and between contests, which affect how individuals are 
copied? Does variation across contests in individual strategies relate to 
improvement?  
The first section of this chapter will address the first two questions, 
characterising individual variation in terms of activity, performance, and 
social information use, and linking this variation to improvement at the 
individual level. The second section will investigate whether individual 
characteristics of performance lead to prestige-like effects that affect copying 
within and between contests. Finally, the last section will be concerned with 
whether improvement at the contest level is a matter of population size or, 
rather, whether the characteristics of specific individuals in the population are 
better predictors of cultural accumulation.  
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4.2. Methods 
This chapter uses the same dataset as Chapter 3, originating from a series of 
19 online competitions organised by MathWorks. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
throughout the week of each contest, participants were allowed to submit as 
many solutions as they wanted, which resulted in numerous participants 
submitting multiple entries. The participants were identified using an 
identification number that was linked to a MathWorks account, which they 
themselves created and which was needed to submit entries to the contest. 
Individuals were not forbidden from creating multiple accounts if they wished 
to do so, but I have reason to believe, based on online communication 
between participants, that most did not. Additionally, since this would have 
required substantial effort (e.g. creating a new account, linked to a new email 
address), I expect this was not a major confounding factor in this analysis. 
Nonetheless, because there was no means of identifying such potential repeat 
participants, the analysis presented in this chapter does not attempt to engage 
with the issue of single participants submitting from multiple accounts. When 
quantifying the number of unique participants in a contest, for example, I 
assume no overlap.  
Overall, our sample included 2,645 participants from 19 contests, and a total 
of 56,663 entries. Participants submitted an average of 21 entries each, but 
with very large variation between participants, ranging between 1 and 1,502 
entries each. This repeated submission framework allows us to define a 
distribution of entries for each participant and use it to characterise variation 
both between and within individual participants, to assess within- and 
between-individual correlations, as well as to relate these correlations to 
cross-contest variation in performance. 
In this chapter, I characterised this individual variation through three 
principal metrics that I term activity, performance, and novelty. Activity (the 
number of entries submitted) at the individual level is an indirect measure of 
motivation – we expected that more motivated, more interested players would 
submit more entries throughout the contest. Novelty, measured as the 
proportion of novel lines of code, is evidently linked to social learning – 
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copying in the context of the MATLAB contests constitutes social learning – 
and this measure allowed us to quantify and investigate individual differences 
in social learning. Finally, performance in the contest in terms of score and 
improvement in score was a measure of both individual and collective 
improvement in task.  
For the rest of this chapter, I have grouped entries according to the participant 
that has submitted them (henceforth called ‘author’) within each contest. Each 
author is responsible for a collection of entries, which can be characterised in 
terms of activity, novelty, and performance, and which define the ‘strategy’ of 
that player in the contest. The analysis in this chapter includes only valid 
entries, which followed the contest guidelines and received a score.  Although 
it is the case that several participants have taken place in multiple contests, we 
are mainly interested in within-contest dynamics (how individuals vary in 
their solutions, their copying, and their performance). Because each contest 
presents a different challenge, it would be less useful to investigate the 
variation in solutions across contests within one individual, because this 
variation is very likely to be intrinsically linked to the space of possible 
solutions each challenge provides. Therefore, I treat each contest as 
independent, and do not take into account repeated participation, nor try to 
link identities across contests. Section 3.2.1. provides the only exception to 
this convention, where I specifically investigate variation within individuals 
who participated in multiple contests. 
4.2.1. Individual variation 
Chapter 3 discussed in detail the patterns of convergence emerging 
throughout the contest as a result of considerable copying. The overall 
novelty, defined as the proportion of new lines each entry introduces to the 
contest, decreases drastically over time, and the similarity to the current 
leader experiences a sharp increase as soon as participants are allowed to see 
each other on day 3 of the contests (Fig. 4.1). In this section I investigated 
novelty at the individual level and how participants employed novelty in their 
entries as part of their individual strategy. This allows us to establish whether 
we see a consistent split into ‘copiers’ and ‘mavericks’ or whether individuals 
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submit a wide range of entries varying in their novelty content, as well as 
whether consistent social learning strategies affect performance at the 
individual level. 
For each participant, I used two measures of novelty. One is the proportion of 
lines novel to the contest in each entry (calculated as the number of new lines 
in an entry, over the total number of lines of that entry), an absolute measure 
of novelty. Since I have shown in Chapter 3 that extensive copying of the 
current best entry takes place, I also used the similarity to the current leader 
as a second, relative measure of novelty. As in Chapter 3, the code similarity 
was measured using the Czekanowski similarity, given by: 
𝐶𝑍!" = 2   !"#  (!!",!!")!!!! (!!"!!!")!!!!   (Equation 4.1) 
where CZik is the similarity between samples i and k, xij is the number of 
instances of species j in sample i, and xkj is the number of instances of species j 
in sample k.  For our analysis, each sample corresponds to an entry, and each 
species is a line of code. Every entry is a set of lines of code, so the similarity 
between two entries is a function of the total number of lines they have in 
common, including reoccurring lines, relative to the sum of their lengths.  
As each individual was responsible for submitting a collection of entries that 
could be characterised both in terms of the proportion of novel lines and the 
similarity to the current leader, each individual could thus be characterised by 
a distribution of the proportion of novelty of his or her entries, and a 
distribution of leader similarity. Here I explored these distributions to 
Figure 4.1 – proportion of new lines and similarity to the current leader for all passed 
entries in all the contests, over time.  
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establish whether individuals can be distinctly classified in terms of ‘copiers’ 
and ‘mavericks’.  
In order to quantify performance, an entry’s score would be an obvious 
measure, but score improves steadily, and improvements become increasingly 
difficult throughout the contest, so an improvement in score at the beginning 
of the contest is not comparable to a similar magnitude improvement in score 
at the end of the contest. I used score difference between each entry and the 
current leading entry as a continuous, relative measure of performance, which 
takes into account the continuous improvement in score.  
The score of the leading entry at each time point represents the best 
performance at that time, and the overwhelming majority of entries score 
worse than the current leader (i.e. very few entries take the lead overall; 
Chapter 3). Since a decrease in score represents an improvement in 
performance, then the score difference between the score of an entry and the 
score of the current leader will be negative for entries that improve the overall 
score, and positive for most entries – a bigger difference would indicate a 
particularly unsuccessful entry. In order to make interpretation easier and 
more intuitive, I reversed the signs of these score differences. Therefore, a 
positive increment represents an improvement to the overall score – the 
higher the increment, the higher the improvement – and a negative increment 
represents a worse performing entry relative to the current best – the lower 
the negative value, the worse the performance. In order to reliably compare 
these values across contests, I rescaled this increment within each contest so it 
falls between 0 and 1 (while maintaining the sign, either positive or negative), 
following: 
𝐼′ =    !!  !!"#!!"#!!!"#  (Equation 4.2) 
I tested whether novelty is associated with performance at the individual level, 
using non-parametric Spearman correlations as the data were not normally 
distributed.  
Alternatively, a more straightforward measure of performance is whether an 
entry becomes a leader (i.e. achieves the best score at the time of its 
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submission and thus improves the overall score). Extending this to the author 
level allows us to quantify how many of each author’s entries improved upon 
the current leader. Here I split participants into leading authors (i.e. authors 
who submit at least one leading entry that beats the current best in the entire 
contest), and non-leading authors. By focusing on the differences between 
these two groups, we can investigate whether successful authors use novelty 
differently.  
Leading authors are particular because they have submitted both entries that 
score worse and entries that score better than the current leader. Therefore we 
can distinguish between positive score differences (i.e. score improvements), 
which correspond to the entries that scored better than the current leader, and 
negative score differences, which correspond to those entries that scored 
worse than the current leader. Thus I answered questions about the relative 
magnitudes of these positive and negative score differences, and whether 
leading and non-leading authors differ in their overall performance.   
To test the difference in performance between leading and non-leading 
authors, I fitted a linear mixed model with each entry’s score increment 
relative to the current leader as the dependent variable and a fixed factor as 
independent variable that specifies whether an entry 1) was submitted by a 
leading author and makes a positive contribution to the current leader score 
(i.e. is an overall improvement), 2) was submitted by a leading author but 
does not improve the overall score, or 3) was submitted by a non-leading 
author, and therefore does not improve the overall score. Setting condition 2) 
as the baseline allows testing whether there was a difference in magnitude 
between positive and negative increments within leading authors by 
comparing conditions 1 and 2 (are improvements bigger than decreases in 
score in leading authors?). This also allows to test whether there was a 
difference in negative increments between leading and non-leading authors by 
comparing conditions 2 and 3 (are leading authors better than non-leading 
authors even in those entries that do not take the lead?). In order to control 
for the fact that improvements might differ in difficulty and, therefore, 
magnitude between contests, the model included contest as a random effect. 
Moreover, to control for the fact that some individuals are inherently more 
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skilled independent of their leader status, the model also included author as a 
random effect, nested within contest.  
Finally, I used non-parametric Wilcoxon tests to establish whether there were 
differences in the average use of novelty and in exploratory behaviour between 
leading and non-leading authors. 
4.2.2. Influence 
Here I investigated whether individuals formed reputations within and across 
contests, and whether those reputations affected how the individuals were 
copied. This links with Henrich and Gil-White’s notion of prestige (Henrich 
and Gil-White, 2001), and although the MATLAB does not allow for direct 
interaction between participants, it does allow testing hypotheses proposed by 
the authors like whether people preferentially copy successful individuals, and 
whether prestigious individuals are influential even beyond their domain of 
expertise. I expect the MATLAB contests will bring positive evidence for both 
those hypotheses. In order to test this I define ‘prestige’ or prestige-like effects 
in terms of whether individuals manage to take the lead, i.e. achieve the best 
score at the time of an entry’s submission. This is a remarkably salient signal, 
as the top of the leaderboard was closely monitored throughout each contest, 
and I expect that individuals who managed to take the lead should have higher 
influence on subsequent entries. Even more, this framework allows testing 
whether this influence carries across contests, a proxy for different domains – 
surely, MATLAB expertise is required for success in this context across all 
contests, but whether individuals should be expected to perform just as well 
on different problems remains an empirical question.  
 Chapter 3 showed evidence of a strong payoff bias in the MATLAB contests, 
as the current best entry at any time seems to be preferentially copied. In this 
chapter I investigated whether this effect extends at the individual level and 
whether individuals recognise leading authors as more successful and use this 
recognition to guide their copying. Moreover, in previous analyses each 
contest was treated independently, but it is the case that the same individuals 
participated in more than one contest. Thus it was possible to investigate 
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whether individual participants formed cross-contest reputations and whether 
reputations affected the way they were copied. If leading authors showed 
more influence irrespective of how well their entries score, this would be 
evidence of a prestige-type effect. If the effect held cross-contests, and leading 
authors had more impact if they had also been leading authors in previous 
contests, for instance, then the evidence for prestige bias would be even more 
convincing.  
4.2.2.1. Influence measure  
To this end, I needed to establish the extent to which an individual was copied 
throughout the contest. This was challenging since there was no unambiguous 
record of whether an entrant was copying a specific individual at the time they 
submitted their entry. The closest proxy for copying used so far is the 
similarity between two entries: if the similarity between an earlier and a later 
entry is high enough, more often than not the later entry copied the earlier 
one to some extent. This does not exclude, however, the possibility that the 
two entries are related through copying via a third entry. Instead of 
attempting to quantify how many entries a submission has been copied by, I 
devised a measure I call ‘influence’ that attempts to capture how much of an 
entry the population has picked up following the entry’s submission.  
Influence is a continuous population-level measure of subsequent similarity 
that indicates how a given solution, once introduced, persists in the 
population. This measure does to some extent distinguish between the initial 
innovator and the following copiers, but it does not completely discount 
copiers. We would not want to ignore the fact that although an initial 
innovator introduces an idea in the population, it could be that a subsequent 
copier manages to popularise it - in a way, copiers have as much influence as 
the initial innovator if they were clever enough to copy a successful solution. 
More specifically, influence was calculated as the average similarity between 
an entry and all subsequent entries. The influence of the entries submitted at 
the beginning of the contest will naturally be lower than the influence of the 
entries submitted towards the end, purely because for the entries submitted at 
the beginning there is a higher number of entries that could potentially 
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diverge from them. Therefore I divided this average similarity by a serial 
number indicating the point along the contest timeline of the entry’s 
submission. This number ranges between 0 and the total number of days in 
each contest (typically 7), with a precision of 4 decimals (such that the first 
entry is submitted at time 0, the second at time 0.0291 for example, etc.).  
Because of the difference in magnitude between similarity and this measure of 
time, influence is skewed, assigning very high numbers to initial entries. 
Therefore the analysis used a log-transformation of the influence measure. 
Thus, influence was given by: 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = log  (!"#$  !"#"$%&"'(!"#$ + 0.001)  (Equation 4.3) 
Finally, this influence measure was rescaled between 0 and 1 using the same 
form as Equation 4.2 above, to make comparison across contests possible.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, more than half of the contests consisted of three 
periods of visibility. In ‘darkness’, the first day, participants were only allowed 
to see their own entries and score. In the second day, ‘twilight’, participants 
could additionally see their own rankings compared to the other participants. 
Only from the 3rd day on, in ‘daylight’, did participants have full access to all 
the other entries and their scores. Because here we were interested in how 
reputations are formed once participants can see and copy each other, the 
influence analysis only included data from ‘daylight’, from the 3rd day 
onwards, and only included valid entries that received a score.  
4.2.2.2. Statistical analysis 
In order to test whether leading authors had a higher influence than non-
leading authors both in their leading and non-leading entries, I fitted a mixed 
linear model with the influence of each entry as the dependent variable and a 
factor with three levels that specified whether 1) the entry took the lead and 
was submitted by a leading authors, 2) the entry did not take the lead but was 
submitted by a leading author and 3) the entry did not take the lead and was 
submitted by a non-leading author. The baseline was set to group (3), the 
entries that did not take the lead and were submitted by non-leading authors. 
The model included the entry’s score increment as a fixed effect to control for 
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the fact that better performing entries might have higher influence 
irrespective of who submitted them. The author and the contest were included 
as random effects, with author nested within contest, to control for the fact 
that each contest might be characterised by a different average level of 
copying, and the fact that within each contest some authors might have 
generally higher influence independent of their leader status. Therefore the 
model specification was:  𝐸(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!"#) =   𝛼 +   𝛽! +   𝛾!" +   𝛽!  𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! +   𝛽!  𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟! 𝛽!   ~𝑁 0,𝜎!! ;   𝛾!"   ~𝑁(0,𝜎!!) 
for each entry k submitted by author j in contest i.  
The predictor of interest here was the author factor. We expected leading 
entries submitted by leading authors to have a significantly higher influence 
than entries submitted by non-leading authors. If there were also a significant 
increase in influence in non-leading entries submitted by leading authors, 
compared to entries submitted by non-leading authors, this would suggest 
that leading authors generally have more influence, which is consistent with a 
prestige bias.  
Some individuals participate in multiple contests, which gives us the 
opportunity to investigate whether individuals perform consistently across 
different problems or whether the variation between contest problems 
somehow breaks down these individual characteristics. Through a similar 
argument as before, if authors performed consistently across contests, and if 
this performance lead to the emergence of reputations that individuals can use 
when copying, we would expect that more ‘prestigious’ individuals would have 
higher influence, and that this prestige-type effect will hold across contests. 
This was tested using a similar mixed linear model as for within-contest 
influence.  
In this context, because authors participated in more than one contest, we 
could distinguish between whether the author submitting each entry managed 
to become a leading author in the same contest the entry was submitted in, or 
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whether the individual managed to become a leading author in a separate 
contest. The predictor of interest was therefore a factor that specified whether 
the entry took the lead, the author submitting the entry was a leader in the 
same contest the entry was part of, or the author was a leader in a different 
contest. This factor had 6 levels: 1) non-leading entry submitted by a non-
leading author who was not a leading author in a different contest, 2) non-
leading entry submitted by a non-leading author who was a leading author in 
a different contest, 3) non-leading entry submitted by a leading author who 
was not a leading author in a separate contest, 4) non-leading entry submitted 
by a leading author who was also a leader in a different contest, 5) leading 
entry submitted by a leading author who was not a leader in a different 
contest, and 6) leading entry submitted by a leading author who was also a 
leading author in a different contest. As before, I included score increment as 
a fixed factor, and contest and author identity as random factors. 
This allowed us to establish whether entries had more influence when 
submitted by a leading author, independent of how well they scored. Crucially, 
this analysis also allowed us to establish if entries had more influence when 
submitted by an author that was a leader in a different contest (i.e. if 
reputations carry across contests). If entries that do not take the lead, 
submitted by authors who do not become leaders in the same contest, but who 
had been leading authors in a different contest still have higher influence than 
entries submitted by non-leading authors both within and across contests, it 
would mean that the leadership reputation at the individual level was 
maintained across contests, evidence of cross-domain prestige bias.  
4.2.3. Cross-contest improvement  
This section addresses the question of whether improvement at the contest 
level can be best predicted using population size or the composition of 
individuals participating in a contest. In other words, is score improvement 
driven by “collective brain” effects or the presence of particularly talented 
individuals. Choosing a measure of improvement is challenging, because 
contests vary in the problems proposed, and because each contest allows for 
open-ended improvement in task.  
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A straightforward measure of the overall improvement in each contest is how 
much the entire population improves over an initial baseline score. Because 
each contest proposed a different challenge, and the score was intrinsically 
linked to the challenge, as it was a function of the algorithmic result of that 
problem, this overall improvement needed to be normalised by a number that 
characterises the problem. Fortunately, in each contest, the organisers 
provided a sample entry that participants could use as an example and build 
on. This sample entry is the first entry, and it provides a useful baseline that 
can be used to compare each contest improvement. Therefore, our measure of 
improvement was calculated as the difference in score between the best entry 
(the entry with the best/lowest score in our case) and the first entry, divided 
by the score of the first entry. This gave a measure of overall improvement  
independent of the algorithmic solution of each problem. 
I selected a number of key measures characterising size, activity, and 
performance for each contest. These measures are: 
• Number of authors – how many participants each contest attracted, a 
measure of population size; 
• Number of leading entries – this is not necessarily a measure of overall 
improvement in a contest; rather, it characterises how incremental 
improvement is; 
• Number of authors who took the lead – a measure of how many skilled 
participants there were; 
• Range of mean score increments relative to the current leader per 
author – a measure characterising the variance in mean relative 
performance per author, to understand whether there is a relationship 
between overall improvement in a contest and how varied the 
performance of individuals taking part in that contest was; 
• Mean leader similarity – a measure of average novelty per contest; 
• Mean proportion of novel lines – absolute novelty per contest. 
Does the number of authors participating in each contest relate to overall 
contest improvement? Or is it the case that individual make-up, in terms of 
how novel, variable in performance, or successful individuals are affects 
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overall improvement? Testing the relationship between overall improvement 
and each of the above measures will answer this question.  
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4.3. Results  
4.3.1. Individual variation 
Individuals differed widely in their activity patterns, measured in terms of the 
number of entries submitted by each participant (Fig. 4.2). The number of 
entries per author was roughly exponentially distributed in all contests, with a 
very small number of authors responsible for a large number of entries, and a 
long tail of authors with very few entries.  Indeed, 30% of authors submitted 
only one entry the entire contest, 60% submitted 5 or less, and less than 1% 
submitted more than 50 entries. 
 
The distribution of leading authors was similarly skewed – a very small 
number of authors managed to submit at least one entry that took the lead 
Figure 4.2 – number of total entries (red indicates failed entries, blue indicates 
passed entries) per author for each of the 19 contests 
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(Fig. 4.3a).  More specifically, only 22% of all participants in all contests 
submitted at least one entry that took the lead, and only 14% did this more 
than once. This is consistent with the results from Chapter 3, which indicate 
that improvement in task is very difficult and most entries do not manage to 
take the lead.  
There seems to be a link between activity and performance (Fig. 4.3b). 
Bearing in mind that a higher average increment indicates better average 
performance, while leading authors showed considerable variation in how 
many entries they submit, there were virtually no authors who submitted a 
large number of entries and performed badly. Therefore participants who 
were not very successful were also not very active. The variation in activity in 
leading authors suggests, however, that high activity is not necessary for a 
participant to be able to take the lead. It is perfectly possible for newcomers 
with no history of improvement to join the contest and beat the current best 
score. 
 
4.3.1.1. Novelty 
Visualising the distributions for both our novelty measures (proportion of 
novelty and similarity to current leader) allows us to explore the average 
novelty introduced by an individual (i.e. whether they have a general 
Figure 4.3 – (a) number of leading entries per author in all contests; (b) average 
score increment relative to the current leader, for each author in each contest, as a 
function of the number of entries, rescaled in [0,1]. Blue points indicate leading 
authors, red dots indicate non-leading authors 
a. b. 
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predilection for copying), as well as the variation in that novelty (i.e. do they 
show consistent preferences for copying/novelty or do they exhibit a varied 
strategy?).  
Figure 4.4a and 4.4b plot the average values per author, along with the range 
of each author distribution, for both similarity to the current leader and 
proportion of novelty. The distribution of leader similarities across authors 
shows a sigmoidal pattern, with more authors showing low similarity, and a 
relatively gradual shift from low to high average similarity. Some authors were 
very conservative and preferred to keep their entries ‘safe’ through copying, 
while some authors were relatively adventurous, submitting highly varied 
entries in terms of the solutions. This mirrors the pattern we saw in Chapter 3, 
where most entries copied the current leader and therefore scored very 
similarly, while some entries deviated from the code the population was 
currently entertaining. Therefore authors varied widely on the conservatism 
spectrum, but if we were to informally categorise individuals they can be 
broadly split into three groups: 1) a surprisingly large number of low similarity 
authors, ‘incurable mavericks’ who barely ever took the lead, 2) an 
intermediate group of ‘occasional mavericks’, who were most likely to take the 
lead, and 3) a smaller group of ‘extreme conservatives’ who, again, rarely took 
the lead.  
Most leading authors and the most active authors lie towards the copying end 
of this spectrum, suggesting that copying is associated with better 
performance at the individual level. This is confirmed by Fig. 4.4c, which 
illustrates between and within-author variation in performance, as measured 
by the score increment. Most leading authors introduced small improvements 
on average (right-hand side of the graph), associated with more copying and 
less novelty.  
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b. 
Figure 4.4 – (a) leader similarity, (b) proportion of novel lines, (c) score increment - 
average values with bars spanning the range of the distribution. The red points 
indicate leading authors (i.e. authors who submitted at least one entry that 
improved the overall score at the time of its submission), and the size of the 
points is proportional to the total number of entries submitted by each author 
c. 
a. 
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The majority of authors exhibited broad diversity in their entries’ similarity to 
the current leader. Low mean-similarity authors did not seem to submit any 
high similarity entries (left-hand side of Fig. 4.4a), but these also tended to be 
authors with a small number of submissions (there was a positive correlation 
between the number of submissions and the similarity to the current leader at 
author level – Spearman ρ= 0.22, p < 0.001).  Most authors however were 
very likely to submit both similar and dissimilar entries to the current leader, 
which suggests a high degree of flexibility in strategies. Very few authors 
limited themselves to merely copying, preferring instead to also explore 
solutions that deviate from the current norm. Importantly, there is no specific 
point on this axis that would unequivocally split authors into ‘copiers’ and 
‘mavericks’ – rather, individuals fall on a continuous spectrum between 
absolute novelty and absolute copying, with the majority exhibiting large 
variation in similarity between entries.  
The proportion of novel lines paints a very similar picture (Fig. 4.4b). The 
average proportion of novel lines per author was typically low, and more 
active and more successful authors tended to show a lower proportion of 
novelty. There was, again, a large range of variation within author in terms of 
novelty, which indicates individuals in this context did not split cleanly into 
innovators and conservatives.  
Interestingly, active leading authors showed large variation in leader 
similarity across entries (Fig. 4.4a), but they did not show as much variation 
in proportion of new lines across entries (Fig. 4.4b). This is clearly illustrated 
by Fig. 4.5 – most authors who submitted at least one leading entry showed 
high values of average similarity, but low average proportion of novel lines. 
This, intriguingly, would suggest that while successful authors sometimes 
deviated from the current best, it was not because they introduced 
considerable novelty, but perhaps because they recombined material already 
present in the contest.  
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Finally, as there does not seem to be a clear split between ‘copiers’ and 
‘mavericks’, I tested whether novelty was associated with the score increment 
relative to the current leader. There was indeed a significant negative 
correlation between the average proportion of novel lines of an author and 
their average score increment (Spearman ρ= -0.26, p < 0.001) and a 
significant positive correlation between the average similarity to the current 
leader and the average score increment (Spearman ρ= 0.42, p < 0.001). 
Bearing in mind that a higher increment is indicative of good performance, 
this confirms that the results from Chapter 3 hold at the individual level – 
authors with who introduce more novelty were less successful (Fig. 4.6).
 
Figure 4.5 – average leader similarity as a function of average proportion of new 
lines, for each author in all contests. The red points indicate leading authors, and 
the size of the points is proportional to the number of entries submitted by each 
author   
Figure 4.6 – average score increment as a function of average proportion of new 
lines and average leader similarity, for all authors in all contests. For ease of 
visualization, novelty and similarity have been grouped in bins covering 
approximately 10% of each measure 
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4.3.1.2. Leaders  
The leading authors, the individuals who manage to submit at least one entry 
that takes the lead, represented 526 out of the total of 2353. Thus 22% of 
authors managed to take the lead at least once, but they were responsible for 
76% of all passed entries, indicating much higher activity levels in leading 
authors (Fig. 4.7). The average number of entries per leading author was 10 
times larger than the average number of entries per non-leading author.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 illustrates the difference of magnitude between positive and 
negative score differences within leading authors, and the results from the 
mixed linear model testing the differences in score increment between the 
three groups are presented in Table 4.1. As expected, improvements in leaders 
were smaller than non-successes.  However, we have no reason to believe that 
negative score differences in leading authors should be different from negative 
score differences in non-leading authors, but this is precisely what the results 
indicate. This suggests that although there was considerable variation between 
individuals, leading authors performed consistently better throughout the 
contest than non-leading authors.  
Figure 4.7 – distribution of number of entries per author, normalised over contests, 
for leading and non-leading authors  
CHAPTER 4 
 
141 
 
Leading authors also seem to be introducing novelty differently in their 
entries (Fig. 4.9). Non-leading authors were characterised by an s-shaped 
curve with higher variation concentrated around middle values, but the 
distribution of similarity to the current leader for leading authors displayed a 
relatively gradual increase in mean similarity and very wide ranges. The 
distributions for the proportion of novel lines did not show as much disparity, 
although leading authors generally displayed more variation than the rest of 
the participants (Fig. 4.10). This suggests that leading authors are more 
exploratory, deviating more from the current leading solution.   
 
 Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 
Leader  
negative score 
difference 
0.041 0.0191 2.08 0.03 
Leader 
improvement  
-0.029 0.002 -13.08 <0.001*** 
Non-leader  
negative score 
difference 
0.094 0.008 11.53 <0.001*** 
Table 4.1 – results from linear mixed model increment ~ group + (1|contest:author) 
 
Figure 4.8 – distribution of positive score differences submitted by leading authors 
(left), negative score differences submitted by leading authors (centre), and 
negative score differences submitted by non-leading authors (right). 
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a. 
b. 
Figure 4.9 – (a) average values and range bars for the distribution of similarities to 
current leader for leading authors and (b) non-leading authors   
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This indeed becomes evident when comparing the use of novelty between 
leading and non-leading authors (Fig. 4.11). Leading authors displayed a 
higher average similarity to the current leader than non-leading authors 
(Wilcoxon W(2353)= 382380, p<0.001), and they introduced a smaller 
proportion of novel lines on average, compared to the non-leading authors 
a. 
b. 
Figure 4.10 – (a) average values and range bars for the distribution of the proportion 
of new lines for leading authors and (b) non-leading authors 
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(Wilcoxon W(2353) = 720250, p<0.001). This mirrors the results presented in 
Figure 4.5, indicating that better performing individuals introduced less 
novelty on average.  
Nonetheless, leading authors showed a much larger variation of solutions than 
non-leading authors (Fig 4.11b). Leading authors displayed a higher range of 
similarity to the current leader authors than non-leading authors (Wilcoxon 
W(2353)= 818580, p<0.001), and a higher range of novel lines (Wilcoxon 
W(2353)= 671260, p<0.001), suggesting that the solutions introduced by 
leading authors were in fact more variable than the solutions of the less 
successful authors. So although, on average, leading authors tend to use 
introduce less novelty, they explore the solution space more broadly. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 – (a) distributions of average leader similarity and average proportion of 
novelty for all non-leading and leading authors; (b) distributions of leader similarity 
ranges and proportion of novelty ranges for non-leading and leading authors 
a. 
b. 
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4.3.2. Influence 
The influence measure accurately captured the patterns of similarity over time 
observed in Chapter 3, and was strongly correlated with the similarity to the 
current leader (Pearson R = 0.8, p < 0.001, Fig. 4.12). 
	  
The between and within-individual variation in influence mirrors the patterns 
of similarity observed in the previous section – it seems that leaders and more 
Figure 4.12 – influence (log-transformed average similarity between each entry and all 
the subsequent entries) for all passed entries submitted from day 3 onwards in all 19 
contests 
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active authors display higher variation in the influence of their entries, a sign 
of more exploratory behaviour (Fig. 4.13). 
 
Influence was associated with performance both at the entry level and 
individual level (Fig. 4.14). As expected, leading authors on average had a 
significantly higher influence than non-leading authors (Wilcoxon W = 
195280, p<0.001) but this difference extends to entry-level influence – 
whether an entry was a leader affected the influence value of that entry. 
Results from the linear mixed model show that indeed leading entries had 
significantly higher influence than non-leading entries. Importantly, even 
non-leading entries submitted by leading authors had significantly higher 
influence than entries submitted by non-leading authors (Table 4.2), even 
when we control for score difference. The increase to an entry’s influence due 
to its submitter being a leading author was slightly smaller than the increase 
associated with the entry being a leading entry – becoming a leading entry 
essentially doubles the influence of an entry compared to the entry merely 
being submitted by a leading author without managing to take the lead. 
Nonetheless, the increase associated merely with a leading author is 
Figure 4.13 – average values for the distribution of influence for all authors in all 
contests, and bars spanning the range of each distribution. The size of the points is 
proportional to the number of entries submitted per contest, and the red points 
indicate leading authors.  
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detectable and significant. Therefore, leading authors submitted entries that 
had a higher effect on other participants, even when those entries were not the 
best available to copy and even when variation in actual score was accounted 
for. This indicates that a prestige-type effect is taking place in the contests, 
with authors who manage to take the lead at least once forming reputations 
that influence how the other individuals copy them.  
  
Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 
Non-leading author 
Non-leading entry 
0.68 0.014 46.9 <0.001*** 
Leading author 
Non-leading entry 
0.13 0.009 14.05 <0.001*** 
Leading author 
Leading entry 
0.16 0.009 16.48 <0.001*** 
Score increment 0.24 0.006 41.74 <0.001*** 
Table 4.2 – results for fixed effects from linear mixed model  
influence ~leader_group + increment + (1|contest:author) 
 
Figure 4.14 – entry-level influence distribution for entries submitted by non-leading 
authors, non-leading entries submitted by leading authors, and leading entries 
submitted by leading authors 
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4.3.2.1. Cross-contest reputation 
Out of the total of 1416 unique authors, more than 83% only participated in 
one contest. The numbers of participants sharply decrease as the number of 
repeated contests increases, but there were still individuals who took part in 8 
or 9 contests, with one participant competing in 14 out of the 19 contests we 
are investigating (Fig. 4.15). In order to adequately capture within-participant 
variation and to ensure methodological validity, I chose to examine 
individuals who participated in more than 3 contests, which leaves us with a 
sample size of 51 authors.  
	  
There was considerable variation both within and between all these repeat 
participants in terms of activity novelty, and performance (Fig. 4.16). Authors 
who participated in more contests, naturally, showed more variation in both 
the number of entries submitted and the number of entries that took the lead. 
For instance, some participants submitted on average 1 to 10 entries per 
contest, some usually contributed around 200 entries per contest, while the 
most active participant submitted between 400 and 1200 entries in the 
contests they competed in.  
There was similarly large variation in the score increment relative to the 
current leader and, particularly, in the average leader similarity. Therefore 
different individuals seemed to show variation in their average strategy – for 
Figure 4.15 – number of authors who participated in 1, 2, 3, … 14 contests 
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instance, a large number of individuals showed consistently high leader 
similarity in all contests (Fig. 4.16d). Yet they also showed different levels of 
variation across contests – some individuals were relatively consistent in their 
strategies, but there is no lack of examples of individuals who used widely 
varying strategies in different contests. Table 4.3 presents the results from the 
linear mixed-model testing whether the influence of an entry depends on the 
identity of the author who submitted and, importantly, whether this effect is 
present even for authors who have been leaders in a different contest from the 
one the entry was submitted in. That indeed seemed to be the case.  
 
Overall, leading entries had significantly higher influence than non-leading 
entries, and so did non-leading entries that have been submitted by an author 
who managed to take the lead in the same contest. Yet, although weaker, this 
effect held even for entries that did not take the lead, submitted by authors 
a. b. 
Figure 4.16 – (a) per author cross-contest distribution of the number of entries, (b) 
the number of leading entries, (c) per-contest average score increment relative to 
the current leader, and (d) per contest average similarity to the current leader. Each 
boxplot represents the distribution of the number of entries for (a) and (b), and 
average values for (c) and (d) for an author across all the contests the author 
participated in 
d. c. 
d
. 
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who did not become leaders in the same contest, but did at some point take 
the lead in a different contest. The increase in influence associated with the 
score increment was double any increase associated with the identity of the 
author or the leadership status of the entry, suggesting payoff bias was 
stronger than prestige bias. Entries that became leaders were associated with 
the highest increment, followed by entries non-leading entries that had been 
submitted by a leading author both within and across contests. The increment 
associated with a non-leading entry that had been submitted by a leading 
author in that contest was more than double than the increment of a non-
leading entry submitted by a leader in a different contest, so overall the effect 
of leading in that contest is bigger than the effect of leading in a different 
contest (both for leading and non-leading entries). Nonetheless, leading in a 
different contest has a significant, albeit smaller effect on the influence of an 
entry. This suggests that cross-contest individual behaviour was significantly 
related to entry-level measures of influence, indicating that consistent 
individual characteristics affected how entries were copied, in line with 
prestige effects forming across contests through repeated participation.  
Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
(Intercept) 
Non-leading entry 
Non-leading author 
Not leading elsewhere 
0.675 0.014 45.35 <0.001** 
Non-leading entry 
Non-leading author 
Leading elsewhere 
0.045 0.014 3.11 0.0019** 
Non-leading entry 
Leading author 
Not leading elsewhere 
0.128 0.012 10.37 <0.001*** 
Non-leading entry 
Leading author 
Leading elsewhere 
0.147 0.012 11.91 <0.001*** 
Leading entry 
Leading author 
Not leading elsewhere 
0.156 0.013 11.92 <0.001*** 
Leading entry 
Leading author 
Leading elsewhere 
0.176 0.012 13.77 <0.001*** 
Score increment  0.249 0.005 41.69 <0.001*** 
Table 4.3 – results for fixed effects from linear mixed model  
influence ~leader_group + increment + (1|contest:author) 
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4.3.3. Cross-contest improvement  
The distribution of improvements within each contest, calculated as 
normalised score difference between the best entry and the baseline first entry 
in each contest, showed wide variability (Fig. 4.17), and ranged from a small 
percentage over the baseline provided (in contests like ‘Molecule’ ) to very 
large improvements of several orders of magnitude  (for example  in ‘Sudoku’ 
the score decreased from  25390 to 96.9).  
 
I tested the relationship between this measure of total contest improvement 
and both population size and our measures of the characteristics of 
individuals within each contest using non-parametric Spearman correlations. 
None of the relationships between improvement and the measures selected 
were significant. This is surprising particularly since there is an established 
relationship in the literature between cultural accumulation and group size, 
which would predict that contests with more authors and more entries will be 
associated with higher improvement, but that does not seem to be the case in 
this data. It is possible that improvement within a contest is a function of 
complex interactions between performance, activity, and novelty that the 
chosen measures failed to capture. 
Figure 4.17 – score improvement relative to the baseline, for each contest 
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4.4. Discussion 
This chapter has explored individual variation in the cumulative cultural 
setting of the MATLAB contests, how it relates to performance and copying, 
and how it affects contest improvement. There was considerable variation 
between individual participants regarding activity, performance, and the use 
of novelty in their solutions. More investment, in terms of time and how many 
entries an individual submits, was associated with better performance overall, 
but it was still possible for newcomers to join the contest and improve the 
overall score straightaway, suggesting that improvements in this setting were 
not dependent on experience.  
The individual-level patterns of entry novelty did not indicate a clear split 
between individuals who prefer copying and individuals who prefer 
innovation, but rather described a continuous spectrum, in which individuals 
varied gradually in their proclivity to copy. This work is, then, another 
example of the importance of individual variation for the study of the 
evolution of social learning (Molleman, van den Berg and Weissing, 2014). 
Incorporating individual preferences for different learning strategies could 
lead to interesting interactions that models assuming homogenous behaviour 
might fail to capture. It could well be the case that different learning 
phenotypes are preferred in different environmental conditions (social 
learning is not necessarily an advantage in a highly variable environment, for 
example), so variation in learning strategies could arise from divergent 
selection under highly variable environmental conditions.  
Results here suggest some individuals were consistently more successful than 
others, and that individuals who typically introduced more novelty were less 
successful overall.  Individuals split into three broad groups with regards to 
how they commonly use novelty in their solutions: a group of extreme 
conservatives and a group of extreme mavericks, who rarely took the lead, and 
a third intermediate group of exploratory individuals who showed appreciable 
variation in their solutions, but who also regularly took the lead.  
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I have found that leading authors on average were more similar to the current 
leader and introduced less novelty, but they were also significantly more 
exploratory in their solutions, suggesting that diversity within individuals is 
positively associated with better performance. Reputation is a substantial 
reward in this contest setting – there is no cost to submitting a low performing 
entry, but introducing an entry that takes the lead is highly sought after, so it 
pays to experiment with solutions in order to find a well-performing one. 
Derex et al. (2013) discuss how this distinction between rewarding the highest 
score or the cumulative score affects exploratory behaviour. While rewarding 
the highest score (i.e. the highest single payoff) encourages exploring the 
fitness landscape, rewarding a cumulative score (i.e. the amount of payoff 
harvested during a given time) puts a considerably higher cost on sub-optimal 
solutions, which restricts exploration. A cumulative score is, arguably, more 
realistic as it reflects a trade-off between ensuring an accumulation of 
resources and improving technology to gain resources, for instance, but a high 
score reward would reflect how technological improvements can take place in 
an environment where failure is less costly. This raises interesting questions 
regarding whether different social structures could create different risk 
environments that would lead to between-group differences in behaviour. 
I found that leaders had more influence on the patterns of solutions in the 
population, even through entries that did not take the lead. This effect 
extended across contests, such that individuals who had proved successful in 
other contests still managed to have higher influence even in contests in which 
they did not take the lead. While it is not clear if this phenomenon represents 
prestige per se, we can safely say there is some indicator of performance at the 
individual level, here signalled by the leader status, which can be picked up by 
the patterns of copying across time in each contest. By modelling the influence 
of leaders while controlling for the individual performance of each entry, I 
could establish whether leaders had higher influence merely as a result of 
submitting generally better entries, or whether leadership genuinely creates a 
reputational effect. The latter indeed seems to be the case, suggesting 
prestige-like effects in the copying of leaders. This is not a purely cross-
domain phenomenon – the effect holds between contests, suggesting an 
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individual’s reputation builds in the MATLAB contest microcosm 
independently of the specific challenge, yet they all rely on the same 
programming expertise.   
This analysis is vulnerable to the measure of influence we use. If it is the case 
that individuals progressively work on the same solution trying to improve it, 
then the non-leading solutions submitted by leaders will be similar to their 
leading solutions, and so will their subsequent similarity (which is what we 
used here to quantify influence). Therefore the non-leading entries submitted 
by leaders will have a higher influence not because they have a better 
performance, but because they are more similar to entries that do indeed have 
better performance and are therefore picked up by the population through 
payoff bias. This does not however change the fact that leading entries have a 
higher influence even when we control for entry performance and, 
importantly, does not explain why we find a leader effect across contests, 
suggesting that the leader status is indeed used to create a prestige-type effect. 
Finally, I found no relationship across contests between population size, nor 
participant characteristics, and solution improvement, which is surprising 
given previous research discussed in the introduction. Indeed there is a great 
deal of debate around whether it is population size, group size, connectivity, 
or sociality that causally affect cumulative improvement in a given population 
(see Baldini, 2015 for an overview). In this case, the population is fully 
connected in theory, as all the entries are visible to all participants, but it is 
worth bearing in mind that the size of cultural repertoire in a contest quickly 
becomes too big for individuals to be able to inspect every entry, which is why 
they resort to copying the best entry. This could mean that the number of 
individuals used here is not a clear reflection of the ‘group size’ in the sense of 
the individuals or the cultural traits individuals interact with, but a superior 
alternative is not obvious. At the same time, the relatively small variability in 
terms of improvement between contests could be responsible for the fact that 
there was no relationship between improvement and variation in participant 
patterns. Although our dataset might not be specifically suited for answering 
this, the question whether individual variation promotes cumulative 
improvement is intriguing and merits further investigation.  
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Individual variation in behaviour is a topic that has only recently started to 
attract more attention in the field of cultural evolution. It has typically been 
neglected or treated as noise, and for good reason as it greatly complicates 
analyses and interpretation and introduces additional methodological 
difficulties. Nonetheless, the recent shift in the field towards acknowledging 
and attempting to explore individual variation as well as cultural variation is 
encouraging, as we expect individual variation to have important effects on 
the patterns of cultural evolution we witness. Mesoudi et al. (2016) suggest 
that assuming that social learning strategies are purely genetically specified 
could underestimate the speed of response to environmental variation, and 
support previous suggestions that the use of social learning can itself be 
culturally learned (Heyes, 2012a), which would speed up environmental 
adaptation, but could also contribute to faster spread of maladaptive traits. 
The importance of cultural differences has been recognised by behavioural 
scientists suggesting that a shift away from Western societies would question 
the universality of a great deal of current findings (Henrich, Heine and 
Norenzayan, 2010). The study of individual differences therefore has deep 
theoretical implications and will surely provide a fertile avenue for fruitful 
future research.  
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Chapter 5 
An Experimental Investigation of Group 
Structure and Cumulative Culture 
 
 
Abst ract  
Population size, connectedness, and sociality have been shown to be 
important factors shaping population-level dynamics of cumulative culture, 
but little work has attempted to address the mechanisms through which larger 
groups might promote an accumulation of more complex, more efficient 
culture. In this chapter I investigate experimentally whether group structure is 
such a mechanism that can lead to increased improvement in skill via an 
increase of cultural diversity, by modifying the MATLAB contest paradigm 
introduced in the previous chapters. I ran a similar programming competition 
with two conditions – a control that replicated previous contests, and an 
experimental condition, which involved splitting participants in three small 
groups for the first four days of the contest, and merging these groups for the 
last three days. Results show that the large group achieved better performance 
than the small groups overall, but through more incremental improvement, 
and increased activity levels. The large group showed more copying, but also 
more cultural diversity than the small groups, and our group structure 
manipulation did not increase diversity overall. Nevertheless, the diversity 
decreased in both conditions, through different processes – in the large group, 
diversity decreased as a result of convergence on similar solutions, while in 
the merged group condition the separate groups entertained different solution 
‘traditions’, which were swapped for a new tradition once the groups were 
merged. I discuss the implications of group size on different cumulative 
cultural regimes.  
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5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have shown that, in a cumulative setting, increasingly 
difficult improvements and a strong payoff bias drive populations to copy 
substantially, and to converge on increasingly similar solutions over time. This 
greatly reduces cultural diversity, as individual solutions are nearly 
indistinguishable. This is a paradoxical result, since human culture is 
evidently characterised by tremendous diversity and variability across groups. 
This chapter is concerned with experimentally exploring the potential causes 
of this paradox by focusing on how group structure affects cultural diversity 
and, consequently, incremental improvement.  
The cultural evolution literature shows a great deal of effort dedicated to 
understanding whether population size promotes cultural accumulation, both 
through theoretical and empirical approaches. In 2004, Henrich developed a 
model to investigate the conditions under which skill in a cultural trait 
accumulates in a population, under the assumption that improvement in skill 
depends crucially on imitation errors (Henrich, 2004). In this model, all 
individuals could successfully identify and attempt to copy the person with the 
highest level of skill, 𝑧!, but learning was not entirely accurate. Copying errors 
were modelled as a Gumbel distribution described by mode 𝛼 − 𝑧! and 
dispersion 𝛽, which means that, in a cumulative cultural scenario in which 
traits are generally very difficult to learn, most individuals will acquire a worse 
skill level than what they are trying to copy, but a small proportion of 
individuals will acquire a better one. Then, 𝛼 represents the effect of low 
fidelity transmission, the systematic error that all individuals make when 
attempting to copy – a small 𝛼 represents a skill that is easy to learn. On the 
other hand, 𝛽 is the effect of inaccurate inference, and models the individual 
variation in learning accuracy.  
Henrich concluded that the change in skill level depends, critically, on the 
population size. In this scenario, cultural evolution results in an accumulation 
of skill when the effect of transmission errors is overcome by the advantage of 
having a larger set of models, although this happens at different points for 
different types of skills. This means that under certain conditions, if the 
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population size decreases enough, there are not enough individuals that 
manage to accurately copy and improve on the highest skill, curbing cultural 
accumulation. It could even be the case that, as the population size decreases, 
the erosion in knowledge is so high that the population loses artefacts and 
skills, as in the case of Tasmanian technology loss (Henrich, 2004).  
Henrich’s model is not without its critics (Henrich, 2006; Read, 2006), but 
has nonetheless been adopted and adapted to include population structure, 
migration, overlapping generations, and different social learning strategies 
(Powell, Shennan and Thomas, 2009; Bentley and O’Brien, 2011; Lehmann, 
Aoki and Feldman, 2011; Mesoudi, 2011c; Vaesen, 2012; Kobayashi, Ohtsuki 
and Wakano, 2016). These studies confirm the general finding that population 
size boosts cumulative culture. For example, Powell et al. (2009) adapt the 
Henrich model to investigate how group structure and connectedness affects 
the accumulation of beneficial culturally inherited skills. Using a simulated 
meta-population with sub-populations of different densities, connected 
through migration, the authors found that the accumulation of skills is not 
dependent on the meta-population size, but rather on the degree of 
interaction between sub-populations. Higher density leads to higher 
accumulation of skill and, importantly, higher migration rate does too. 
Migration has the same effect on cultural accumulation as increasing the size 
of an isolated population, as it increases the variation in skill level within a 
group, thus increasing the possibility that the group will improve over the 
mean skill level z. Even more, the authors show that model estimates of 
demographic changes fit archaeological data and explain the emergence of 
human modern behaviour in the Late Pleistocene.  
This relationship between technological complexity and population size has 
been tested using data from real world populations too, with mixed results – 
some studies support a positive relationship between complexity and 
population size (Kline and Boyd, 2010; Collard, Ruttle, et al., 2013), while 
others find no evidence (Collard, Kemery and Banks, 2005; Collard, 
Buchanan, et al., 2013). For example, islands with small populations in 
Oceania are characterised by less complex fishing technologies (Kline and 
Boyd, 2010), but a study comparing several hypothesis regarding the driving 
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forces promoting technological complexity finds that environmental risk, but 
not population size or residential mobility, predicts technological richness in 
recent western North-American hunter-gatherer populations (Collard, 
Buchanan, et al., 2013). 
The link between cultural accumulation and group size has been also 
investigated empirically (Caldwell and Millen, 2010; Derex et al., 2013; 
Muthukrishna et al., 2013; Kempe and Mesoudi, 2014), with the common 
conclusion that a larger group size promotes higher improvement or better 
preservation of skill, consistent with the modelling work. For example, 
Caldwell and Millen (2010) use the transmission chain paradigm to show that 
chains of participants exposed to three rather than one model improved an 
artefact more over time. Using a more complicated design, Derex et al. (2013) 
investigated experimentally the interaction between group size and task 
complexity. Groups of 2, 4, 8, or 16 individuals were seeded with two 
technologies: a simple task, which involved building an arrowhead whose 
efficiency was reliant on shape, and a complex opaque task, which involved 
building a fishing net characterized by complex interactions between several 
features. Each technology could be used to gain ‘life units’, which the 
participants aimed to accumulate. The participants could learn about artefact 
design by choosing to copy individuals from their own group. Results showed 
a qualitative difference between the small groups of 2 or 4 individuals, and the 
bigger groups. The simple task remained stable in the small groups, and 
improved in the larger groups, while the complex task deteriorated in the 
smaller groups, but remained stable in the larger groups. Even more, the 
authors showed that increasing group size maintained cultural diversity, as 
measured by the presence of both tasks in the group.  
The main criticism of Henrich’s model is that it does not incorporate 
population structure, but instead copiers possess full visibility and unhindered 
access to the best model. If, instead, we distinguish between population size 
and network size, and take into account how dense and connected the 
population is, it becomes clear that the rate of innovation and the spread of 
that innovation are two distinct factors that contribute separately to how a 
skill spreads and is maintained in a population, which are potentially 
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mediated by different mechanisms. Baldini (2015) made exactly this 
distinction in a model that investigates the effect of population size on 
cumulative culture, but distinguished between population size (total number 
of individuals), network size (number of individuals accessible for copying), 
and connectedness (migration), finding that total population size has little 
effect on the accumulation of skill, but network size and connectedness do. 
This relationship was modulated by an interaction with the innovation rate – 
unsuprisingly, the importance of population size diminished at higher 
innovation rates.  
Baldini’s work (2015) raises interesting points regarding how the diffusion of 
information, and population structure, are key to the accumulation of culture. 
How rare innovations are and how they are transmitted are central issues, and 
this spread of behaviour is modulated by population structure. Cultural 
accumulation is therefore less affected by population size, and more by how 
the population is connected (Powell, Shennan and Thomas, 2009). Indeed 
this is starting to be confirmed empirically (Derex and Boyd, 2016), and it 
seems that social structure and the mode of the diffusion becomes crucially 
important once the assumption of one-shot learning is relaxed - if learners 
require more than one exposure to information in order to acquire it, for 
example, the social structure of the population is critical to the spread of that 
information, with more clustered networks ensuring more effective 
information spread (Centola, 2010).  
Therefore much of the literature has been concerned with establishing 
whether larger groups promote an accumulation of more efficient culture, but 
to our knowledge the mechanisms that might support this link have yet to be 
investigated. Following Henrich’s model, in which the population-level 
improvement in skill relies on the variation of skill between individuals, here I 
set out to investigate whether group structure might promote cultural 
accumulation via increased cultural diversity. Thus, if more diversity leads to 
an increased chance that the population invents a better solution, and group 
structure increases diversity, then manipulating group structure should lead 
to more improvement. I have shown that a large, fully connected group is 
characterized by cultural convergence, but if cultural diversity promotes 
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cultural accumulation, then perhaps isolated groups would maintain more 
cultural diversity, which would in turn affect the patterns of cultural 
improvement at the population level.  
To test this, I designed an experiment that follows a very similar structure to 
the previous MATLAB competitions (Chapters 3, 4), while manipulating 
group structure to test experimentally whether diversity affects performance 
in a cumulative cultural setting. The control condition replicated as much as 
possible the previous MATLAB contests, while the experimental condition 
consisted of three isolated small groups, which were merged halfway through 
the contest. This merge resulted in an overall total number of players 
comparable to the total number of players active in the large control group.  
Firstly, this paradigm allows us to easily test whether group size affects 
performance in the programming contest by comparing performance within 
the small isolated groups with the large control group. Regarding cultural 
diversity, we expect that splitting participants into smaller groups should 
boost initial diversity across the whole population, since the presence of 
separate groups would mitigate the strong convergence effects witnessed in 
previous contests. If the population is structured, we might still see copying 
and convergence, but the separate groups would not necessarily converge on 
the same solutions. Thus, separate groups should maintain more diversity 
overall at the meta-population level. I tested this by comparing the patterns of 
similarity and novelty in different sized groups to establish whether there are 
differential levels of copying. I compared diversity patterns across the two 
conditions to confirm whether differential copying affected how the diversity 
changes. Once the groups were merged, I could compare the newly merged 
group with the control to test if the diversity patterns change when splitting 
and merging the small populations, and if these diversity patterns affect 
performance (i.e. improvement in the task). Therefore, this paradigm allows 
us to investigate group structure as a possible mechanism that could promote 
cultural diversity. This experiment tests two specific hypotheses: 1) larger 
groups are characterised by larger improvement and 2) group structure 
stimulates higher cultural diversity, which, in turn, leads to higher 
improvement. With respect to H1, I expect that larger groups will be 
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characterised by larger improvement in the first 4 days before merging, but I 
remain agnostic regarding whether this difference in improvement is 
maintained after the entire 7 days. Rather, according to H2 I expect that the 
initial increase in diversity associated with splitting groups will boost 
performance so that, by the end of the 7 days, the improvement in the 
experimental condition will exceed the improvement in the large group 
condition.   
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5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Experimental procedure 
I replicated the original MATLAB contests in an experimental setting with 
different group structure. Just like in the original contests, this used an NP-
hard optimisation problem (see Appendix for details) and for the course of 
seven days, participants could submit solutions to the problem through an 
online interface, aiming to achieve the best score. The solutions were 
automatically scored upon submission using (similarly to Chapters 3 and 4): 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =   𝑘! ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 +   𝑘! ∗   𝑒!!∗!"#$%&' (Equation 5.1) 
This is an optimisation problem, so result was the penalty calculated from the 
algorithmic solution that the solution aims to reduce, and runtime is the CPU 
time required for the algorithm to run. The k variables scaled and weighed the 
two values such that result contributed more to the score, while the runtime 
penalty ensured the entries would not take absurd amounts of time to be 
evaluated. The values used for the k variables were k1 = 1; k2 = 0.1; k3 = 0.05. 
The score, as well as the full solution code, its name, the nickname of the 
participant, and the time of the submission were all public on the website.  
I recruited participants through a mix of online advertisements, including 
specialised MATLAB newsgroups, and mailing lists. Before the beginning of 
the contest the participants were invited to make an account on the contest 
website and were informed of the general structure of the contest (i.e. 
duration, collaborative format, prizes), but only on the first day of the contest 
were they shown the actual challenge to be solved. At no point were they 
informed about the group manipulation – participants did not know they were 
split in groups. The winner in each condition (large control group and merged 
groups) was awarded the grand prize, which consisted of St Andrews 
University merchandise. In order to encourage activity throughout the 
contest, each day, in each group I awarded two prizes – a random entry and 
the best entry at a randomly picked time – each consisting of MATLAB t-
shirts. 
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Prior to the beginning of the contest I randomly distributed all 132 of the 
signed-up participants into 4 groups, each belonging to one of two conditions. 
After the beginning of the contest, any new participants who joined were 
assigned randomly to a group. In all of the 4 groups, the participants could see 
all the above information (score, code, etc.) from all the other participants in 
their own group, but not the other groups. The first condition, the ‘Large 
group’ condition, consisted of initially 66 participants who could see each 
other’s solutions from the beginning of the contest for the entirety of the week. 
The second condition, the ‘Merged groups’, consisted of 3 smaller groups of 22 
participants who, for the first 4 days of the contest could only see the solutions 
of their own small group. From the 5th day on, the 3 small groups were 
merged, so that now participants from each small could also see the solutions 
of the other two small groups, but not the large group. A diagram of the 
experimental design is illustrated in Figure 5.1. This work was approved by the 
University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee of the University of St 
Andrews (approval code BL12543).
 
Figure 5.1 – experimental design  
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5.2.2. Analysis  
For all the analysis I compared the large control group (henceforth ‘Group 1’), 
either before or after the merge date, with either the three small groups 
(‘Group 2’, ‘Group 3’, and ‘Group 4’), or the group formed by merging them 
during the experiment, in the experimental condition. It is worth noting that 
the composition of the control group was not manipulated before, or after the 
merge date.  
5.2.2.1. Group size and performance  
In order to test whether group size affects the degree to which the group 
improved its solutions over time, I compared performance across groups 
before merge (i.e. in the first four days of the contest). I used two measures of 
performance: total score improvement, to quantify the overall population-
level improvement in solutions for the task given, and average individual 
performance, i.e. how well individual entries perform. This permits 
distinguishing between population-level performance and individual-level 
performance. For example, it could be that larger populations discover better 
solutions overall, but individual solutions in the population typically do not 
perform as well as the population best.  
In order to quantify absolute improvement, an initial baseline score value was 
needed to compare the other scores to and establish how much each group 
improved relative to. I used the first entry in each group as a baseline, relative 
to which the other scores either increase or decrease. In the large group, 
because the first entry’s score was an outlier, double in value compared to all 
other scores in all groups at the beginning of the contest, I instead used the 
score of the second entry as a baseline, which incidentally is equal to the score 
of the first entry in two of the small groups, and one point smaller than the 
score of the first entry in the third small group. No other groups showed such 
a large score difference between the first and second entries. I therefore used 
the same baseline value of 104044 for all four groups. A smaller score is an 
improvement relative to this baseline. 
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In order to quantify the performance of each individual entry, I calculated 
entry-level increments, similarly to Chapter 3 and 4, relative to the current 
leading entry, as the difference in score between the leading entry and the 
target entry – this results in a positive value for the entries that improve over 
the current leading entry’s score, and a negative value for the entries that do 
not manage to improve the overall score. 
Performance can also be measured by quantifying how many entries became 
leaders, i.e. improved the overall score at the time of their submission, and by 
quantifying the magnitude of those positive increments, which improved the 
score over the current leader. Thus it is possible to characterise how 
incremental the improvement in a group is. If, for example, two groups show 
the same decrease in score, but one is characterised by a larger number of 
leaders, this suggests a more incremental improvement, achieved through 
more steps, while a smaller number of leaders would mean the same overall 
improvement was achieved through fewer, larger steps. Separately, if two 
groups comprise the same number of leaders, but the leaders in one group are 
characterised by higher average improvements than the leaders in the other 
group, then naturally the overall improvement in the former group will be 
higher than the overall improvement in the latter.  
5.2.2.2. Group structure and performance 
In order to test whether the group manipulation implemented in the 
experiment did indeed affect improvement over time, I compared 
performance in the control group after the merge date (i.e. the last three days 
of the contest), with performance in the newly merged group, using the same 
measures of performance used in the previous section: (1) absolute 
improvement, calculated as the difference in score between the best entry in 
each group at the end of the contest and both the baseline (to quantify total 
improvement), and the best entry in each condition before the merge date (to 
quantify overall improvement in each condition after merge in the last 3 days 
of the contest); (2) individual-level score increment in both conditions after 
the merge data, to quantify typical individual performance; (3) number of 
leading entries, and the magnitude of the score improvements achieved by 
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those entries, in both conditions, to quantify how incremental improvement 
was.  
5.2.2.3. Similarity and novelty 
In order to quantify the amount of copying in the two conditions, I used two 
measures of novelty. A relative measure of novelty in the context of the 
MATLAB solutions is the similarity between the entries – less similarity 
means more novelty. By inspecting the patterns of similarity over time in each 
group, I illustrated the patterns of convergence in solutions. I used the same 
variation of the Sørensen–Dice coefficient used in the previous to chapters in 
order to measure the similarity between two entries. The Czekanowski 
similarity (Bray and Curtis, 1957), is given by: 
𝐶𝑍!" = 2   !"#  (!!",!!")!!!! (!!"!!!")!!!!      
(Equation 5.2) 
where CZik is the similarity between samples i and k, xij is the number of 
instances of species j in sample i, and xkj is the number of instances of species j 
in sample k.  For our analysis, each sample corresponds to an entry, and each 
species is a line of code.  
A second measure of code novelty used here is the absolute number of lines of 
code newly introduced by each entry. I did this at group level, such that for the 
large group, a new line in an entry represented a line that had not been used 
by any other previous entries within the large group (i.e. it could have been 
used in the merged group, for example, but it would still be considered new in 
the large group). Similarly, a new line in the small groups before the merge 
date represents a line that had not been used in each of the small groups, 
respectively – therefore, we treat each of the three small groups 
independently. Finally, a new line in the merged group after the merge date 
represents a line that had not been previously used in any of the three small 
groups combined. Thus I measured novelty at the group level, but in practice 
there was vanishingly little difference between this approach and novelty at 
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the condition-level, or even overall novelty in the entire contest, because there 
was very little overlap in solutions between groups. I normalised the number 
of new lines of code in each entry by the total number of lines submitted by 
each entry, to control for longer entries skewing the distribution. Therefore, 
the measure of novelty used is the proportion of lines of code each entry newly 
introduced in its respective group.  
Finally, for each entry in each group, I recorded the similarity to the current 
leader at the time of its submission, or the previous leader in the case of 
entries that managed to take the lead. I used this measure to quantify how 
much tweaking behaviour takes place in each condition, as a higher 
proportion of high leader similarity indicates stronger payoff bias and more 
tweaking. This measure was also used to investigate the relationship between 
tweaking behaviour and performance at the entry level.  
5.2.2.4. Cultural diversity 
The experimental group manipulation allowed us to test whether group 
structure affects cultural diversity. I measured cultural diversity as the 
number of unique lines submitted in each group. If the solutions are more 
similar, a large number of lines should be reused as a result of copying, which 
would result in a smaller number of unique lines. If a group is characterised 
by a larger number of entries, and those entries are more complex, the group 
will naturally include a larger number of unique lines. To control for the fact 
that the large group might contain more, longer entries, I also present 
diversity as a proportion of the total number of unique lines introduced in 
each condition, i.e. the total number of unique lines introduced throughout 
the entire week in the large group, and the total number of unique lines 
introduced throughout the entire week in all three small groups, and the 
merged group. This experimental setup allowed me to ask several questions 
about the effect of group size and structure on cultural diversity. 
Does group size affect diversity? 
Firstly, a larger group could demonstrate more diversity than a small group. 
All things being equal, a larger group would be associated with more variation 
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in terms of solutions, which should also increase diversity. I tested whether 
this was the case by comparing the large group and the small groups in the 
first four days of the contest, before the merge date. 
Does splitting the population into groups increase diversity? 
Secondly, dividing the population could generate more cultural diversity as 
separate groups potentially settle on different traditions. I tested this here by 
comparing the diversity in the large group with the overall diversity in the 
three small groups pooled together, before the merge date. This provided 
evidence about whether the small groups entertained different solutions or 
whether small groups naturally introduced the same, perhaps simpler, 
solutions. 
Does diversity decrease after merge? 
Thirdly, after merging, I expected the large group to display less diversity than 
the merged small groups. The reasoning is that while the large group 
converges on similar solutions, which decreases diversity, the merged group 
would still entertain a more diverse range of solutions, as players did have not 
as much time after the merging to evaluate and copy all the new solutions 
introduced by the merging event. This prediction was tested by comparing the 
diversity in the large group and the diversity in the merged group throughout 
the last three days of the contest, after the merge date.  
How does diversity change over time? 
Finally, I investigated whether the diversity in the large group overall changed 
differently over time compared to the diversity in the merge condition. It 
could be that even though diversity levels are comparable between conditions, 
the change in diversity over time is different, which is what this last analysis 
tests. 
In the previous MATLAB contests, the cultural diversity decreased steadily 
over time. Here, I tested whether the differential group structure affected 
diversity change over time. Comparing the relationship between diversity and 
time in the large group and the three small groups speaks to whether group 
size affects the dynamics of cultural diversity. Similarly, comparing the small 
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groups with the merged group characterises how diversity changes through 
splitting and merging events. Finally, comparing the large group with the 
merge group conditions overall (the three small groups pooled together and 
the merged group) indicates whether splitting individuals into groups actually 
generates more diversity than keeping the population homogenous. 
Diversity over time per group 
To investigate how diversity changed over time in finer detail in each group, I 
split the time period spanned by each group in ten equally spaced intervals. 
Therefore, each group was characterised by a total time duration represented 
by a numeric value ranging from 0 to the number of days the group was active 
for, and each of these durations was split in 10 intervals. For the large group, 
for example, the overall time duration ranged from 0 to 6.96 (i.e. almost 7 
days of submissions), split every 0.69 time units (such that the first time 
interval ranged from 0 to 0.69, the second one ranged from 0.69 to 1.39, etc.). 
I rescaled each of these time intervals between 0 and 1 in order to be able to 
compare between groups, such that the actual values for the time intervals 
used for the statistical analysis were 0, 0.1, 0.2, etc.  For each time interval in 
each group, I calculated the number of unique lines of code submitted in that 
interval, as a proportion of the total number of unique lines submitted in each 
group, respectively. This normalisation allowed us to compare diversity 
change across groups. I tested the relation between time and diversity using 
Spearman rank correlations.  
Diversity over time per condition  
Finally, I used the same analysis to compare diversity across conditions in 
order to establish whether dividing the population produces more or less 
diversity overall. I compared the diversity change in the large group condition 
with the diversity change in the merged condition, in which I pooled the data 
from the small groups. Therefore, the merged group data consisted of the code 
submitted throughout the whole contest, in the pooled small groups, and the 
merged group. Because splitting the data by condition resulted in more data 
overall, I split the time duration using the same protocol as before into 20 
intervals. For each of the two conditions, and for each of the 20 intervals, 
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diversity was calculated as the number of unique lines of code submitted in 
each interval, as a proportion of the total number of lines submitted in each 
condition. To establish whether the diversity changed differently in the two 
conditions, I ran two linear regression models with diversity as the dependent 
variable and time interval as the explanatory variable – one on the data from 
the large group condition, one for the data from the merged group condition.  
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5.3. Results	  
5.3.1. Activity 
Although a balanced number of participants between the two conditions was 
attempted, participation was fully voluntary, and players could interact with 
the task as much as they wanted, or not at all. Throughout the contest, the real 
number of active players was much smaller than the prior number of signed 
up participants. In total, for the first four days before merging, the 
distribution of players per group was: 18 players in group 1 (the large group), 
8 players in group 2 (small group), 3 players in group 3 (small group), and 5 
players in group 4 (small group), submitting a total of 428 entries in the large 
group, and 113, 14, and 40 entries in the small groups, respectively. After the 
merge, 10 players stayed involved in the large group, and submitted an 
additional total of 462 entries, while 9 players contributed to the merged 
group a total of 90 extra entries (Fig. 5.2). Overall, the large groups consisted 
of 20 unique players throughout the entire week, while the small groups 
together before and after the merge consisted of 17 unique players.  
There was a large difference between the two conditions in terms of activity, 
both regarding the number of entries submitted and the number of active 
players. The number of entries submitted in the large group was 4 times larger 
than the largest number of entries submitted in any of the smaller groups both 
before and after the merge, and some of small groups before the merge 
showed remarkably little activity (i.e. 14 entries in 4 days). Not unexpectedly, 
the larger group contributed more entries to the contest, but it seems like the 
relationship between group size and activity is not as simple as more players 
submitting more entries, since the difference in number of entries is 
disproportionate to the difference in the number of players. Even after the 
smaller groups had been merged, the number of entries contributed by this 
merged group was still proportionally smaller than expected from this number 
of players, compared to the larger group. 	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There was also a distinct difference in the patterns of activity per day between 
the two conditions (Fig. 5.3). The large group maintained a relatively stable 
activity pattern throughout the week, with a large spike in activity in the last 
day. The beginning of the contest displayed more failed entries, characteristic 
of initial exploratory behaviour until players settle on working solutions that 
they subsequently refine. In contrast, the three small groups showed much 
more variation. Group 2, which is also the largest of the three small groups, 
showed a relative increase in activity over the first 4 days, while groups 3 and 
4 showed a drastic decrease. 
The numbers reported above include both valid entries and entries that did 
not pass the evaluation because of algorithmic or runtime errors. Taking this 
factor into consideration, the differences in the activity levels become even 
more pronounced (Fig. 5.3). The smaller groups were characterised by a much 
larger proportion of failed entries, indicative of relatively smaller success 
compared to the large group. A potential explanation is that while the big 
group creates the same dynamic we have witnessed in previous contests, with 
entries resorting to copying the current leader and becoming increasingly 
successful and similar, the smaller groups do not manage to reach this stage, 
potentially for lack of activity.  
Figure 5.2 – number of total entries submitted in group 1 (large group) before and after 
the merge date, groups 2, 3, and 4 before merge (small groups), and merged group 
after merge 
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An interesting question is whether this increased activity in the larger group 
was due to the number of individuals or the identity of those individuals.  The 
number of active players after the merge was similar for both conditions (Fig. 
a. 
b. 
e. 
d. 
c. 
Figure 5.3 – (a) number of total entries submitted per day in group 1, (b-d) groups 2-
4 before merge, and (e) the merged group. Passed entries in blue, failed entries in 
red
 
d
c
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5.4, 5.5) – 10 in the large group, and 9 in the small group, but the larger group 
showed more variation in the first four days, with 18 different active 
participants submitting solutions. In the smaller groups, however, only 8, 3, 
and 5 participants took part before the merge, respectively. In the small 
groups 3 and 4, for example, there were even inactive days when no entry was 
submitted. 
 
 
Both the large group and the small groups saw a similar decline in the number 
of participants after the first four days – from 18 to 10 in the large group, and 
from 16 to 9 in the merged groups, but there did not seem to be a consistent 
pattern in the characteristics of the players who choose to leave the contest in 
Figure 5.4 – number of total active players in group 1 (large group) before and after 
the merge date, and groups 2, 3, and 4 before the merge date, and the merged 
group 
Figure 5.5 – number of active players per day in the big group (left) and the merged 
group (right) 
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the last 3 days of the contest. Both in the large group and the small groups, the 
players who quit varied from individuals who only submitted only one entry, 
to very active individuals. None of the groups was entirely abandoned – there 
were players from each of the small groups still competing in the merged 
group.  
An explanation for the difference in activity between the two groups could be 
that, by chance, some of the players in Group 1 were more skilled, or more 
competitive, and drove this pattern in activity we witnessed. Indeed, in the 
last three days in both groups, the merged group showed an average of 10 
entries per author, ranging between 1 and 27, with the three most active 
players submitting 21, 23, and 27 entries respectively in total in all three days. 
In contrast, in the large group participants submitted an average 40 entries 
each, ranging between 1 and 269. This distribution was skewed by two very 
active players in the large group, with a total of 146 and 269 entries 
respectively, submitted in the last three days. These two players also seemed 
to be among the best performing players in the contest –they scored in the top 
3 average score per participant. This suggests it is not the number of 
participants, but the individual characteristics of the participants, that explain 
the differential patterns in activity levels. 	  
5.3.2. Scores 
5.3.2.1. Group size and performance – results before the merge 
Scores improved in all groups over time. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the log-
transformed score over time throughout the entire contest, and the patterns of 
overall score decrease over time. These dynamics are very similar to the 
dynamics of score improvement witnessed in the previous MATLAB contests 
presented in Chapter 3. I tested whether there was a link between group size 
and overall performance by comparing scores in the large group and the three 
small groups before the merge date, i.e. throughout the first four days of the 
contest. After the first 4 days, the median score value across all groups was 
86348.8, ranging between 77439 and 511847, therefore while there is 
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considerable variation, on average entries improved approximately 17% 
relative to the baseline (i.e. the first entry, which scored 104044).  
The best score in group 1 (the large group) was 77429, while the best scores in 
groups 2-4 were 82760, 89179, and 83186, respectively. This amounted to 
25.58%, 20.46%, 14.29%, and 20.04% improvement relative to the baseline, 
respectively. Therefore, after the first four days, the large group improved 
more than any of the small groups, as predicted.  Due to the small sample size 
of N=4 I did not attempt to test whether difference in improvement is 
statistically significant, not statistically test whether group size predicts score. 
Nonetheless, the patterns of improvement in the large group are convincingly 
different from the patterns in the small groups, but future work should 
attempt to formally disentangle these questions through larger sample sizes.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 – (a) log-transformed scores over time in the large group condition and 
(b) the merged group condition throughout the whole contest. The merged group 
condition plot pools the data from the 3 small groups for the first four days. The red 
line follows the leading entries (i.e. entries that improve the overall score) 
a. 
b. 
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Figure 5.7 – (a) log-transformed scores over time in the large group before and (b) after 
the merge, and (c-e) in the small groups 2-4 before merge and (f) after the merge. The 
red line follows the leaders in each respective group 
a. b. 
c. 
d. 
e. f. 
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5.3.2.2. Group size and individual performance 
Moving on to discuss individual-level performance, Figure 5.8a illustrates the 
score distributions in the four groups before the merge date, and Table 5.1 
presents mean and median values for the scores in all four groups, as well 
average and median percentage improvements relative to the baseline. 
Median scores were very similar for group 1, 2, and 4. Group 3 performed 
more poorly, but there was little difference in the other three groups, 
suggesting individuals on average perform comparably between conditions. 
For instance, group 1, the large group, and group 4 manage a similar median 
improvement.  
This suggests that although the large group managed to find a better absolute 
solution, there was no impact of group size on the typical individual 
performance of the entries in each group. When considering the average 
score, individuals in the large group actually performed the worst, with an 
Figure 5.8 – (a) score distributions for the four groups (group 1 – large group, 
groups 2-4 – small groups) before the merge, and (b) before and after the merge 
a. b. 
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average score that represented a decline in performance relative to the 
baseline (Table 5.1). This was caused by the fact that the large group exhibited 
considerable variation in performance across entries, as the score distribution 
also illustrates (Fig. 5.8a). The scores in the large group varied widely, as the 
largest score is almost 7 times larger than the smallest score; on the contrary, 
the difference between the largest and the smallest score in Group 3, for 
example, was a mere 9%.  
Group Mean Mean 
improvement 
Median Median 
improvement 
Standard 
deviation 
Group 1 105967 -1.85 % 86187.66 17.16 % 74839 
Group 2 105624.7 -1.52 % 88468.93 14.97 % 35796 
Group 3 93855.46 9.79 % 94508.16 9.16 % 2991 
Group 4 95105.36 8.59 % 86133.96 17.21 % 31897 
 
With regards to the number of leading entries per group, the large group was 
characterised by a much larger absolute number of leaders, 49, compared to 
18 leaders in Group 2, 1 in Group 3, and 5 in Group 4. However, when 
normalising these values by the number of passed entries submitted in each 
group, only 17% of the entries in Group 1 manage did take the lead, compared 
to 22%, 17%, and 28% in the other three groups (Table 5.2). Therefore, when 
controlling for the overall activity levels in terms of entries submitted, the 
large group was again not performing better on a per capita basis, potentially 
because of the stronger competitive environment.  
It could be the case that the number of improvements in the large group was 
not proportionately larger, but the magnitude of those improvements was, 
leading to higher improvement overall. To address this I isolated only the 
entries that improved on the current leading score (Table 5.2). The mean and 
median values for improvements across groups did not support the hypothesis 
that the larger group was characterised by bigger improvements on average. 
In fact, the average improvement value in the large group was comparable to 
the other groups, but the median value was much smaller. This indicates that, 
opposite to our expectation, the large group was actually characterised by 
more improvements, but smaller in magnitude, compared to the small groups. 
Table 5.1 – mean and median scores, and mean and median improvements relative 
to the baseline in the 4 groups, before merging 
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To summarise, the larger group achieved better performance overall at the 
end of the first four days through more, smaller improvements, but the 
individuals entries submitted in the larger group were not better, in terms of 
score improvement, than the entries in the other groups on average. 
 
5.3.2.3. Group structure and performance – results after the merge 
If manipulating group structure had an effect on performance, this would 
translate into differential score patterns both at the population level and the 
individual level between the two groups in the last three days of the contest, 
after the merge date. There was much less variation in scores in the last three 
days of the contest, though scores decreased steadily (Fig 5.7b, 5.7f). In terms 
of overall absolute improvement, the large group still wins. The final best 
score at the end of the contest in the large group was 76776, which 
represented a 26.2% increase relative to the baseline, and a 0.8% increase 
relative to the best in the large group before merge. In the merged group, the 
final best score was 78952, which represented a 24.11% increase relative to the 
baseline, and 4.6% improvement relative to the best score in all small groups 
prior to merging (with value 82760). The large group was still performing 
better overall after the merge, but by a much smaller difference. 
In order to explore individual-level performance, the score distributions for 
the two groups overall, and after the merge, are plotted in Fig. 5.9 (see Fig. 
5.8b for a comparison with the distributions prior the merge). After the merge 
date, individuals on average performed much better in the large group than 
the merged group (Fig. 5.9a, Table 5.3). The mean and median scores in the 
large group were very small and very similar to the final best score in the 
Group Number of 
improvements 
Proportion 
improvement 
Mean 
improvement 
Median 
improvement 
Standard 
deviation 
Group 1 49 17% 2613.4 80.9 14479 
Group 2 18 22% 1182.4 388.33 2274 
Group 3 1 17% 2713.04 2713 NA 
Group 4 5 28% 2770.8 1251.4 3680 
Table 5.2 – number of improvements, proportion of entries that improve out of the 
total number of passed entries, average and median improvement values in the 4 
groups, before merging 
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entire contest. In the merged group, however, scores showed much more 
variation, and the average scores did not manage to improve relative to the 
best score in the group before merge. Therefore, contrary to the patterns 
witnessed before the merge date, here entries in the large group performed 
better on average.  
 
  
Group Mean Mean 
improv. 
wrt 
baseline 
Mean 
improv. 
wrt group 
best 
Median  Median 
improv. 
wrt 
baseline 
Median 
improv. 
wrt group 
best 
Sd 
Large 
group 
77546.2 25.47% -0.15% 77183.22 25.82% 0.39% 1349 
Merged 
group 
92219.97 11.36% -11.43% 83723.7 19.53% -0.16% 12656 
Table 5.3 – mean and median scores, mean and median improvements relative to 
the baseline, and mean and median improvements relative to the best score before 
merge in each respective group, for the two groups, after merging 
a. b. 
Figure 5.9 – (a) score distributions for the two conditions (big group and merged group) 
after the merge, and (b) over the whole contest (pooled data from the three small groups 
before merge, and the merged group after) 
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With respect to how many entries became leaders in the two groups in the last 
three days of the contest, and how much those leading entries improved the 
score on average relative to the current leader, the pattern found before the 
merge date held after the merge date as well (Table 5.4). The large group was 
characterised by a very large number of improving entries that only 
represented 11% of all passed entries, while the merged group only improved 
through 14 entries, almost 30% of all passed entries in this group. The median 
improvement value in leading entries in the large group was 5, while the 
median improvement in leading entries in the merged group was 202. These 
two results further reinforce the picture that the large group introduced many, 
but relatively small improvements compared to the merged group. Note that 
all these mean and median improvements are very much smaller compared to 
the pre-merge improvements presented in Table 5.2, indicative of the fact that 
improving is generally more difficult in this later part of the contest. 
It is worth noting that the number of entries submitted post-merge date in the 
large group condition was almost 10 times larger than the number of entries 
submitted in the same period in the merged group condition, which suggests 
that the high activity levels observed pre-merge in the large group were 
maintained, while the merged group does not see this much activity, even if 
the groups were nominally similar in size.  
  
Group Number of 
improvs. 
Proportion 
improvs. 
Number of 
entries 
Mean 
improve. 
Median 
improve. 
Standard 
deviation 
Large 
group 
46 11.4% 404 14.18 5.07 28.5 
Merged 
group 
14 29.8% 47 340.8 202 389.9 
Table 5.4 – number of improvements, proportion of entries that improve out of the 
total number of passed entries, average and median improvement values in the 2 
groups, after merging 
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5.3.3. Similarity and novelty 
The big group was plainly characterised by many, small improvements, and a 
large number of entries lying very close to the leader line (Fig. 5.7), which 
suggests considerable copying. Group 2 somewhat showed this dynamic, but 
the patterns broke completely in the other two small groups, and in the 
merged group – there was less convincing evidence of copying. The large 
group showed the tweak and leap dynamic so prevalent in the previous 
contests, while the small groups seemed to rely more on individual 
exploration and little social learning. This section addresses the patterns of 
novelty and copying in the two experimental conditions and how they relate to 
the patterns of improvement. 
The differential patterns seen in the dynamics of score improvement over time 
between the two conditions are very clearly reflected in the patterns of code 
similarity across time in the two conditions. Figure 5.10 illustrates the 
Czekanowski similarity between all passed entries in the large group condition 
and Fig. 5.11 breaks these patterns up by group before and after merge. For 
ease of visualisation, I present here the relationships between passed entries 
only, but the patterns are very similar if we take all entries into account. The 
large group was characterised by a very clear dynamic of convergence on 
similar solutions over time. Entries converged on a solution initially, then 
switched to a more popular solution that stayed in the population throughout 
the whole contest. 
Figure 5.10 – similarity between all passed entries throughout the whole contest in 
the large group, ordered chronologically from left to right and top to bottom. Lighter 
colour indicates higher similarity 
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Indeed, in the last three days after the merge, the entries in the large groups 
showed overwhelmingly large similarity, clear evidence of copying (Fig. 11b). 
This pattern was still present, but not as strong and subject to more noise, in 
small Group 2 before merge (Fig. 5.11c), and to some extent in Group 4 (Fig. 
5.11e, though the sample size was too small for a clear pattern to emerge). 
After the merging date, the merged group showed signs of convergence for 
small period of time, but this convergence was less convincing because of the 
small number of entries (Fig. 5.11f). In our dataset, the larger groups showed 
stronger signs of convergence than the smaller groups. The difference between 
Figure 5.11 – (a) similarity between all passed entries throughout the whole contest, 
ordered chronologically from left to right and top to bottom, for the large group 
condition before and (b) after the merge, and (c-e) the three small groups before the 
merge, and (f) the merged groups 
a.  
d.  
c.  
b.  
e.  f.  
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the large group and the small groups before and after the merge is, at least, 
clear evidence that the processes at work in the large group, perhaps a matter 
of group size, motivation, or an interaction between the two, are related to 
strong convergence in the population.  
The difference in the entries’ reliance on copying suggested by these similarity 
matrices is further confirmed by the distribution of novelty per group (Fig. 
5.12). The large group condition was characterised by significantly less novelty 
as measured by the proportion of novel lines than the merged group 
condition, both before the merge date (Wilcoxon W = 8922, p<0.001), and 
after the merge date (Wilcoxon W = 2068, p < 0.001). Entries in the large 
group introduced generally little novelty in the first half of the contest, with 
relatively large variation between entries. The median value for the proportion 
of novelty in this group was very small, 0.56%, ranging between 0 and 80%. 
This variation was purely due to initial high novelty in the group, prior to the 
population settling on a successful solution. After the merge date, the 
proportion of novel lines in the large group entries was minuscule, with a 
median value of 0.073% (though bear in mind that the merge date did not 
change visibility in the large group – this is result is purely due to 
convergence). 
 
Figure 5.12 – Proportion of novelty for the large group before and after the merge 
date (left), and the three small groups before the merge, and the merged group 
(right)	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The proportion of novelty was visibly much larger in the merge condition, 
both before and after the merge. The typical proportion of novelty remained 
higher in the small groups, because there was less drastic convergence and 
there were generally fewer entries to be copied. The median values in Groups 
2, 3, and 4 were 3.8%, 28.7%, and 4.22%, respectively. After the merge, the 
median proportion of novelty in the merged group was 3.3%, still much larger 
than in the large group.  
This difference in the proportion of novelty between the two conditions could 
be partly due to the fact that entries become much longer in the large group 
condition compared to the small groups. In the small groups before merge, 
the average length of an entry was 110 lines of code, while the average length 
of an entry in the large group before merge was 405 lines of code. After the 
merge, entries in the merged group were 135 lines long on average, but entries 
in the large group were 1261 lines long on average. This difference in length is, 
again, due to the extensive amount of copying taking place in the large group, 
but not in the small groups. As entries are being copied and added to, they 
become increasingly longer. This phenomenon does not take place in the 
small and merged groups, as the tweaking behaviour does not have a chance 
to get established and develop.  
One final piece of evidence for differential convergence patterns comes from 
the differences between groups concerning the similarity to the current leader. 
In previous contests we observed strong payoff bias as most entries copied the 
current leader and tweaked it. In this data, before the merge date, there was 
virtually no difference between the large group and the small groups in terms 
of entries’ similarity to the current leader (Fig. 5.13; except for Group 3, the 
smallest group, which showed virtually no sign of copying the current leader). 
After the merge, though, the large group converged almost exclusively on 
copying the current leader, yet the merged group still showed considerable 
variation – most entries here did not copy the current leader. Therefore, the 
large group showed clear evidence of payoff bias and tweaking behaviour, as 
most entries submitted in the second part of the contest were extremely 
similar to the current leader, but the merged group did not show this pattern 
at all.  
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There was a significant relationship between copying the current leader and 
performance. In all entries, there was a significant positive correlation 
between the similarity to the current leader and the score increment relative 
to the current leader (Spearman S = 44948000, ρ = 0.53, p < 0.001), 
indicative that payoff biased copying paid off - entries who copied the leader 
performed better. Overall, the large group condition replicated the results 
from the previous MATLAB contests (Chapter 3). After an initial period of 
code novelty, the population converged on highly similar solutions as a result 
of considerable copying of the current best entry. The evidence in the small 
groups and the merged group is much more variable. While some entries 
introduced little novelty and copied the current leader, this was far from being 
a majority trend. The small groups showed much more variation in terms of 
novelty, and less clear evidence of convergence over time. It is surprising that 
we did not observe convergence even after the groups have been merged (Fig 
5.13), which was what we expected.  
Figure 5.13 – Similarity to current leader for the large group before and after the 
merge date (left), and the three small groups before the merge, and the merged group 
(right) 
CHAPTER 5 
 
191 
5.3.4. Cultural diversity 
5.3.4.1. Does group size affect diversity? 
The large group clearly entertained a larger repertoire of lines of code than 
any of the other groups (Fig 5.14a). Even after normalising within condition, 
the large group was still characterised by a much larger amount of diversity 
than the small groups (Fig. 5.14b). In fact, 82% of the number of unique lines 
of code in the large condition had been submitted in the first half of the 
contest. In contrast, the small groups each displayed much smaller diversity. 
 
5.3.4.2. Does splitting the population into groups increase diversity? 
While the small groups separately were less diverse than the big group, it 
could be the case that once the three small groups are pooled together, this 
pooled diversity is actually larger than the large group diversity, because the 
three small groups in fact introduce different solutions. This would answer the 
question of whether splitting groups generates more diversity overall.  
This did not seem to be the case  - the diversities in the large group and the 
small group pooled were comparable (Fig. 5.15). While in absolute numbers, 
Figure 5.14 – (a) number of unique lines and (b) number of unique lines as a 
proportion of the total number of unique lines in each of the two conditions (large 
group vs. merged group), for all groups, before and after the merge 
a. b. 
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the diversity in the large group was almost twice as high as the diversity in the 
pooled small groups (Fig. 5.15a), the diversities were practically equal when 
controlling for the total number of lines submitted in each condition (Fig. 
5.15b). This suggests that, although the diversity within each small group was 
relatively small, the solutions in these small groups were different enough 
that, once pooled together, the diversity reached levels comparable to the 
large group. Indeed, while the small groups 2, 3, and 4 introduced 823, 351, 
and 629 lines each before merge, the overlap between these groups in terms of 
lines was minuscule. Groups 2 and 3 had 12 lines in common, groups 2 and 4 
had 15 lines in common, and groups 3 and 4 had 10 lines in common. This 
indicates that each group converged on its own group-specific solutions, with 
little common ground between groups. There was similarly little overlap 
between the lines in the large group and each of the small groups, suggesting 
again that each groups converged on its own solution ‘tradition’, with little 
similarity across groups.  
 
5.3.4.3. Does diversity decrease after merge? 
If the convergence in the large group were strong enough, and the players in 
the merged group pool together their solutions after merge, we would expect 
Figure 5.15 – (a) number of unique lines and (b) number of unique lines as a 
proportion of the total number of unique lines in each of the two conditions (large 
group vs. merged group), for the large group before and after the merge, the three 
small groups pooled before merge, and the merged group 
a. b. 
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that the diversity in the large group would be smaller than the diversity in the 
merged group (after the merge). This was not the case (Fig. 5.15) – the 
diversity in both conditions after the merge date was comparable once we 
controlled for the total number of entries submitted.  
In fact, after the merge date, there were two distinct processes at work in the 
two conditions, responsible for the diversity patterns witnessed. Figure 5.10 
clearly illustrates that in the large group the population converged on a 
specific solution and maintained that solution throughout the whole last three 
days of the contest, after merge. In the merged condition, however, it was not 
the case that the population adopted any of the solutions already existing in 
any of the 3 small groups prior merging. The moderate similarity within the 
merged group suggests the population was working on a relatively consistent 
solution that persisted in the group (Fig. 5.11f), but this solution was not based 
on any previous solution originating in any of the small groups before merge 
as the code similarities indicate. It was, in fact, a new solution that the group 
created after the merge. Therefore, although the diversities in the large group 
and the merged group were comparable, they were the result of two different 
phenomena. In the large group, the diversity decreased as a result of 
convergence on a similar solution, while in the merged group the diversity 
decreased as a result of the introduction of a new solution unlike those in any 
of the smaller groups beforehand.  
5.3.4.4. How does diversity change over time? 
In order to illustrate how diversity changed over time within condition, I split 
the diversity presented in Fig. 5.14b across conditions by day. Therefore 
Figure 5.16 plots the number of unique lines in each group per day, presented 
as a proportion of the total number of lines introduced in each of the two 
conditions, large group vs. merge group. There was a general downward trend 
in the large group, though the last day displays more diversity, driven by last 
minute competition. The diversity did not change in such an evident way in 
the small groups. Group 2 showed a relative increase, followed by a decrease 
in diversity over the first four days of the contest, while groups 3 and 4 were 
characterised by less activity, but a decreasing trend in diversity. Finally, when 
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the groups were merged the diversity soared, but decreased by the end of the 
contest. Therefore merging the small groups seems to have increased the 
diversity, but bear in mind that if the small groups are pooled together, we 
actually observe a change from a much larger pooled diversity, to reduced 
diversity once the groups merged (Fig. 5.15). 
 
The relationship between cultural diversity and the time measured in equal-
sized intervals as discussed in the Methods for each of the 5 groups are 
presented in Figure 5.17. Some of the groups are characterised by fewer than 
10 data points because there were no entries submitted in some of the time 
intervals. There was relatively large variation in how diversity changed 
between groups. While there was a general negative trend in the relationship 
between time and diversity, group 2, for example, actually showed a positive 
relationship. However, time and diversity were not significantly correlated for 
any of the groups, therefore there was no consistent diversity change over 
time that could be picked up at the group level.   
Figure 5.16 – (a) diversity measured as the number of unique lines submitted per day 
in the large group, presented as a proportion of the total number of unique lines 
introduced in the large group overall, for ease of comparison between conditions. 
(b) diversity measured as the number of unique lines submitted per day in the merge 
conditions, as a proportion of the total number of unique lines introduced in the 
three groups before merge and in the merged group 
a. b.	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Comparing the change in diversity between conditions throughout the entire 
week shows a clear difference (Fig. 5.18). There was an obvious downward 
trend in the merged group condition, but the relationship between cultural 
diversity and time in the large condition was not as obvious. Indeed, results 
from the linear model showed that time was not a significant predictor of the 
change in diversity in the large group, but it was in the merged group 
condition (Table 5.5). This is most plausibly due to the fact that diversity in 
the large group at the end of the contest increased as a result of increased 
competition, which was associated with more novelty. Excluding the last day 
of the contest, the trend is clear in both conditions, suggesting that, again, 
diversity decreased over time as players introduce less novelty and focus 
instead on developing entries based on previously submitted entries. 
 Time estimate Std. Error t-value p-value 
Large group 
diversity ~ time interval 
0.01 0.021 0.49 0.627 
F(1,18) = 0.243, R2 = 0.013 
Merged group 
diversity ~ time interval 
-0.066 0.027 -2.44 0.024* 
F(1,18) = 0.249, R2 = 0.249 
 
Table 5.5 – results from the linear model diversity ~ time interval for the data in the two 
group conditions 
Figure 5.17 – diversity measured as the proportion of unique lines out of the total 
number of lines submitted within each group, per time interval for each group 
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Figure 5.18 – diversity measured as the proportion of unique lines out of the total number of 
lines submitted within each condition, per time interval for each condition 
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5.4. Discussion 
This chapter set out to test whether manipulating group structure affects 
cultural diversity and performance in the programming contests paradigm. In 
the large group condition participants showed more activity above and beyond 
that expected by the difference in the number of players between that and the 
other smaller groups. Out results suggest an interaction between group size, 
competition, and individual variation, which affects diversity.  
In terms of performance, the large group was associated with a higher overall 
improvement, characterised by many small incremental steps. The 
experimental small-group condition achieved less improvement, but through 
fewer, larger advances. The incremental nature of improvement is not 
surprising under the stronger competitive regime expected in the bigger 
group. Improvements are harder under the given time constraints, when there 
is a higher possibility that a different individual could ‘scoop’ your idea. The 
convergence in solutions would also promote more incremental 
improvements, since Chapter 3 showed that higher entry similarity translates 
into smaller score variation. It could even be the case that stronger 
competition and time constraints drive the population towards stronger 
convergence, as copying is a less risky strategy in a competitive context than 
the independent invention of solutions.  
In the first half of the contest, entries in the large group in fact were 
characterised by worse average performance compared to the merged 
condition, because of higher variation in score at the beginning of the contest. 
This raises interesting questions regarding the link between exploratory 
behaviour, variation, and performance, and relates to results presented in the 
Chapter 4, where I showed that more exploratory individuals performed 
better overall in the context of the previous programming competitions. 
Because there is no cost to submitting a poorly performing entry as a means of 
testing an algorithm, for example, it may be the case that here, too, the 
individuals who explore the problem more and submit more varied entries 
manage to achieve superior solutions that score better. Why this behaviour 
would be more prevalent in the large group remains an open question, but it 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
198 
could tie in with differential motivational patterns between the two 
conditions. 
It is less clear whether the lack of activity we witness in the small groups 
relative to the large group is merely an artefact of the small sample size in this 
experiment (two of the small groups consisted of only 3 and 5 active players), 
or whether it could be a genuine mechanism that underlies the relationship 
between group size and cultural complexity in real world data. There is 
evidence that performance cues promote exploratory behaviour and increase 
performance (Toelch et al., 2011). Using a computer-based task allowing for 
innovations of varying degrees of difficulty, which also vary in their payoffs, 
the authors tested whether participants varied in their exploratory behaviour 
and performance when they were exposed to different performance cues. They 
framed the performance cues in terms of the previous participants’ scores, 
which they presented to participants. Results show that participants cued with 
low scores showed a drastic reduction compared to participants cued with 
high scores, both in terms of exploratory behaviour and innovations 
discovered, as well as overall performance.  
This mechanism could be solely responsible for the differences we see in 
performance between groups in our data. If knowing that other individuals 
are performing better is enough incentive to explore, innovate, and improve, 
then it could be that the lack of those social cues is enough to stifle exploration 
and cap performance to a standard deemed acceptable in the absence of 
contradictory information. This would mean that in a functional task, once the 
group grows enough that there are enough individuals to provide social cues 
regarding performance, social comparison would then drive individuals to 
become more exploratory and start improving substantially, which will in turn 
encourage even more exploration and improvement. The relationship between 
group size and cultural complexity could be purely a matter of the interplay 
between social cues and competition. Current models investigating group size 
like Henrich’s (Henrich, 2004) typically assume the free exchange of 
information and further theoretical work incorporating groups structure and 
varying group sizes should help elucidate whether the phenomenon proposed 
here does play an important role in cumulative culture. Furthermore, while 
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theoretical models typically assume equilibrium has been reached, in the case 
of the MATLAB contest the problems allow for open-ended advances in skill. 
Improvement becomes increasingly and drastically difficult over time, but it is 
possible at any point in time. A week was chosen for the duration of the 
experiment here mainly for practical reasons and because improvements 
seemed to level out after this period in previous contests, but it could be the 
case that in theory the dynamics observed here would change if we allowed 
the experiment to run ad infinitum. Clearly, the unfeasibility of such a study 
constrains our experimental approach, but further theoretical work could help 
elucidate these questions.  
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, explanation for the differential 
patterns of activity and performance witnessed could simply be that individual 
identity interacts strongly with the different competition modes in the two 
conditions, which exacerbates these differences. Two participants in the large 
group who contributed a disproportionately large number of entries also 
proved to be two of the best players in the entire competition. It could be, 
then, that this increased performance in the large group is the result of an 
interaction between players’ abilities, the initial diversity of solutions 
contributed by more individuals in the initial days of the contest, and 
increased competition, which could in turn also be strongly affected by activity 
and diversity of solution. It remains unclear, then, whether this result is 
purely due to individual-level characteristics, population dynamics, or due to 
an interplay between the two. 
With regards to similarity and novelty, the large group displayed the same 
convergence of solutions and ‘tweaks and leaps’ dynamic observed in previous 
contests, while this pattern was ambiguous at best in the small groups. The 
merged condition showed more novelty both before and after the merge. 
While the entries in the large group showed high similarity to the current 
leader, the pattern was reversed in the small groups, in which entries did not 
resemble the current leader much, suggesting that payoff bias was very strong 
in the large group, but largely absent from the small groups. Nonetheless, 
when entries did copy the current leader in both conditions, it paid off – there 
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was a positive relationship between improvement and similarity to the current 
leader in both conditions.  
Finally, the large group was characterised by a more diverse repertoire in 
terms of the number of lines of code used in individual solutions, and 
generally by longer solutions, indicative of a larger, more complex cultural 
toolkit. This is in line with much of the evidence surrounding the debate 
regarding population size and cultural complexity discussed in the 
introduction. I found clear evidence that a larger population sustains a larger 
cultural repertoire, but it is worth bearing in mind that the number of 
individuals present in these groups is considerably smaller than what we 
would expect real populations to consist of. The real-world populations from 
Oceania discussed in Kline and Boyd, for example, amount to thousands of 
individuals (Kline and Boyd, 2010), while some of the groups in this 
experiment only contained 3 or 5 individuals. In this sense, the results here 
are more easily comparable to experimental studies of group size and cultural 
accumulation like the ones performed by Derex et al. (2013) or Muthukrishna 
et al. (2013).  
However, it is unclear whether cultural accumulation undergoes a qualitative 
difference once groups increase in two or three orders of magnitude. It could 
be that group size has a very strong effect on cultural improvement for small 
groups, but once the population grows into the order of thousands of 
individuals, these differences in improvement become less prominent. A 
possible explanation could tie in to the effect of group structure on cumulative 
culture: small, well-connected groups promote fast accumulation, and a 
difference between the collective knowledge of 5 vs. 10 individuals evidently 
affects how the group improves in skill, while in large groups information 
travels slower, which would hinder the effect of increasing population size. 
The sample size in our experiment therefore means we investigated a ‘small 
group effect’, where an increase in group size from 5 to 20 individuals 
translates into a noticeable increase in the cultural toolkit.  
Returning to the hypotheses proposed in the introduction, we expected that 
larger groups would entertain more diversity. Indeed, even when controlling 
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for the size of the repertoire, the smaller groups showed less diversity than the 
larger group. We also hypothesised that splitting individuals into groups 
should generate more diversity, and this diversity should relate to higher 
improvement overall. When pooled together, however, the diversity of the 
small groups combined was similar to the diversity of the large group, 
indicating that dividing the population in groups did not increase, nor 
decrease, the cultural diversity in this case. If anything, results showed the 
opposite pattern to that expected – the diversity in the pooled group was 
comparable to the diversity in the large group, but the population-level 
performance in the latter was better, both at the merge date and overall 
throughout the whole contest.  
The diversity of solutions decreased in both conditions over time, but through 
different mechanisms. On the one hand, the large group converged on one 
solution that became established in the population through copying. On the 
other hand, the three small groups each entertained different solutions. All of 
the groups showed different ‘traditions’ in terms of the solutions they each 
entertained, as there was little overlap between the code used in either of the 
groups.  
This evidence for different processes affecting the dynamics of cultural 
diversity could explain the surprising result regarding the lack of increased 
performance in the merged group condition. We assumed that the tweak and 
leap dynamic would be present in both conditions – populations would 
converge on the most successful solutions, therefore multiple groups would 
converge on a more diverse set of solutions, which would promote increased 
improvement. Instead, there was little convergence in the small groups, which 
might be the result group size in the small groups. The distinction in 
cumulative culture regimes we made above between groups of 5 or 10 
individuals and groups of thousands of individuals could be applied here as 
well. Thus, a large group of, here, 20 individuals (but up to 200 in the 
previous contests presented in Chapters 3-4) creates a strong competitive 
system characterised by fast initial improvement, in which copying is a much 
cheaper alternative to individual learning. A small group, such as in our small 
group condition here, does not. Instead, individuals rely more on individual 
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exploration, which has drastically different effects on the dynamics of both 
culture and skill improvement.  
Naturally, the generality of these results is dependent on our experimental 
approach. I designed the experiment expecting bigger sample sizes (along the 
lines of 50 and 10 participants in the large group and the small group, 
respectively), which were not achieved. Whether the results presented here 
regarding differential cultural diversity dynamics in the different sized groups 
still hold with larger sample sizes is an open question. It is very possible that, 
as predicted, slightly larger groups will develop the tweak-and-leap dynamic. 
Then, group size could remain a modulator of performance when both small 
and large groups show the same cultural diversity dynamics, or it could be 
that the patterns of improvement prove to be drastically different – further 
work will disambiguate this. An obvious future experiment already being 
planned will try to attract more participation and more activity by using a 
more competitive reward (perhaps prize money). Nonetheless, this 
complication emphasises the importance of taking sample size into account 
when interpreting experimental results from studies interested in group size.  
Therefore, this work did not find evidence for group structure as a driver of 
cumulative improvement via increased cultural diversity per se, but it added 
evidence for another layer of complexity to the debate regarding the 
importance of population size on cumulative culture by finding a qualitative 
difference in the dynamics of cultural evolution between groups of different 
sizes. Whether this qualitative difference is the result of differential 
competition regimes, individual abilities, cognitive mechanisms underlying 
motivational differences, populations dynamics, or an interplay between all 
these factors, remains an open question.  
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6.1. Summary of findings 
This thesis has been generally concerned with the drivers and dynamics of 
cumulative culture, analysed in novel, more naturalistic settings than ever 
before. In Chapter 2 I used a complex agent-based model to investigate how 
cumulative improvements, termed refinement, interact with the trade-off 
between social and individual learning in the Social Learning Strategies 
Tournament. I found that, in the tournament context, refinement leads to 
tensions between individual and population interests, as the population 
benefits from a higher refinement rate than is individually beneficial. Through 
refinement, strategies could construct a more beneficial environment in which 
refined behaviours are the most advantageous, but to this end strategies had 
to pay a cost for refinement, which led to differential success outcomes for 
strategies that did use refine relative to strategies that did not. Copying 
allowed individuals to attain refinement without paying this cost, and led to a 
strong convergence in the population on a small number of refined 
behaviours.  
This pattern of convergence was confirmed experimentally with human data 
in Chapter 3 using the MATLAB programming competition as a model of real-
world cumulative culture. We have shown that, in a cumulative setting, 
improvement in a task quickly became extremely difficult. Innovation was a 
risky strategy, as it was associated with large rewards but, more often than 
not, it led to notable failures, while copying was safe and was associated with a 
small score variance. This drove individuals to primarily engage in tweaking 
behaviour by copying and modifying the best-scoring solutions, and 
comparatively little innovation – this pattern is well recognised in the 
economics literature (Lane, 2016). As a result, solutions increased in 
similarity over time, which caused a concurrent and drastic decrease in 
cultural diversity, as the population converged on extremely similar solutions. 
Individuals mostly relied on copying as a way of acquiring solutions – 
innovation and recombination were rare at the individual level, but 
recombination of cultural traits accumulated at the population level as a result 
of considerable persistence of old ideas over time.   
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Chapter 4 addressed the question of individual differences in engaging in 
copying and innovation in a cumulative culture setting, again using the 
MATLAB contests as a model. I found that individuals varied widely in their 
preferences for social or asocial learning, but that the best performing 
individuals introduced less novelty overall while at the same time showing 
more exploratory behaviour in terms of the similarity of their solutions to the 
current leader. Individual differences in performance contributed to 
establishing reputations within and across contests, which lead to prestige 
effects, as individuals who submitted leading entries had higher influence on 
subsequent solutions overall.  Neither population size, nor participant 
composition seemed to affect improvement throughout the contest. Therefore, 
while variation was beneficial at the individual level in terms of the novelty of 
solutions, it did not seem to have an effect at the contest level.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 I experimentally investigated whether group structure 
can affect cultural diversity, and therefore the dynamics of improvement and 
similarity using the MATLAB contest paradigm. I showed that a larger 
participating group was linked to larger overall improvement, characterised 
by more, smaller increments, while smaller groups achieved worse overall 
performance. The two group structure conditions showed differential patterns 
of cultural diversity. The large group converged on similar solutions through 
copying, replicating results from Chapter 3. However, the three small groups 
each entertained independent solutions, and once merged they converged on a 
separate common solution. This means that in both conditions the cultural 
diversity decreased over time, but through different processes.   
6.2. Broader implications 
A common theme emerging from Chapters 2 and 3 is that cumulative culture 
can lead to a dramatic collapse in diversity. Cumulative culture creates a 
scenario in which a great deal of investment in terms of time and effort goes 
into improving a particular solution, which becomes remarkably more 
efficient than any one individual could every recreate in their own lifetime (or 
contest participation, in the case of the MATLAB contest). Thus copying is a 
cheaper and much more efficient alternative to trial-and-error learning, and 
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as a result the population convergences on the same solutions through social 
learning. This was the case for the Social Learning Strategies Tournament, 
where individuals had a choice between a number of discrete behaviours that 
can be improved sequentially, but also in the open-ended case of the MATLAB 
contest, where individuals were free to develop any solution to the problem. 
What we saw was that, even in such an unconstrained environment, 
individuals still converged on similar solutions through copying. This 
convergence translated into a drastic decrease in cultural diversity.  
This result creates a paradox, as this lack of diversity is not something we 
observe in real human culture globally. Cumulative culture has been proposed 
to be the key process that explains the uniqueness of human culture, but in 
these contexts it led to opposite patterns to what human culture is 
characterised by. There are several possible explanations that are not mutually 
exclusive. One possibility is that payoff bias is key for explaining our results in 
both cases, yet in the real world we do not expect individuals to always be able 
to accurately assess how useful a skill or solution would be. We expect that if 
the link between a behaviour and its payoff is blurred, one lacks a reliable way 
of measuring which behaviours are useful, which may break down this pattern 
of convergence we witness. That may not necessarily be the case, though, since 
individuals could adopt other heuristics that would allow them to acquire 
beneficial behaviours, like attending to characteristics pertaining to 
individuals, if those characteristics can systematically be linked to possessing 
good skills. Prestige bias would be an example of this (Henrich and Gil-White, 
2001), which when used sensibly by the population could lead to the same 
convergence patterns we see in our results. Indeed, my results indicate 
evidence of a prestige-type effect even when the payoffs are easily accessible, 
and this effect is strong enough to persist even when controlling for individual 
performance. This suggests that payoff bias and prestige bias are not mutually 
exclusive strategies, but can co-exist. Therefore it would not be implausible to 
believe that were the strength of the payoff bias manipulated through 
decreasing the transparency of the outcomes, the population would lean more 
strongly on prestige bias.  
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Another reason for the lack of diversity witnessed could be related to the fact 
that in this work I focused on specific processes at work in cumulative culture. 
The tournament was concerned with refinement, or incrementally improving 
a single trait, while the MATLAB contest employed a highly replicative 
mechanism, where individuals could copy verbatim other solutions. Different 
processes can lead to different patterns of evolution and diversity at the 
population level (Enquist, Ghirlanda and Eriksson, 2011), so it is important to 
identify which mechanisms support cumulative improvement in which 
situation. Naturally, we should not imagine that culture evolves following 
simple, clear-cut patterns – rather, several mechanisms would be at work at 
the same time, which would explain why the patterns of cultural diversity 
witnessed in the real world are more complex than what this work illustrated. 
Importantly, whether cumulative evolution relies more heavily on incremental 
modifications than big jumps, for example, is expected to be domain 
dependant (Acerbi and Mesoudi, 2015). We would not be surprised if in a 
functional domain like tool making, where the effectiveness of a tool is highly 
dependant on following a correct design sequence and where failing to do so 
can mean the difference between starving or surviving, there is strong 
pressure for high replicability. In such a domain, one would want to copy a 
useful design as accurately as possible to ensure success. Other domains, like 
symbolic culture, are subject to different pressures, and perhaps rely on 
different innovative processes. It is not functionality, but converging and 
maintaining group markers, for example, that affect how cultural traits are 
learned and change over time in this case. 
Additionally, while these cultural dynamics in respect of single, encapsulated 
problems like the programming contests would generate the convergence 
witnessed here, cultural diversity might emerge from the diversity of cultural 
traits in different domains observed in entire populations, and ecological 
diversity that can provide new problems for cumulative culture to solve. 
Similarly, the empirical studies presented here are mostly concerned with a 
single group per trait, while meta-populations of unrelated subgroups would 
most likely involve different traditions or solutions to even similar problems.         
We expect that different populations would be characterised by varying 
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numbers of domains, which themselves vary across ecological contexts, 
thereby raising diversity levels. 
Therefore the choice of defining ‘cumulative culture’ in the modelling and 
experimental work will crucially affect the results. The theoretical literature 
has modelled cumulative culture in a variety of ways, from the mere 
persistence of a trait in the population (Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Enquist 
et al., 2010), to an increase in the number of traits (Enquist et al., 2008; 
Strimling et al., 2009), continuous or sequential improvement in a single trait 
(Henrich, 2004; Mesoudi, 2011c; Nakahashi, 2014), or an infinite number of 
traits being invented in a fixed sequence, each with an infinite number of 
complexity levels (Kempe, Lycett and Mesoudi, 2014). The experimental 
literature has conceptualised cumulative culture as improvement in a skill like 
building a paper airplane (Caldwell and Millen, 2008, 2010), tying a knot 
(Muthukrishna et al., 2013), or more ecologically valid tasks like building 
fishing nets or arrowheads (Derex et al., 2013, 2015). As mentioned earlier, 
one modelling study proposes a more complex cultural system in which traits 
interact, facilitate and inhibit each other (Enquist, Ghirlanda and Eriksson, 
2011), but this proposal of increasing the complexity of the modelling 
approaches for cumulative culture has not been taken up by future studies. 
Similarly, in a recent experimental study, Derex and Boyd (2016) go beyond 
viewing cumulative culture as a liner increase in a skill, and incorporate 
recombinations as the central driving force of improvement.  
All of these studies understandably implement artificial simplifications of a 
large-scale complicated process that operates in large populations over 
impractical timescales, in order to gain insight into some of the mechanisms 
involved in cumulative culture, and we have done the same in the Social 
Learning Strategies Tournament presented in Chapter 2. The type of 
refinement implemented in this work is clearly not full-blown cumulative 
culture as it relies on sequentially improving independent traits, but it 
nonetheless considerably increases our understanding of the type of culture 
that can allow a population to overcome environmental variability. None of 
the previous studies have attempted to investigate refinement using agent-
based simulations which enable us to follow how individual-level decisions 
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translate into population outcomes, in a large interactive changing 
environment, and it is precisely this paradigm which allowed us to show how 
individual learning can lead to population-level convergence of cultural traits.  
The MATLAB contests provide what arguably is the most realistic empirical 
model system of cumulative culture to date in the literature. A large group of 
individuals is collectively solving a difficult challenge within the confines of a 
complex programming language while openly sharing their solutions and the 
payoffs. The way participants craft solutions reflects how real-world 
innovation takes place, through copying, modification, and recombination, 
which lets us directly asses the benefits of different individual social learning 
strategies, as well as their effect on the population patterns of improvement 
and cultural change. Admittedly, this took place on a limited time scale of one 
week, with a smaller population that what is observed in the real world, but it 
provides a tractable framework for answering questions regarding cumulative 
culture in an experimental setting. 
The MATLAB programming contest provides real-world evidence on how 
collective improvement takes place in a technological domain. The patterns of 
improvement showed strong reliance on tweaking the current best solution, 
but also rare maverick innovations that make large improvements. 
Technological improvement generally shows a pattern of incremental 
improvement in which technologies change in small steps towards more 
optimal designs (Basalla, 1988), but the history of technology and science has 
usually glorified individual ‘lone geniuses’ as the drivers of progress. In a 
reaction to this, recent work has been focusing on the idea that collective 
improvement depends very little on individual-level inventive abilities, but 
rather on a ‘collective brain’ type effect in which individuals cohabitate and 
cooperate as a result of evolved norm-psychological pro-social processes and 
cooperative institutions. In large-scale societies small incremental 
improvements accumulate until a critical mass of small innovations is 
reached, which gives rise to what appears to be a completely novel invention 
that in fact relies on recombining and modifying already existing cultural 
traits (Henrich, 2016; Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016). Muthukrishna and 
Henrich (2016) propose that the main types of innovation are recombination 
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and refinement – the only individual-level type of novel invention they 
recognise is serendipity, where individuals accidentally discover a beneficial 
trait, but entirely discard the possibility that individuals could introduce 
extremely novel inventions. However, here I have shown evidence for both 
incremental improvement and large beneficial innovations. 
In the MATLAB contests there was little evidence of recombination at the 
individual level, with the main mode of technological improvement being 
refinement. Nonetheless, I also found clear evidence of entirely novel 
solutions that make large increases in the overall performance. The ultimate 
source of these innovations is unclear since we do not know what causes 
specific individuals to introduce novel beneficial solutions, but there is little 
debate that individual abilities should be a key factor – some individuals are 
more skilled and manage to invent a new, better solution. Whether this 
solution is ultimately inspired by previous ones, or by other programming 
problems outside of the MATLAB domain, is rather a philosophical issue – 
how large is the domain that recombinations draw from, how far back in time 
do we track modifications, how do we define serendipity? What is less 
arguable is that in the context of these programming contests, collective 
improvement did take place both through tweaks and leaps. 
If, like Henrich and Muthukrishna (2016), we assume that cumulative 
improvement relies on recombination and refinement, then clearly the 
population size should directly affect the rate of improvement. The more 
individuals in a population, the higher the variation of cultural traits that 
could potentially be combined or refined, which would lead to higher 
diversification and, implicitly, higher improvement. This is the key 
assumption in the Henrich model of Tasmanian cultural loss (2004) and 
much of the work investigating the importance of population size to cultural 
complexity. This thesis brings mixed evidence for the effect of group size on 
cumulative culture. In Chapter 5 I showed that larger groups were 
characterised by a larger toolkit associated with higher overall improvement, 
but in Chapter 4 I found no link between population size and improvement 
across contests. This is consistent with the controversy in the modelling, 
experimental, and field study literature – while experimental work focusing 
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on small group sizes consistently found that an increase in the group size 
promotes more improvement, studies on real populations sometimes do 
(Kline and Boyd, 2010; Collard, Ruttle, et al., 2013), and sometimes do not 
(Collard, Kemery and Banks, 2005; Collard, Buchanan, et al., 2013) find this 
effect.  
However, Andersson and Törnberg (2016) built on the Henrich model to relax 
the copy-the-best assumption by incorporating a parameter that controls the 
strength of the skill bias, and by adding a dependency between skill 
complexity and imitation errors. Thus, in their model, the authors could 
investigate the relationship between population size, skill bias strength, and 
imitation fidelity. Allowing imitation errors to depend on the complexity of 
the skill essentially puts a cap on how much a population can improve in skill 
through a trade-off between selection pushing for higher skill complexity, and 
the maladaptive nature of transmission errors. Even more, they found that, 
when the fidelity of transmission is kept constant, increasing population size 
increases skill complexity for small population sizes (in the order of a few tens 
of individuals), but does not increase complexity for large population sizes. 
Results from this thesis seem to confirm that this relationship between group 
size and cultural complexity may be non-linear, such that the effect of 
increasing group size diminishes as the population increases. Even more, this 
relationship might vary across cultural domains (Lupyan and Dale, 2010; 
Acerbi, Kendal and Tehrani, 2017), such that we might expect that a 
technological domain would show a stronger relationship between population 
size and cultural complexity. 
6.3. Current debates in cultural evolution 
The convergence illustrated both through theoretical and experimental 
approaches in this work provides valuable insight into the issue of conformity, 
as it shows that when individuals make sensible decisions in a cumulative 
cultural setting, behavioural homogeneity can be achieved without having to 
resort to complex cognitive mechanisms such as normative conformity. This 
conformist bias, defined as disproportionately copying the majority, has been 
suggested as a key mechanism that can ensure between-group differences, 
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which is necessary for cultural group selection to operate on (Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 1998). Cultural group selection is an 
important candidate theory for explaining the evolution of large-scale 
cooperation in humans. If there is variation in co-operative tendencies 
between individuals, and these co-operative tendencies stabilise at the group 
level through a mechanism like conformity, then if we assume that co-
operative groups are more successful than non-co-operative groups, selection 
would increase the frequency of co-operation at the meta-population level 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985). This theory has sparked much interest in the 
evolution of a conformist bias in both humans and non-human animals, but 
evidence is debateable (Eriksson, Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2007; Efferson et 
al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2012; van Leeuwen and Haun, 2014), and depends to 
a large extent on how each study defines conformity (van de Waal, Claidière 
and Whiten, 2013; Aplin et al., 2014).  
Normative conformity, for example, has been well studied by the psychology 
literature ever since the 1950s (Asch, 1956; Bond and Smith, 1996), but 
whether naïve individuals indeed disproportionately copy the majority, as the 
cultural evolution literature suggests, has only been confirmed in one study 
(Morgan et al., 2012). Even more, when given a choice between using a payoff 
bias or a frequency-dependant bias, people seem to prefer the former, so it is 
still unclear under which circumstances a conformist bias would be beneficial 
(McElreath et al., 2008; Mesoudi, 2011a). A more recent study has 
incorporated cumulative culture in explaining large-scale co-operation 
through group selection by positing that cumulative culture has sparked a 
complex of cognitive adaptations including improved social learning and 
conformity that support co-operation, which spread through group selection 
and increase selection for pro-sociality (Chudek and Henrich, 2011). My 
analysis from Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that a conformity bias is not necessary 
to promote the behavioural homogeneity necessary for cultural group 
selection to operate on, but instead cumulative culture creates a pressure for 
increased copying, which leads to convergence and conformist outcomes. 
The domain-specificity of cultural evolution dynamics ties in with recent 
suggestions of a potential need to extend models of the replicative nature of 
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culture to incorporate more specific cognitive mechanisms involved in the 
transmission of culture. Cultural attraction theory has drawn attention and, 
sometimes, criticism, by arguing that the cultural evolution field has been 
focusing too much on the replicative nature of cultural transmission 
(Claidière, Scott-Phillips and Sperber, 2014; Acerbi and Mesoudi, 2015; 
Morin, 2015, 2016; Sterelny, 2017). Cultural attractor theorists suggest that 
culture is not copied faithfully from one individual to another, but rather each 
individual reconstructs each cultural trait every time they learn it. Cultural 
transmission, then, is not purely a selective process where individuals choose 
‘intelligently’ between different variants, with those variants copied exactly. 
Rather, in this view culture becomes a transformative process in which 
individual cognition becomes crucially important. The main idea is that the 
stability of culture is explained by the fact that individuals possess certain 
“cultural attractors”, which determine which information is preferentially 
maintained, and which guide changes in cultural traits towards these 
attractors (Claidière, Scott-Phillips and Sperber, 2014).  
This observation is supported by experimental studies using transmission 
chain experiments, in which participants are required to remember and pass 
on short vignettes, showing that people display several biases with regards to 
the retention and distortion of such vignettes. People preferentially remember 
features concerning social information and survival information (Mesoudi, 
Whiten and Dunbar, 2006; Stubbersfield, Tehrani and Flynn, 2015), as well as 
emotionally arousing content such as disgust (Stubbersfield, Tehrani and 
Flynn, 2017), and participants even sometimes transform the stories so that 
they become more consistent with these biases. A particularly convincing 
study presented participants with a novel artificial system of colour terms 
paired with real colours, and asked them to generalise the labels learned to 
new colours. Results showed that through an iterated learning paradigm, over 
simulated generations, people converged on colour systems very similar to 
colour systems seen across natural languages, as guided by their individual 
perception biases (Xu, Dowman and Griffiths, 2013).  
Some have argued that this reconstructive position is not different from Boyd 
and Richerson’s ‘guided variation’ process, in which individuals not only copy 
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traits, but also modify them as part of the transmission process (Acerbi and 
Mesoudi, 2015). This view, however, has not constituted the main focus of the 
cultural evolution literature, and cultural attraction theorists claim that in fact 
this is the main mode of transmission at work in cultural evolution, which 
shifts the emphasis from emerging collective innovations to individual 
cognition (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Laland, 2004; Rendell et al., 2010; 
Henrich, 2016; Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016). 
Acerbi and Mesoudi (2015) argue that the reliance on either reconstructive or 
replicative processes depends on the cultural domain. As mentioned above, we 
expect that causally opaque technologies require stronger preservation and 
hence favour replicative processes, while domains like the colour systems 
discussed above will be more strongly influenced by perceptual attractors. 
Cultural attraction theory is most interested in explaining why traditions with 
no obvious utilitarian purpose, like songs and folk tales, persist over time, and 
seems to be better suited for case-by-case proximate explanations of cultural 
change, while the classic view of cultural evolution seems to be more 
interested in ultimate questions. This domain dependency and the difference 
in the relevant mechanisms supporting cultural stability in different domains 
is important when interpreting already established findings. Acerbi, Kendal, 
and Tehrani (2016) find, for example, mixed results in the relationship 
between population size and cultural complexity in the domain of folktales. 
These results are mediated by the metric they use to measure complexity, and 
the authors argue that this relationship with population size may be less 
relevant in folktales than in a domain like technology precisely because of 
their differential reliance on reconstructive processes. 
Finally, contrasting cultural attractor theory to the classic view of cultural 
evolution asks which factors are more important when explaining cultural 
stability – cognitive transformations, or the interaction of individual decision-
making processes and population dynamics? The answer is probably in the 
middle, with attraction and selection representing two ends of a continuum on 
which the relative importance of preservative or reconstructive processes is an 
empirical question. Sterelny (2017) argues that if we can overcome 
methodological challenges and compare the two positions, it could either be 
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the case that 1) populations of trusting and discerning social learners lead to 
the same dynamics, 2) cumulative culture would be rare in a population of 
discerning social learners, because incremental improvement relies on 
faithfully copying causally opaque skills, or 3) discriminating social learning 
might actually lead to better cumulative adaptation, as individuals would 
generate more useful innovations. Ultimately, whether there are significant 
qualitative differences between the two approaches and their effect on 
cumulative culture remains an empirical question.  
Nonetheless, cultural attractor theory argues that cognition should be a 
stronger focus of the cultural evolution field, and this idea is not new (Heyes, 
2012a, 2012b; Heyes and Pearce, 2015). Heyes thinks that the cultural 
evolution field has relied on behaviourist approaches to social learning and 
cannot say much about the cognitive mechanisms at work in social learning, 
nor their neurological underpinnings (Heyes, 2012b). For example, in a 
critique of social learning strategies, the author points out that the literature 
sometimes addresses these social learning strategies as if they are genetically 
specified adaptations for cultural learning, but they could very well be relying 
on the same cognitive mechanisms as asocial learning. The ‘social’ in social 
learning could just be the fact that, in the case of social learning, the input 
mechanisms are biased to preferentially attend to social cues (Heyes, 2012a).  
A comprehensive understanding of social learning should, naturally, include 
cognitive explanations, but a focus on how social learning works 
mechanistically could also shed light on how and why individual differences in 
social learning arise (Molleman, van den Berg and Weissing, 2014). In 
addition to consistent individual differences in social learning, we have 
evidence of different social learning approaches across cultures (Mesoudi et 
al., 2015; Glowacki and Molleman, 2017). I expect that the evolution of these 
cultural differences would be mediated by group structure (as I have shown in 
Chapter 5 that different groups converge on different cultural traits) but, more 
importantly, it would be supported by the fact that cultural learning itself can 
be culturally learned (Heyes, 2012a). Heyes suggests that the psychological 
processes that make cultural learning possible are not genetic adaptations, but 
rather learned in development through social interactions. If the way we use 
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social learning is learned socially, then clearly the culture we grow up in will 
affect our approaches to social learning, which will lead to these cultural 
differences we witness. Therefore using the “broad brushstroke” work done so 
far to guide more specific studies of cultural variation and individual cognition 
would have important consequences for explaining human culture.  
This recent debate surrounding cultural attractors emphasises the fact that in 
this work we have defined cumulative culture in a narrow sense, focusing 
mainly on incremental improvement in technology. This has indeed been the 
main target of the classical view of cultural evolution (Henrich, 2016; Clarke 
and Heyes, 2017), and stems from an initial interest in understanding the 
adaptive value of culture. If we think that culture was shaped by natural 
selection, the natural initial focus should rest on functional culture that has 
direct fitness benefits, so technology is a logical place to start to investigate the 
emergence of culture.  However, as discussed above, different cultural 
domains are under different pressures, so it is unclear how results from the 
technological domain extend elsewhere. These observations shed doubt on the 
usefulness of the concept of cumulative culture, as defined presently. We have 
a relatively good understanding of technological change, which increases in 
complexity and efficiency over time, but is the same true about symbolic 
culture, norms and traditions? Can we reliably extrapolate our predictions to 
other domains? Does art count as cumulative culture? Does language? 
Moreover, comparative work has been interested in finding traces of 
cumulative culture in other species but, if we do, what does that tell us about 
cumulative culture and how does that change our understanding of human 
culture? Cumulative culture, in a narrow sense, has been a practical concept 
central to fruitful studies of the evolution of technology, but it is unclear 
whether using an extended sense of the concept would contribute beneficially 
to the study of human culture or if, conversely, would merely further 
ambiguity once we try to extend our understanding to other cultural domains.  
6.4. Challenges and future work 
If we are interested in how culture changes in a functional domain in which 
cultural traits have a clear utilitarian purpose, moving away from simple 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
218 
experimental design to include realistic large-scale tasks that can model 
cumulative culture in a naturalistic way is profoundly beneficial, as I have 
shown in this work. The dynamics of improvement over time can only be 
studied when individuals are allowed to freely explore an unbounded solution 
space, as was the case with the MATLAB contests we used here.  
Although the MATLAB programming contest provided a realistic complex 
model of cumulative culture, its design still restricted the questions we could 
investigate. One obvious limitation relates to the fact that there was no 
objective way to identify which entries were copied by which, so I had to rely 
on similarity as an alternative method to measure cultural transmission. This 
allowed us to quantify the amount of novelty at the individual level, and the 
patterns of convergence at the population level, yet a more fine-grained 
measure of copying would have allowed us to track each solution back in time 
and answer different questions about solution relatedness, phylogenetic 
histories, and the amount of replication and blending in this type of cultural 
transmission. The experimental approach in Chapter 5 was also restricted by 
both the MATLAB framework and practical issues like recruiting and 
motivating participants. A higher sample size would have strengthened the 
results and increased empirical validity, but like with any experimental study 
there is a trade-off between more, better data and practical limitations. In our 
case, a higher sample size could have been ensured though more costly 
incentives, but would have also increased the cost of administrative effort.  
Another clear limitation to this framework is the direct, obvious link between 
cultural artefacts and payoffs, which means our model of cumulative culture is 
applicable only to some types of culture. However, this paradigm could be 
easily extended to investigate the evolution of the kind of opaque culture that 
Henrich (2016) refers to, in which it is hard to judge both how a trait is 
constructed, and how beneficial it is, by manipulating the relationship 
between solutions and payoff. A simple way of doing this would be to remove 
payoff information completely from the contest and allow participants to 
purely judge solutions based on the code submitted. While this would 
encourage participants to inspect a more varied range of solutions and would 
potentially provide scope for increased innovation and recombination, we 
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expect that the sheer number of solutions submitted would prevent a useful 
exploration of the search space. Other factors, like the identity of the 
submitter, could be used to judge the usefulness of a solution. For example, 
results showed a prestige effect emerging for individuals who achieved a 
leader status – this could then become a proxy for performance, and be used 
to guide social learning.  
Adjusting visibility periods in the MATLAB contest would be a simple way of 
manipulating innovation rates and their effect on improvement. Most contests 
began with a ‘darkness’ period, where individuals could only see their own 
scores, thus working alone and developing their own solution, then followed 
by a full visibility ‘daylight’ period. Introducing a late ‘darkness’ period after 
‘daylight’ would allow participants to discover and learn beneficial solutions 
from others, but also work alone on refining or modifying those solutions 
without the pressure of worrying that their solutions might be immediately 
copied. I anticipate this would allow for more exploration and potential 
innovation in solutions. The strong pressure for fast and cheap improvement 
seen in the contests is artificially strong, and I expect that reducing this 
pressure would lead to more naturalistic dynamics characterised by more 
cultural variation.  
Similarly, manipulating group structure in this framework can answer 
questions regarding the dynamics of cultural diversity in a cumulative setting 
that result from splitting/merging events and migration. Chapter 5 
implemented a simple group manipulation, but we can imagine a series of 
manipulations to systematically test how group size and splitting/merging 
events interact. Moving participants between groups throughout the contest 
can answer interesting questions regarding the role of migration in the 
diffusion of information. It could either be the case that participants conform 
to the local standards they migrate into, or it could be that an immigrant 
carrying a particularly useful solution can change the cultural make-up of the 
group it migrates into – I expect the answer to this question to be mediated by 
payoff pressures and payoff access.  
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Ultimately, this framework models how innovative, superior artefacts arise in 
a population mainly through many incremental improvements focused on 
improving the current leading solution, and rare remarkable novel solutions 
that could potentially introduce revolutionary innovations. Nonetheless, the 
convergence we see on solutions similar to the current best does not guarantee 
the population is necessarily converging on the best solutions - and, indeed, in 
this context an optimal solution is impossible in realistic time, which means 
the population is always entertaining imperfect solutions. These results speak 
to how collective improvements are achieved in a collaborative setting and can 
have direct practical implications for real world domains concerned with 
achieving progress. For example, science funding is presently concentrated on 
investing in the current leaders that have already proved successful, but this 
would suggest that improvement will be incremental, and the chances of 
revolutionary innovations decreased. Should it instead be pursuing diversity 
and innovation, accepting that this would increase the risk of failure? 
Experimental work focusing on the particular type of cumulative 
improvement studied here will provide meaningful insight into these 
questions.  
For a more general understanding of cumulative culture, future work should 
attempt to focus on investigating how different learning and innovation 
processes involved affect the dynamics of cumulative improvement. We 
imagine learning in a cumulative setting represents a continuum between 
innovation and replication, with different processes like refinement, 
modification, and combination lying somewhere in between. The main 
process at work in the MATLAB contest was refinement, and I have briefly 
touched on recombination – this has also been the focus of recent 
experimental work (Derex and Boyd, 2016). More research focusing on these 
processes individually, and on examining the interactions between them, is 
needed in order to thoroughly understand the full range of learning strategies 
that have a role in cumulative culture.  
Similarly, different tasks are expected to rely on different processes to 
different extents, so focusing on diverse, naturalistic cumulative tasks is 
essential for identifying what underlies human cultural change. Here I have 
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shown that a programming competition can provide invaluable insight into 
these questions, and a large variety of similarly realistic datasets is not beyond 
reach. Studies have already explored how culture changes in the real world 
exploring the combinatorial nature of US patents (Youn et al., 2015), the 
evolution and history of programming languages (Valverde and Solé, 2015), or 
using phylogenetic methods to reconstruct the history of tools (O’Brien, 
Darwent and Lyman, 2001) and musical instruments (Temkin and Eldredge, 
2002), or even non-functional culture like fairy tales (Tehrani, 2013) and 
textiles (Tehrani and Collard, 2002). This gives us a good appreciation of how 
cultural traits change over time, so an obvious next step would be 
incorporating individual-level decisions to these realistic domains through 
experimental approaches for an inclusive understanding of cumulative 
cultural evolution.  
6.5. Conclusion 
The main task of the cultural evolution field is to explain cultural patterns by 
integrating simple individual-level decisions with population-level micro and 
macro-evolutionary patterns of cultural evolution, which interact in complex, 
non-straightforward ways. Experimental approaches can inform us with 
regards to individual-level processes, and complex theoretical modelling 
techniques and phylogenetic comparative methods can explain large-scale 
patterns of evolution over long periods of time. Therefore, a comprehensive 
view of the evolution of culture relies on linking individual and population-
level dynamics and requires the use multiple complementary approaches. 
Ideally, theoretical observations will always be corroborated by real-world 
data, and this is what was attempted in this thesis by using theoretical and 
complex, naturalistic empirical methods to shed light on the drivers and 
dynamics of cumulative culture. I expect that, with time, this integration of 
methodological approaches will help crystallise our knowledge into a 
comprehensive understanding of human culture.  
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Supplementary figures 
 
  
Figure A1 – Code similarity matrices between all pairs of passed entries in all 19 contests.  
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Contest description example 
Peg Solitaire, May 2007 
This contest is based on a simple peg jumping game. In a typical game of Peg Solitaire, the 
board contains pegs (sometimes marbles) and at least one empty space. Pegs can be removed 
by jumping over them with another peg, and the aim is to remove as many pegs with a 
combination of jumping moves. 
This implements an extended version of the original Peg Solitaire game, in which the pegs 
carry points, and the goal is to jump pegs in order to make the score as low as possible. This 
may mean it is not necessary to remove all the pegs. Each peg has a value, or weight. A move 
consists of one peg jumping over and thereby removing another peg. A "jump" is a horizontal 
or vertical move in which one peg passes over exactly one other peg and comes to rest on an 
empty space. Diagonal jumps are not permitted. There is a reward for every peg removed 
from the board according to its weight, and a penalty for each jump according to the weight of 
the jumping peg. The score is therefore the difference between the value of the peg being 
jumped over and the jumping peg. Therefore a good score can be achieved by jumping with a 
low value peg over a high value peg; the bigger the difference between the values of the two 
pegs, the better the score. If, however, a high value peg is used to jump over a low value peg, 
the score decreases.  
 
A peg with weight 1 jumps over a peg with weight 3. The reward is 3 and the penalty is 1, 
therefore the value of the move is 2. If several jumps in a row can be performed using the 
same peg, the penalty only has to be paid once.  
In more detail: 
• Each peg has a weight, which is always positive. 
• The board is a matrix. Each positive number indicates a peg, zeros indicate empty 
squares, and negative numbers indicate off limits squares outside of the board. 
• Every move is a four-element row vector with the format [from_row from_column 
to_row to_column] 
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• The code must return a four-column move matrix in which each row represents one 
move. This matrix can have any number of rows between 0 and (numpegs – 1). Any 
number of rows exceeding this is ignored. 
• The value of each move is the sum of the removal bonus and the jumping penalty. 
• Consecutive moves by a single peg only incur one jumping penalty.  
• The score starts at a high value (the sum of all the peg weights). After each move, the 
point value of that move is subtracted from the score. The foal is to minimize the 
score 
• An invalid move does not generate an error – the board remains unchanged and the 
jumping penalty is still paid.  
An example game 
 
The initial score for this board is 31 (the sum of all the weights on the board).  The removal 
bonus for this move is 8, and the penalty is 2, so the value of the move is 8 – 2 = 6 points. The 
score after this move is 31 – 6 = 25 points.  
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In move 2 there is no penalty, as we are using the same peg. The score after this move is 25 – 
7 = 18 points. 
 
At this point, there is no further move that will improve the score. The only move possible is 
jumping the 4 peg over the 3 peg, but since the jumping peg has a higher value than the peg 
being jumped over, this would not improve the score.  
 
There is a slightly better alternative series of moves. Starting from the same initial 
configuration, the 4 peg can be used to jump over the 3, 7, and 8 pegs in succession. Although 
the first jump in disadvantageous, the overall result is better. The final score is 31 – 3 - 7 - 8 + 
4 = 17 points. 
Scoring 
The overall score of an entry is a combination of three factors: 
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• result – the average score across all game boards 
• runtime – how fast the code runs 
• complexity – cyclomatic complexity - a measure of the number of independent paths 
through a program's source code. Typically, as this number gets higher, the program 
becomes less transparent and more difficult to understand.  
The final score is calculated according to the equation: 
score = k1*result + k2*e(k3*runtime) + k4*max(complexity-10,0) 
The goal is to minimize all three factors. The lowest overall score at the end of the contest 
wins. An entry is disqualified if it has a runtime over 180 seconds.  
 
Data structure 
Meta data 
For each entry in the contest, we have information on: 
• the overall score 
• the time of submission 
• title of the entry 
• a numeric identification of the author 
• the result – the average score from solving the problems in the test set 
• CPU runtime 
• a numeric identification of the entry 
• whether the author declared a parent entry as inspiration 
• the rank of the entry at the time of its submission 
• whether the entry passed the contest requirements 
• the code, stored as a list of the lines  
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Sample entry 
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Contest information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name Date Number of 
players 
Number of 
entries 
Number of 
passed 
entries 
Total number 
of lines 
Ants May 2005 167 2206 1972 18497 
Binpack Dec 1998 138 1455 877 6666 
Blackbox Nov 2006 170 6367 4600 85754 
Blockbuster Apr 2006 183 5922 5150 26546 
Color Bridge Nov 2009 117 2837 2270 14684 
Crossword Apr 2011 94 2280 1847 18362 
Gene Splicing Nov 2007 136 3285 2687 38760 
Gerrymandering Apr 2004 169 2392 2038 32749 
Mars Surveyor Jun 1999 63 1647 1371 10321 
Mastermind Sep 2001 123 1138 511 6322 
Molecule May 2002 154 1631 977 8286 
Moving Furniture Nov 2004 109 1834 1270 14282 
Peg Solitaire May 2007 119 3914 3426 19428 
Protein Folding Nov 2002 202 2437 1881 11901 
Sailing Home Nov 2010 98 3616 3175 17183 
Sensor Apr 2010 182 4814 4232 21503 
Sudoku Nov 2005 186 3061 2439 22778 
Tracking Freight Apr 2003 129 1661 1363 7369 
Wiring Apr 2008 106 4166 3707 92181 
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Contest problem descriptions 
Ants 
In a sandbox with ants, sugar cubes, anthills, and rocks, try to bring back as many sugar cubes 
as possible back to the anthill in a limited time period, by using local information from each 
ant (limited vision, limited carrying capacity) while using chemical trails to guide ants across 
the sandbox. 
 
Binpack 
Given a list of songs and a CD length, try to find the best combination of songs that leave the 
least empty space on the CD. 
 
Blackbox 
Find out what is inside a black box by shining a laser into the box – the laser can be absorbed, 
deflected, or reflected, depending on how close is passes by the objects in the box, returning 
information about the objects. 
 
Blockbuster 
Given a box of coloured blocks, empty the box by ‘popping’ blocks – the block vanishes, so do 
all adjacent blocks of the same colour, and all the blocks above it fall down as though pulled 
down by gravity.  
 
Color Bridge 
A colour flooding problem – given a grid of coloured squares, create a four-connected single-
colour region that reaches from the upper left corner to the lower right corner, by changing 
the colour of the top left square (two adjacent squares of the same colour will change colour 
together). 
 
Crossword 
Given a list of acceptable words, bearing weights, and a grid size, find a grid that maximises 
the number of high value words.  
 
Gene Splicing 
Based on the problem of gene transposition – given two DNA sequences, how many 
transposition events are required to transform the test sequence into the target sequence? 
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Gerrymandering 
Carving up an electoral district according to population size in order to derive a political 
advantage – given a map grid with different population sizes in each square, divide the grid 
into N districts of roughly equal population. 
 
Mars Surveyor 
Program a mars rover – explore as much land as possible of a rectangular grid while avoiding 
obstacles, with limited fuel. 
 
Mastermind 
Iteratively guess an unknown sequence of coloured pegs given incomplete feedback in the 
form of black and white pegs, which indicate how many pegs are the correct colour in the 
correct position, or the correct colour in an incorrect position, respectively.  
 
Molecule 
Model the structure of a two dimensional molecule – given a list of lengths of linear rods 
connecting atoms, try to combine them as well as possible in a two dimensional shape. 
 
Moving Furniture 
Move furniture from one configuration to a second configuration with as little effort at 
possible (effort is defined as distance and weight of furniture) 
 
Peg Solitaire 
A modified version of a peg jumping game – on a board containing pegs and at least one 
empty space, pegs can be removed by jumping over them with another peg. Here, each peg 
carries a value, and the aim is to remove as many pegs with a combination of jumping moves 
while maximising the points collected.  
 
Protein Folding 
Simplified version of a protein folding problem in two dimensions, with two amino-acids. 
Given the amino acid sequence of a protein, determine a final "optimally folded" 
configuration, which minimises the free energy level. 
 
Sailing Home 
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Navigate a boat on a grid between two points by managing the boat’s velocity – this can be 
affected by the boat’s motor or by wind speed at different squares of the grid – the goal is to 
try to minimise the motor usage. 
 
Sensor 
Try to reconstruct an image in terms of its uncompressed pixel values by requesting 
"compressed" sensor values, each of which is the sum of pixel values within the uncompressed 
image, while trying to minimise the number of requests.   
 
Sudoku 
Generalised Sudoku problem – given a partially filled grid and a list of numbers (there might 
be more numbers than the grid requires), fill in the grid so that each row, column, and region 
add up as close as possible to the same target sum. 
 
Trucking Freight 
Variation of the travelling salesman problem – while driving a truck on a map populated with 
certain stations that contain either some amount of freight (a warehouse) or some amount of 
fuel (a gas station), maximise the amount of freight you can return to the base, while 
minimising the amount of gas. 
 
Wiring 
Inspired by the problem of wiring printed circuit boards – given a board with numbered pins, 
connect each pin to all other pins with the same number, while minimising the length of the 
connector wires.  
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The Chain Game rules 
In this contest, you are given a chain and a box. Each link in the chain is exactly one unit long, 
but each one has a different weight. It looks something like this.  
 
Your job is to place the chain in the box as compactly as possible. The constraint is that the 
chain must lie in a single plane and snake through the box using only straight segments or 90 
degree turns.  
 
So for example, if you are given the chain vector c = [10 5 20 2 5 9] you might choose to put it 
into a 5-by-5 box like so. 
 
If this is how you want to arrange the chain, your code would return a box matrix b like the 
one shown below. The first element of the chain, with weight 10, goes into row 4, column 2. 
The second element, with weight 5, goes just above it at location b(3,2), and so on.  
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Results  
We will measure compactness by calculating the rotational moment of inertia around the 
center of the matrix. Physically you can imagine that we are putting the box on a turntable 
and spinning it. You want the box to spin with as little effort as possible. Mathematically, the 
moment of inertia is calculated by multiplying the mass of each link by the square of the 
distance to the center of the box matrix.  
 
In our simplified matrix problem, this means each position in the box has a penalty based on 
how far it is from the center. For a 5-by-5 box, this distance penalty matrix p looks like this.  
 
The box is always a square matrix with an odd number side length n. So there is zero penalty 
for whatever link occupies the centre of the box. That makes it a good place to put your 
heaviest link, which is exactly what we've done here. Our result is thus  
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res = 10*2 + 5*1 + 20*0 + 2*1 + 5*2 + 9*5  
res = 82  
We pay a high price for the 9 in the first row of the box. Let's twist the 9 down to location 
b(2,3) as shown here. 
 
res = 10*2 + 5*1 + 20*0 + 2*1 + 5*2 + 9*1  
res = 46  
 
 
 
